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II 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is currently the largest opposition party in Japan. 
The DP J consists of various factions and is fragmented in three dimensions. On the 
other hand, the DP J is able to gain a stable support from unaffiliated voters. This 
dissertation aims at understanding factors that prevent the DP J from disintegration 
and media strategies that the DP J applied to gain support from unaffiliated voters. 
This dissertation suggests the DP J leadership may play an active role in maintaining 
internal coherence and formulating media strategy. In the present study, we conduct 
first-hand interview, researched for party documents, news articles and politicians' 
works, performed content analysis on politicians' belief and counted the distribution 
of party and Diet posts to understand the role of leadership in maintain internal 
coherence. We discovered in maintaining internal coherence, the DP J leadership 
manipulated in party organization, created collective incentive and distribute selective 
incentive. On the other hand, we conducted documentary research on party documents, 
news articles and politicians' works to understand the DP J media strategy. In 
promoting the party, we discovered the DP J leadership adjusted media strategy and 
party organization in response to external environmental changes, and there are three 
stages of media strategy throughout the DP J history. 
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Chapter 1: Introductory Chapter 
This dissertation investigates two questions concerning the major opposition 
party in Japan: the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The first question 
concerns about the factors that prevent the DP J from disintegration and the 
second questions asks about the media strategies that enable the DP J to gain 
support from unaffiliated voters. This dissertation suggests the DP J leadership 
has certain level of autonomy and actively manipulated in maintaining the 
party s internal coherence and adjusting the party s media strategy. In 
maintaining internal coherence, the DP J leaders manipulated in party 
organization, created collective incentive and distributed balanced and 
comprehensive selective incentive. In promoting to unaffiliated voters, the DP J 
leaders adjusted media strategy according to external environmental changes 
and there were three stages of media strategy in the DP J history. The increasing 
importance of the DP J in contemporary Japanese politics suggests it is the right 
time for a thorough investigation of the party. 
1.1 Introduction 
Post-war Japanese party politics is characterized by a long-term governance of 
the LDP. Under the one-party predominance "55' System"l , the LDP dominated the 
1 The one-party predominance system is also called as the "55' System" because the LDP officially 
formed in 1955, and since 1955 the LDP dominated the government. The LDP dominated the 
government until 1993 which marked an end to the 55' System. 
2 
government and the major opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), failed to 
replace the LDP government. Even if the LDP lost control of the government in 1993, 
which indicates the beginning of a new multi-party system2, the LDP returned to 
power and participated in every coalition government from 1994 till now. In other 
words, opposition parties in Japan failed to act as an effective and sustainable 
alternative to the LDP government. Opposition parties in Japan are fragmented (both 
internally within party organization and externally among opposition parties), unable 
to overcome structural and environmental constraints, and therefore failed to 
challenge the LDP regime. Inability of opposition parties to constantly challenge the 
LDP continued until the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) emerged in 1996. The DPJ, 
currently the largest opposition party in Japan, originally formed from splinters of 
opposition parties. Surprisingly, the DP J remains unified despite being regarded as an 
umbrella of diverse forces with diverse interests and ideology. Moreover, the DP J is 
able to overcome various external environmental constraints and recovers after 
electoral failure. The party continues to advance in elections, won the majority in the 
House of Councilor in 2007 and probably shall replace the LDP government in the 
near future. 
2 Hrebenar (2000) categorized the new party system since 1993 as a mUlti-party system. 
3 
1.2 The Two Research Questions 
There are two interesting and important puzzles regarding the DP J: what are the 
factors that prevent the DPJ from disintegration? And why can the DPJ gain a stable 
support from urban and unaffiliated voters which contribute to its electoral 
performance? This dissertation argues the leadership of the DP J is the key to answer 
the two research questions. It is the DP J leaders, who identified the New Frontier 
Party (NFP) experience as a warning to the DPJ, strive to maintain internal coherence 
of the DPJ. They worked on three major areas in order to prevent the DPJ from 
disintegration: manipulation in party organization; formulation of collective incentive; 
and distribution of balance and comprehensive selective incentives. At the same time, 
this dissertation identifies the DP J leaders' manipulation in formulation of media 
strategies and adjustment of party organization. There are three stages of media 
strategy focusing on different aspects throughout the DP J history in response to the 
changing electoral environment. 
In details, the first question concerns with the party's ability to remain unify for 
more than twelve years, despite the DP J has internal fragmentation on former 
affiliated party, ideology and generation. The question relates this dissertation to the 
discussion of opposition failure in Japan, especially those investigating internal 
4 
fragmentation of opposition parties. Opposition fragmentation is one of the reasons of 
opposition failure, as opposition parties failed to unify internally and cooperate 
externally, resulting in failure to challenge the LDP regime. Existing literatures often 
place their focus on internal fragmentation of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the 
New Frontier Party (NFP)3, and there is only few literatures focusing on the DP J. 
Those literatures that recognize the problem of internal fragmentation within the DP J 
seldom regard prevention of disintegration as an issue and therefore unable to explain 
why the DP J is able to escape from break down in times of difficulties. Among the 
several literatures that attempt to explain the factors contributing to internal coherence 
of the DPJ, for example Otake (1999), Kabashima Semina (2000), Tamura (2000) and 
Kollner (2004) provide explanations such as electoral system and distribution of 
selective incentives are neither fully convincing nor conclusive. This dissertation 
intends to provide a more comprehensive explanation towards internal coherence of 
the DP J, and hope to act as a foundation for future research in party organization of 
opposition parties in Japan. 
The second question concern about the ability of the DP J to gain a relatively 
stable support from unaffiliated voters, despite there is fluctuation in the party's 
3 For example, Hrebenar (2000) has detailed discussion on the JSP and NFP fragmentation. 
5 
electoral performance. It is especially interesting because although unaffiliated voters 
are defined as voters who do not support any political party, they have relatively 
stable support towards the DP J in contrast to vigorous fluctuation in the support 
towards the LDP. The question addresses several issues in contemporary Japanese 
politics, including increasing importance of unaffiliated voters, rising of new political 
issues and increasing influence of media in the political arena. Wide range of existing 
literatures has investigated the above issues with fruitful research outcome, but few 
discussions combined the above findings with strategies of political parties. These 
literatures addressed the above issues mainly concerned the LDP and Koizumi media 
strategy4, and the media strategy of opposition parties, for example the DPJ, is 
generally ignored. This ignorance denies the achievement of opposition parties in 
recent years, and pays no attention to their "actorness" in winning electoral support. 
Most literatures explaining electoral performance of opposition parties in recent years 
tend to focus on external reasons such as electoral system, societal ideology and 
voting behaviour which ignore the party's "actomess". On the other hand, 
explanations purely from party organization perspective cannot explain the fluctuation 
in opposition parties' electoral performance. Base on the literatures on unaffiliated 
voters and media, this dissertation hopes to develop the research from a party's media 
4 For example, Taniguchi (2004) proposed the "entertainment-ization" of politics by Koizumi ; Hoshi 
and Osaka (2006) focus on wide-show and Koizumi media strategy; Yamada (2004) suggests 
Koizumi's promotion style is a "populism" one; Ida (2007) investigates voting behavior of unaffiliated 
voters and effect of LDP media strategy. 
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strategy perspective, which tackles the issues of the DP J actorness and fluctuation in 
electoral performance. By investigating media strategy and adaptability of the DP J in 
response to changes in electoral environment, this dissertation can contribute to the 
discussion of media, unaffiliated voters and electoral performance of new opposition 
parties under the new party system. 
1.3 Significance of Studying the DPJ 
Explanations towards reasons of the DP J internal coherence and electoral 
performance are not fully convincing, as the DP J's party organization per se has not 
been fully explored and the adaptability of political parties in response to changes in 
electoral environment has been ignored. This dissertation intends to provide an 
alternative justification to internal coherence of the DP J from a party organization 
perspective, and explaining the electoral performance from a party media strategy 
perspective. Scholars might question the value of studying the DP J, as the DP J would 
disintegrate easily after electoral failure. However, the party did not split after the 
slump in the 2005 House of Representative (HR) election, where the DP J lost one 
third of its seats from 1 77 to 113 seats, proved that the party could remain unified in 
difficult times. Moreover, the victory of the DP J in 2007 House of Councilor (HC) 
election makes the party become the largest party in the HC, and also make the 
7 
opposition camp become the majority in the HC, suggests it is the right time for a 
thorough investigation of the DP J. 
1.4 Dissertation Framework 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation focuses on background of Japanese party politics. 
First of all, the 55' System together with its characteristics of opposition failure will 
be presented. Opposition failure refers to the inability of opposition parties to 
challenge the LDP regime effectively over a long period of time. In the second part, 
various structural constraints identified by scholars, including electoral system, 
electoral campaign law, clientelism and centralized fiscal system and press club 
system in media will be presented. Environmental constraints such as the effective 
LDP party organization and voting behaviour which limits the possibility of 
challenges towards the LDP regime will also be presented. Thirdly, history of 
opposition fragmentation since the 55' System will be presented. After the breakdown 
of the 55' System, the opposition parties cooperated and had a short period of 
governance record, but the coalition eventually failed as these opposition parties 
failed to maintain coherence. The NFP, a new opposition party formed from merger of 
opposition parties, also suffered from internal fragmentation and eventually broke 
down. The repeating opposition fragmentation contributes to the history of opposition 
8 
failure. Finally, emergence and expansion of the DPJ will be briefly presented as a 
base for further discussion. 
Chapter 3 discusses theories and methodology related to this dissertation. Party 
system and party organization, two core concepts in literatures of party politics will be 
briefly discussed. Party system, defined as "forms and modes of parties' coexistences" 
(Duverger, 1954, p.203) and "a system of interactions resulting from inter-party 
competition" (Sartori, 1976, p.44) has four attributes including number of political 
parties, relative strength and size of political parties, structure of competition and 
cleavage system. Party system is not purely a reflection of cleavage system of the 
society, but also related to strategic capability of the parties involved. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate the properties of political parties. Scholars have developed 
different party models base on electoral competition, sociological reasons and 
institutional properties. This dissertation would mainly base on theory related to the 
institutional perspective. On the other hand, a brief discussion of the theories of media 
role in Japan and media effect will be presented. Media role can be divided into 
neutral role, watchdog role, servant role and "trickster" role. Media effect includes 
short-term effect such as agenda setting, framing effect and promoting image 
campaign, and long-term effect on political involvement. However, since this 
9 
dissertation is not related to media studies, but mainly focus on the role of leadership 
in the formation of the DP J media strategy and the change of media strategy of the 
party in response to external environment, this section will be briefly presented. 
Finally, methodology of this dissertation will be discussed in details. 
Chapter 4 presents the first core argument of this dissertation and answers the 
research question on internal coherence of the DP J. First of all, three features of the 
DP J party organization will be presented. The first feature is factionalism, as there are 
several factions within the party. The second feature of internal fragmentation based 
on former party affiliation, ideology and generation will then be discussed. This 
feature has a close relationship with the first feature, but representing a more 
complicated internal ecology within the party. The third feature is the frequent 
leadership change. Secondly, arguments on the DP J unification based on electoral 
system and balancing selective incentives will be presented and criticized, as the 
explanation on electoral system is not convincing and the explanation on selective 
incentive is not comprehensive enough. The argument of this dissertation will then be 
presented in length. This dissertation argues the DP J has three factors to maintain the 
internal coherence of the party: leaders' manipulation in party organization; existence 
of collective incentive; and comprehensive distribution of selective incentives. In the 
10 
first factor, the party leadership clearly noticed the importance of maintaining internal 
coherence within the party after witnessed the NFP breakdown. They manipulated a 
bottom-up policy making process and an open leadership system in order to balance 
interests and voices within the party. Moreover, in the merger with the Liberal Party, 
there are evidences showing party leaders, especially Ozawa Ichiro, manipulated 
behind the scene in order to prevent the DP J from disintegration. For the second factor, 
this dissertation opposes the notion that the DP J is an umbrella party with no 
coherence in ideology, and argues the DP J does have its collective identity to uphold: 
a decentralized and civil-society based participatory style of politics. This collective 
identity inherits from the leaders, Hatoyama and Kan, and acts as a collective 
incentive for its members. The party also tried to differentiate itself from the LDP 
through these two issues. Through analysis on the conformity of the party goals 
among politician, the existence of collective incentive within the DP J is confirmed. 
Finally, this dissertation argues a comprehensive and balancing distribution of 
selective incentive is applied in the appointment of party post and Diet posts in order 
to maintain an internal coherence. Analysis on the distribution of top leadership post, 
the Next Cabinet posts and Diet Committee Chairman and Director Posts validates the 
argument that a balanced personnel policy is widely applied to balance interests of 
different factions, generations and ideology. 
11 
Chapter 5 presents another core argument of this dissertation, focusing on 
electoral support and media strategy of the DP J. First of all, electoral performance of 
the DP J will be analyzed. Then, literatures explaining the DP J's electoral performance, 
including structural explanation, party level explanation and voting behaviour 
explanation will be presented. This dissertation agrees these explanations have certain 
level of explanatory power, but argues these perspectives ignored the "actorness" of 
the DP J, which is the party leaders' manipulation in media strategy in response to 
changing electoral environment. This dissertation argues the DP J leadership 
deliberately applies media strategy to gain support from voters, as the party leadership 
noticed the sensitivity of unaffiliated voters towards media and adjusted media 
strategy in response to external changes. In building up the argument, supporter base 
of the DP J and characteristics of unaffiliated voters will be presented. The 
ineffectiveness of traditional mobilization methods on these voters and the necessity 
of media as a mobilization tool will be argued. Some researches discover unaffiliated 
voters who tend to vote for the DP J have a high level of awareness towards media and 
policy-oriented campaign. Finally, a detailed discussion on the DP J media strategy 
will be provided. This dissertation identifies the leadership's manipulation in the DPJ 
media strategies in response to external environmental changes, and there are three 
12 
stages of media campaign throughout the DP J history: image and popularity 
promotion, policy-oriented promotion and strategic promotion. 
Chapter 6 concludes the arguments of this dissertation and presents some recent 
developments on issues of the DP J internal coherence and media campaign. Some 
further works based on this dissertation will also be suggested. 
1.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research questions and hypothesis of this 
dissertation. This dissertation will investigate the DP J party organization and media 
strategy in order to explain the reasons of the party's unification and ability to attract a 
stable and significant support from unaffiliated voters. The importance of the two 
research questions has been addressed and introduction of each chapter has been 
presented. 
In the following chapter, background of Japanese politics will be discussed in 
details. First of all, existing literatures on opposition failure will be discussed. 
Scholarly works on explanation towards opposition failure can be divided into two 
categories: external constraints and opposition fragmentation. External constraints 
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include structural limitation, the LDP party organization and voting behavior. On the 
other hand, opposition fragmentation includes external fragmentation which is 
cooperation failure among opposition parties and internal fragmentation which is 
incoherence within their party organization. History of opposition fragmentation 
under the 55' system and the new party system will be thoroughly discussed. Finally, 
a brief history of the DP J formation and expansion will be presented. 
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Chapter 2: Background of Japanese Politics 
In this chapter, literatures on opposition failure in post-war Japanese party 
politics will be discussed in details. Firstly, various explanations on opposition 
failure in Japan will be introduced. These explanations can be divided into two 
categories: external environmental constraints and opposition fragmentation. 
External constraints include various institutional setting in electoral system, 
fiscal system and media press club system, as well as party organization of the 
LDP and voting behavior. On the other hand, opposition fragmentation can be 
divided into two perspectives: external fragmentation or opposition cooperation 
failure among opposition parties, and internal fragmentation within opposition 
parties. Since the two fragmentations are sometimes closely related, the two 
perspectives will be introduced collectively. History of opposition fragmentation 
under the 55' System will be introduced. Then, opposition cooperation which led 
to the fall of the LDP government in 1993 will be presented. Follow by that, 
opposition fragmentation under the new party system, especially the 
non-LDP-non-JCP coalition and the NFP experience, will be discussed. After the 
detail discussion on opposition fragmentation, a brief history of the formation 
and expansion of the DP J will be provided as foundation of this dissertation. 
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2.1 Opposition Failure in Japan 
The Japanese Party System from 1955 to 1993, or the "55' System", is regarded 
as a "one-party predominant system" by scholars such as Sartori (1976). The reason 
why these scholars do not regard the 55' System as a "multi-party system" is that, 
opposition parties have never shared political power with the LDP and there was an 
unbroken LDP lower house majorities under the 55' System. The 55' System emerged 
in 1955 when two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, 
merged together and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). On the other hand, 
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) acted as the major opposition party throughout the 55' 
System. However, unlike the governing camp, politicians in the socialist camp could 
not overcome their ideology and policy difference and eventually broke into two 
parties: the "right-wing socialist" Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the "left-wing 
socialist" JSP. There were three other major opposition parties under the 55' System: 
the Komeito, the New Liberal Club (NLC) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). 
Yet these opposition parties were unable to expand their influence and failed to 
challenge the LDP regime. Even if the LDP fell from power in 1993, the "opposition" 
parties failed to sustain their power and the LDP eventually returned to power in 1994. 
The LDP continues to participate in every government since 1994. 
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Scholars provide various explanations regarding opposition failure in Japan. 
These explanations can be divided into two categorizes: external environmental 
constraints on opposition parties and opposition fragmentation. In the following, some 
explanations on external environmental constraints will be presented. These 
explanations concern about structural constraints such as electoral system, electoral 
campaign law and clientelism and centralized government financial structure; party 
level constraints by the LDP party organization; voting behavior and media press club 
system. This dissertation does not reject explanations on external environmental 
constraints, as these factors contribute to the opposition's inability to challenge the 
LDP regime. However, this dissertation would place the focus of opposition failure on 
opposition fragmentation. 
The understanding towards opposition fragmentation in Japan is critical for the 
investigation of the DPJ. It is because history of opposition fragmentation, especially 
the fragmentation among Socialist (left-wing and right-wing socialist), among 
socialist and non-socialists (as represented by the exclusion of JSP in the Kaishin 
group in 1994) as well as within the NFP (anti -Ozawa and pro-Ozawa group), are still 
influential towards politicians and factions within the DP J nowadays. Moreover, 
issues related to these internal fragmentations, for example ideology and balance of 
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power, are still hindering internal coherence of the DPJ. In the second part of this 
chapter, a detailed discussion on opposition fragmentation, including internal 
fragmentation within opposition parties and external fragmentation among opposition 
parties, will be presented collectively. 
2.2 External Constraints Faced by Opposition Parties 
There is several external constraints lead to the opposition failure to effectively 
challenge the LDP in elections. These explanations can be categorized into several 
perspectives: structural perspective includes the electoral system, electoral campaign 
law and fiscal system; the LDP party organization; the voting behavior perspective; 
and media perspective. 
2.2.1 Electoral System 
Japan used the single-nontransferable voting system (SNTV) under 
multi-member district system (MMD) before the electoral reform in 1994. The 
SNTVIMMD system allowed voters to cast one vote to a candidate in a multi-member 
district with two to six seats. The vote could only go to the specific candidate and 
cannot transfer to other candidates or to the same party. Scholars demonstrate the 
electoral system is actually in favor of the LDP, as the LDP has gained more 
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percentage of seats than their share of votes under the SNTV IMMD electoral system. 
For example Johnson (2000, p.57) points out that in every HR election between 1972 
and 1983, opposition parties did receive more votes than the LDP. There are several 
reasons lead to the LDP's advantage and opposition's disadvantage in this particular 
electoral system. 
Firstly, the SNTV IMMD system encouraged a faction-based, candidate-centered 
style of election campaign which strengthens the LDP's advantage in rural area. It is 
because the system encouraged major parties to nominate more than one candidate in 
each electoral district, and a "decentralized" candidate campaign where factions 
played an important role in nominating candidates and backing them with resources 
was employed (Stockwin, 2004, p.45-46). As a result, voting decision relied on 
characteristic of individual candidates, personal linkage and local interest rather than 
party policy and national interest. The LDP was benefited by this voting decision as 
the governing party is effective in distributing interest to local government, especially 
in rural area. Moreover, koenkai (supporter's organization) was effective in 
maintaining personal support and mobilizing votes, especially in rural area where 
personal linkage was important. Mobilization power of the koenkai, as showed by the 
turnout rate in rural area can over 800/0 occasionally when compare with 50-60% in 
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big cities, constituted a large share of "hard vote" for individual candidates which 
strengthen and stabilized the advantage of the LDP. 
Secondly, it was the rural advantage of the LDP, combining with the 
malapportionment of the system, where rural areas received more seats per capita than 
urban area, further strengthened the LDP's advantage in elections. According to 
Stockwin (2004, p.41), the most densely and least densely populated districts had a 
3.9 times difference in 1979. The malapportionment of seats combining with the bias 
in policy towards agricultural sectors, as well as the centralized fiscal structure, 
reinforce the advantage of the LDP. 
Thirdly, the SNTV IMMD system also created a chance of nomination error, 
especially for opposition parties, in three ways: 1. over-nomination; 2. 
under-nomination; and 3. vote division failure. In the first case, major parties that 
wished to win more than one seat in a multi-member district had to nominate more 
than one candidate, facing a risk of spreading the votes thinly. On the other hand, if 
the party nominated too few candidates, the votes would be wasted. Even if the 
appropriate number of candidates was nominated, there was always a risk of error on 
division of votes, where one candidate won too many votes and the other won too less. 
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Major parties always face the dilemma of nomination and election strategies. Cox 
(1996) argues the LDP had an advantage on vote-division over the opposition parties, 
since the LDP could make use of state resources and divide votes efficiently in the 
form of patronage. Reed and Bolland (1999) offer an example of "nomination error" 
by the JSP: the JSP normally nominated one candidate in many districts that they 
could win more than one seats, in order to protect the incumbent politician. In other 
words, although both the LDP and the opposition parties faced the risk of nomination 
error under the SNTV IMMD electoral system, the LDP performed better to overcome 
the problem than the oppositions, which led to the advantage of the LDP in elections. 
Even if the electoral system changed into a hybrid system of single-member 
district (SMD) and proportional representative (PR) system in 1994 (or the SMD-PR 
system), the LDP still has advantage in the HR. Hrebenar (2000, p. 47) points out the 
malapportionment problem still exists under the SMD-PR system. The most 
populated single-seat district Kanagawa 14th has 2.4 times of population than least 
populated district Tottori 3rd in 1998. Kabashima and Sugawara (2004) discover the 
LDP continue to have advantage in rural area. They divide the PR seats of 2003 HR 
election into three categories with 100 seats in each: rural, intermediate and urban. 
The LDP was able to gain 79% of seats in rural area, 58% of seats in intermediate 
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area and 31 % of seats in urban area. Moreover, scholars comment that the PR system 
enables small parties to survive and therefore prohibits consolidation of opposition 
parties, in return allowing the LDP to win the SMD seats with less than 50% of votes 
(Scheiner, 2006, p.59). Although the SMD-PR electoral system has an effect of 
encouraging party-centered election campaign, there are other structural constraints 
prohibit opposition parties to effectively challenge the LDP regime. 
2.2.2 Electoral Campaign Law 
The restrictive electoral campaign law prevents opposition parties to effectively 
communicate with voters and hence benefiting the LDP. Candidates are prohibited to 
perform door-to-door campaigning, polling, parades, unscheduled speeches, etc. 
(Hrebenar, 2000, p.50). Number of poster and leaflet is regulated and candidates have 
to place their posters in official signboards. The government also arranges television 
appearance timeslot in NHK and radio announcements timeslot equally for all 
political party5. Politicians are even prohibited to write about election in their own 
blog during the campaign period. These restrictions limit the chance for political 
parties and candidates to communicate with the public, encourage noninvolvement of 
public, and increase cost of communication between political parties and voters. As a 
5 Refers to Electoral Campaign Law, http://www.houko.com/OO/OIlS251100B.HTM#s13 
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result, an environment which protects incumbent LDP politicians is created, as new 
faces and opposition parties have little chances to promote themselves to voters under 
the strict electoral campaign law, and the LDP incumbent has more chances to expose 
themselves through debates in national politics. 
2.2.3 Clientelism and Centralized Government Financial Structure 
Scheiner (2006) argues clientelist system combining with financial centralization, 
together with institutional protection through electoral system is the major reason of 
opposition failure. Clientelism prevails mainly in rural area among interest groups 
such as farmers, construction companies and workers. The LDP's policies on 
agricultural subsidy and public construction projects often act pork barrel. On the 
other hand, financial centralization resulted in dependence of local-politics on 
national-politics, since funding in local government depends very much on central 
government. Local government leads by opposition party would be punished by 
national government in terms of fewer funding or lower preference in infrastructure 
construction. This results in opposition failure in local level which directly leads to a 
national-level opposition failure. 
Another effect is on the opposition's inability to attract quality candidates in 
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local area. Since opposition parties are unable to develop their strength at sub-national 
level, they cannot attract quality candidates to join them. Scheiner (2006, p.137) 
defines quality candidate as: (1). former prefectural governor and assembly member; 
(2). former city mayor; (3). former House of Councilor member; (4). candidate inherit 
a SMD; (5). former national level bureaucrat; and (6). former television news reporter. 
When the inability of opposition parties in attracting quality candidate in rural area 
combines with the electoral system which biased towards rural area, opposition failure 
in rural area become more significant. Although opposition parties are much easier to 
attract quality candidates in urban area as voters in those areas generally support 
anti-clientelist appeal of opposition parties, opposition parties can only challenge the 
LDP in urban area. As a result, opposition fails to challenge the LDP regime as a 
whole. 
2.2.4 Party Organization of the LDP 
Machidori (2005) concludes the "three pillars" of the LDP party organization 
contribute to its stable ruling. The "three pillars" are: factions, supporting groups and 
a bottom-up approach. These "three pillars" are employed in three aspect of the party 
function: electoral campaigning, organizational operation and policymaking activities. 
The three pillars have to be dependence on the multiple-seat electoral district system 
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in order to run smoothly. 
Factionalism within LDP contributes to the success of the LDP in two mutually 
complementing ways: provides policy coherence and continuity, and acts as electoral 
machinery. Factions within LDP are virtually "parties within party", in which 
different factions having different ideologies and strengths in policies. Factions would 
discuss and coordinate in policy formulation process and hence balance different 
interests they represent. On the other hand, factional endorsement and provision of 
funding and other resources to a particular candidate has a decisive influence on the 
candidate's chance of winning. The winning candidate in return, is expected to 
provide the faction their expertise in policy and further strengthen the base of faction. 
Supporting group refers to politician's personal organization, or the koenkai. The 
koenkai, which closely connects to a particular politician, acts as a regional network 
that substitutes the LDP's own party local organization. These personal organizations 
provide a flexible network for the LDP, as koenkai provides support for candidate and 
also connect the party with district voters. Personal koenkai may be succeeded by the 
politician's inheritor, who is usually the family member or has a close relationship 
with the politician. This ensures the LDP could always conduct activities directed at 
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people in different regions and occupations with specific needs under a 
"decentralized" party organization (Machidori, 2005). 
The third pillar is the bottom-up approach in decision-making process, which 
provides chances for the voices of politicians representing interests of different 
sectors (interest groups), particular ministry ("tribe" of legislators, or zoku gUn) and 
junior politicians to be heard in the debate process. The decision making process 
begins with a discussion in the Policy Research Council (PRC) before the government 
submit bills to the Diet. The PRC has various policy divisions corresponding to the 
government ministries and policy content will be discussed and adjusted within the 
PRC. Then leaders of the PRC policy divisions will make proposed changes for the 
bills and seek approval from the General Council. In the process, different interests 
within the party are balanced that ensures internal coherence of the party. Moreover, 
politicians within the PRC could sharpen the knowledge and expertise in the 
particular policy area (Machidori, 2005). 
Scholars also point out strong leadership and flexibility of the LDP enables the 
party to stay in the government for such a lengthy period. For example Muramatsu 
and Krauss (1987) propose the "patterned pluralism" model, which emphasizes the 
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LDP's responsiveness towards wide and even competing social interests in a 
pragmatic manner. Pluralism is the fundamental factor of the LDP ruling, where 
various interest groups have different points of access to the policymaking process. 
However, the pluralism is "patterned" in the sense that the LDP government is in a 
strong position, and interest groups have to cooperate with the LDP. There is a 
close-end relationship since interest groups are constantly allied with the LDP and 
bureaucrats. 
Pempel (1982) proposes the idea of "creative conservatism" which concerns the 
flexibility and responsiveness in LDP's policy making process. The LDP reacts 
swiftly on environmental changes and public opinion and absorbs policies suggested 
by opposition parties, for example environmental policy and social welfare policy. 
Moreover, despite facing different "external shocks" in its ruling, the LDP is able to 
stay in the government by approaching to new social groups in time of difficulties. In 
this way, the LDP does not only concern the interest of its original supporter (for 
instance the rural area and supporting groups), but also absorbs new supporters by 
reaching out continuously to emerging social groups. In this way, the party is able to 
transform into a catch-all party and stabilizes its ruling. 
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Pempel (1990) also suggests the LDP was able to create a "virtuous cycle of 
dominance" as a ruling party. The LDP's policies benefit certain interest groups and 
social groups. In return, these groups would support the LDP ruling. By balancing 
different interests, the LDP is able to deliver material interest to supporting groups 
and minimizes support to opposition parties. The interdependency of the LDP and 
vested interest groups reinforces the ruling of the LDP. 
2.2.5 Voting Behavior 
Some scholars point out that voters in Japan are conservative and resistant to 
change. For example Curtis (1980, as cited in Hrebenar, 2000) points out new urban 
middle class favor stability and they are reluctant to radical changes in existing 
governmental politics. Even for younger generation, they seem to be dissatisfied with 
their society but unwilling to engage in serious reform. Under this conservative social 
condition, incumbencies generally have higher chance to be reelected in elections, and 
opposition parties' candidates with more reformist appeal have less chance to win. As 
Hrebenar (2000, p.25) states that, electorates who are resistant to fundamental 
changes allow the LDP to remain in power for so many years. 
Kabashima (2004, p.75) proposes the concept of "buffer player", in which 
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defined as "voters who basically expect for a LDP-led government, but cast their 
votes in order to achieve a "hakuchu" (balance) condition". The "era of buffer player" 
prevails from late 1970s to 1993. Buffer players asked the LDP for responsiveness by 
placing it in an unstable condition. When these voters felt dissatisfaction towards the 
LDP politics, they would cast their votes to opposition parties. However, these voters 
did not prefer political crisis which might affect their well-being, therefore they would 
return to the LDP when opposition parties were close to get the office. The concept of 
buffer player bases on the assumption that voters had distrust towards opposition party, 
and at the same time they would like to contain the power of the LDP. Kabashima 
argues the electoral performance of the LDP is being regulated in this way and the 
LDP is allowed to remain in power under the 55' System. 
2.2.6 Press Club System 
Advantage of the incumbent party is further strengthened by the press club 
system, as the system makes mainstream media provides similar and predictable news 
in favor of the incumbent party. Freeman (2000) provides a comprehensive research 
on the press club system. The news is in favor of the LDP in the sense that governing 
party and bureaucracy are the major news sources and make the news biased towards 
them. The behind-scene talk (kondan) and limited-access press conference also 
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provide chances for the incumbent party to provide information exclusively to those 
government-friendly media, and in return they would report news in favor of the 
incumbent party. 
Moreover, the press club system also creates a co-optative relationship among 
rival journalists and discourages them to conduct investigative reports that damage the 
governing party's reputation (Freeman, 2000, p.83). Mainstream media is encouraged 
to cooperate in writing stories and is discouraged to conduct exclusive interviews 
besides the common news source. Mainstream media which conducts investigative 
reports may be punished or banned from participating in the press club by the news 
sources and rival media companies, as this may harm the interest of other media in the 
press club. Therefore, the cooperative norm in press club prevents mainstream media 
to make original reports and investigation that may harm the reputation of the LDP. 
The press club system also controls the information dissemination in media. The 
industry association, Nihon Shimbun Kyokai (NSK), plays an important role in 
strengthening the press club system. The intermediary role of NSK allows news 
sources to exert influence on media, for instance refrain from disseminate information 
within a time period that the news source would like to. On the other hand, in order to 
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make the system work perfectly, the press club system has a set of sanctions rules 
threatening the media to follow the rule of the game. The NSK further strengthen the 
impact of the press club which in favor of the LDP. 
Finally, entry of the press club is strictly controlled by the NSK. The NSK is very 
caution about allowing "outsiders" to enter the press club. Non-mainstream media 
such as the Akahata (official newspaper of the Japan Communist Party) and foreign 
press are difficult to enter the press club system. One of the reasons is that the NSK is 
afraid about the destructive effect of these media to the press club system, as these 
"outsiders" probably would not be willing to follow the rule in the press club system. 
Although a few foreign presses are allowed to join the press club, foreign press with 
connection to the state (such as BBC and the People's Daily) are still not allowed 
joining the press club (Freeman, 2000, p.97). 
In conclusion, the press club system is a very comprehensive institution in 
controlling information gathering and dissemination of Japanese media. The press 
club system allows the state and the LDP (two most important political news sources) 
to manipulate the news reporting process and ensure the end product is following their 
will. As a result, information environment in the mainstream media is biased towards 
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the incumbent party, which makes mainstream media a "servant" of the state and the 
LDP. The effect of the press club system towards general public is significant in the 
sense that, mass media is one of the highest penetrated information source in Japan 
(72.7%, where direct campaign has 78.8% and personal network only has 39.60/0), and 
has rich information content which allow general to make political judgment (Sakaiya, 
2005). 
2.2.7 Conclusion 
The above section has concluded several external constraints lead to the failure 
of oppositions to effectively challenge the LDP in elections. These explanations 
include the electoral system, electoral campaign law; fiscal system, the LDP party 
organization, voting behavior and media press club system. These factors enable the 
LDP to maintain its advantage over opposition parties and prevent opposition parties 
to effectively challenge the LDP regime. However, opposition parties did have 
chances to replace the LDP regime throughout the 55' System. Opposition failure 
occurred because opposition parties failed to cooperate with each others and missed 
chances in many occasions. Opposition parties also failed to cooperate under the new 
party system, as demonstrate in the following section. 
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2.3 Opposition Fragmentation in Japanese Politics 
Throughout the history of Japanese party politics under the 55' System and the 
new party system, opposition parties are able to replace the LDP regime for merely 10 
months. However, opposition parties do have chances to challenge the LDP and could 
have succeeded, as Stockwin (2006, p.120) argues, the one-party predominance 
system is not inevitable but "a product of contingent circumstances at various 
historical stages". Hrebenar (2000, p.11) also states the strategy of "divide and 
conquer" applied by the LDP lead to opposition fragmentation and make opposition 
parties less efficient to replace the ruling party. This dissertation would like to add a 
notion that, it is the opposition fragmentation lead to the opposition failure. 
2.3.1 Opposition Fragmentation under the 55' System 
Opposition fragmentation can be traced back to 1950s, where the Socialist Party 
fragmented internally. The left-wing socialist and the right-wing socialist divided 
ideologically on Marxist versus social democracy ideology, and argued whether the 
JSP should whether be a "class party" or "mass party", and whether should 
concentrate on "parliamentary" or "extra-parliamentary" activities (Stockwin, 2000, 
p216). The left-wing socialist strongly opposed to various reforms in different periods, 
proving to be an obstacle for the JSP to restore policy coherence. In 1960s when the 
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right-wing socialist defected from the JSP and formed the Democratic Socialist Party 
(DSP), the JSP was weakened as well as losing the moderate force within the party. 
The remaining part of the JSP is criticized as ideologically rigid and unable to adapt to 
the changing environment. For example, Curtis (1988) and Stockwin (1992) argue the 
JSP was constrained by the radical fraction which prevented the party moving to a 
more moderate platform. 
The split of the Socialist party did not end the fragmentation, as the external 
fragmentation of the Socialist camp prevented the oppositions to cooperate among 
each other, unified their support base and hence failed to challenge the LDP regime 
effectively. One example of lacking cooperation between the two Socialist parties is in 
the 1970s' . The JSP actively explored chances of forming a left-of-center coalition 
among the JSP, DSP and Komeito, but the proposal eventually failed due to 
opposition from the left-wing Socialist within the JSP (Stockwin, 2000, p.223). The 
JSP and DSP, being supported by the Sohyo union and the Domei Union respectively, 
have very different support base. The JSP has a country-wide support as the Sohyo 
union has a core membership from the public service union all over the country. On 
the other hand, the DSP gained its support from the urban area such as Tokyo, 
Kanagawa, Osaka, Hyogo and Aichi, as the Domei union mainly constituted of private 
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sector union. Despite the fact that the Sohyo and Domei reunified in 1989 to form the 
Rengo, it did not mean the two Socialist parties have unified as they still remained 
their independent status. The DSP joined the NFP in 1994 and eventually moved into 
the DPJ in 1998. On the other hand, the JSP still remains its position of opposition 
party under the new party system, although the party strength is declining 
significantly after the LDP-JSP-Sakigake coalition broke down in 1996. 
There is also cooperation failure or external fragmentation among the three other 
major opposition parties under the 55' System: the Komeito, the New Liberal Club 
(NLC) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). 
The Komeito, formed in 1964, is a political arm of the Soga Gakkai, a 
nationwide Buddhist organization in Japan. The Komeito has one of the strongest 
party organizations in Japan, as the party totally depends on its mother organization, 
especially in terms of votes. The party has many active and loyal members which 
have a stable and high electoral turnout rate. Although the Komeito never discloses its 
membership structure, it is believed that the party has a membership base of 
multimillion (Hrebenar, 2000, p.180), which enables the party to win a stable 10% of 
seats, i.e. 50 seats from the 1970s to 1990s and around 30 seats in recent elections 
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since 2000. The Komeito is a middle-of-the-road party and has joined the NFP in 1994. 
However, the Komeito refused to form a complete merger with the NFP, which is one 
of the reason lead to the cooperation failure within the NFP. The role of the Komeito 
in the NFP fragmentation showed the difficulty of opposition parties to cooperate with 
each others. The New Komeito reemerged in 1998 after the NFP collapsed and joined 
the coalition led by the LDP since 1999 till now. 
The New Liberal Club (NLC) formed in 1976 by a young LDP politician, Kono 
Yohei, when he led five LDP Diet Members out of the LDP. It was the Lockheed 
Scandal that led to the formation of the new party, as some LDP politicians were 
dissatisfied with the moral standard of the LDP. The NLC was able to win 18 seats in 
the 1976 HR election and the public was eager to end a single-party ruling by the LDP. 
However, the NLC failed to cooperate with other opposition parties and searched 
ways to cooperate with the LDP. The NLC had some discussion with the DSP and the 
Socialist Democratic Federation (SDF) to form a new middle-of-the-road party, but 
the NLC eventually joined the LDP to form a coalition government in 1983 after the 
LDP failed to capture a majority by only winning 250 seats out of 511 seats in the HR 
election. However, the LDP actually was able to claim a majority in the HR after 9 
conservative independent politicians joined the LDP after the election, made the 
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coalition with the NLC "convenience rather than necessity" (Hrebenar, 2000, p.1 0). 
Most of the NLC politicians returned to the LDP in 1986, after the party was only able 
to win 6 seats in 1986 HR election. The speculation of an opposition party coalition or 
a LDP-included multiparty government ended. 
On the other hand, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has never played a 
critical role in Japanese party politics nor being invited to join any coalition 
government throughout the history of Japanese politics. The JCP "communist" brand 
would produce a negative impact to other opposition parties that cooperate with the 
JCP, because the image of the JCP is easily affected by international incidents related 
to communism. In fact, the JCP has the strongest party organization in Japan, as the 
party has a centralized party organization leading nearly 26000 local branches, with 
nearly half million of party members during the 70s-80s (Berton, 2000, p.253-299). 
Moreover, the party has an extensive network and publication subscription throughout 
the country, and the party's publication earned a significant portion of income for the 
JCP. However, the JCP exclusion makes the opposition parties unable to benefit from 
the JCP's extensive network and strong party organization. More importantly, the JCP 
seat are negatively related to the JSP seat (Kamijyo, 1991, p.56-61), which indicates 
the competing nature among opposition parties as the two parties are competing for 
37 
the leftist voters' support. 
As the history of 55' system has shown, the opposition parties failed to challenge 
the LDP regime. The Socialist parties split into two wings and compete with each 
other, the NLC failed to cooperate with other non-LDP parties to form a new 
middle-of-the-road party, and the JCP is rejected from cooperation among opposition 
parties and is competing with the Socialist parties in order to capture the leftist votes. 
It is not until 1993 when several new parties formed, and the opposition parties (still 
excluding the JCP) tried to cooperate with each others by forming a coalition 
government, the LDP one-party predomination party system ended. 
2.3.2 Opposition Cooperation and the Break Down of the 55' System 
The Japanese political situation was very unstable by the end of 1980s. After the 
Recruit Scandal, Prime Minister Uno's sex scandal and the introduction of consumer 
tax, the public was upset by the LDP government, and the LDP lost its' majority in the 
HC after the 1989 HC election. In June 1992, the Diet passed the controversial Peace 
Keeping Operation Bill (PKO Bill) with the cooperation of the LDP, the Komeito and 
the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). In August of the same year, Asahi Shimbun 
reported Kanemaru Shin, the vice-president of the LDP, received a 500 million yen 
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bribe from the Sagawa Kyubin. The public instantly called for a political reform and 
the PM Miyazawa Kiichi promised he would launch a political reform publicly in a 
television program. However, the LDP failed to deliver its promise due to internal 
opposition. In June 1993, the HR passed a vote of no confidence as some members of 
the LDP rebelled. Those "rebels" left the LDP and formed two new parties: the 
Sakigake and the Shinseito. Another new party, the Japan New Party (JNP), was 
formed by former Kumamoto governor Hosokawa Morihiro earlier in 1992. The 
opposition parties won a majority in 1993 House of Representative Election and 
formed a coalition government, which marked the end of the 55' System (Tanaka, 
2005, p.173-175). 
In the 1993 HR election, the new parties were the winners. The Japan New Party 
gave a clean image and its devotion to pursue political reform to the voters and won 
35 seats (70/0) in the election. The Sakigake won three more seats and got 13 members 
in the Diet. The Shinseito won a total of 55 seats (11 %). On the other hand, the LDP 
decreased from 286 seats to 223 seats (44%), a 63 seats decrease in total. The LDP 
lost majority after the 1993 election, and the non-LDP-non-JCP coalition government 
was formed. The coalition government included the JNP, the Sakigake, the Shinseito , 
the JSP, the DSP, the Komeito, the Socialist Democratic Federation (SDF) and the 
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Minshu Kaikaku Rengo (Democratic Reform Party, DRP), nominating Hosokawa as 
the Prime Minister. Without cooperation among opposition parties, the 55' System 
may not come to an end. A seemingly viable alternative to the LDP government 
eventually emerged. However, opposition fragmentation and internal conflict within 
the coalition government again denied the opposition parties from constantly and 
effectively challenge the LDP. 
2.3.3 The New Party System and Opposition Coalition Failure 
The new party system is characterized by series of emerging and disappearing of 
parties, merging among non-LDP parties and different forms of coalition government. 
The dynamic political landscape can be concluded as a cycle of opposition 
consolidation and fragmentation: the non-LDP parties tried to cooperate and 
consolidate but continuously suffered from ideology conflicts, imbalance in interest 
and personal dispute, which made cooperation extremely difficult. The situation did 
not improve until the Liberal Party (LP) merged into the DP J in 2003. 
After the coalition government formed in 1993, the most important political 
agenda was political reform: electoral system and political finance reform. However, 
the reformation was not as straightforward as one might expect. One maj or difficulty 
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faced by the Hosokawa government was the cooperation among different parties 
which represent different interests, the conflict among the coalition parties aroused in 
the following aspects. 
Firstly, there was ideological and policy conflict among the coalition parties in 
several major issues. On the issue of political reform, there were different visions 
within the coalition government. The Sakigake pursued a pluralist political system 
that allows minor parties to survive, while Shinseito's Ozawa maneuver to form a 
two-party system with political power on the hand of politicians instead of 
bureaucracy. On foreign and defense policy, the Sakigake and the Komeito 
emphasized on Japan's commitment to the Peace Constitution and international 
contribution and strongly opposed Ozawa's neo-conservative stance with a "normal 
country" vision. In other words, the Sakigake and the Komeito were more "liberal" 
than the Shinseito on traditional constitutional revision and national safety issue. 
Moreover, on the tax reform issue, the Sakigake and the JSP opposed increase of 
national welfare tax proposed by Ozawa as the Sakigake and the JSP represented 
working class. Finally, the JSP opposed the liberalization of rice imports which is 
supported by the Shinseito-Komeito bloc (Otake, 1999, p. 73-76; Curtis, 1999, 
p.114-116; Reed, 2003, p. 24-28). In conclusion, there were conflicts among major 
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political issues, which make any agreement within the coalition government very 
difficult to achieve. 
Secondly, as argued by Reed (2003, p.25), there was an imbalance of power and 
interest among parties. Most of the major posts in the Hosokawa cabinet were 
occupied by the Shinseito and the Komeito, while the JSP and the Sakigake occupied 
most of the minor posts, the JNP received no cabinet post except that of the PM 
Hosokawa. The JNP members, who were all first termers, had a very positive image 
as a reformer among general public, and regarded themselves as the biggest winner in 
the election. However, they were dissatisfied by the fact that they only had a marginal 
influence within the coalition government. Moreover, the Sakigake was dissatisfied 
with the Shinseito-Komeito domination within the party. The imbalance of power and 
interest within the coalition proved problematic as an anti-Shinseito-Komeito bloc 
including the JSP, DSP and Sakigake was formed within the coalition government in 
the later stage, which doomed the fate of the coalition government. 
Thirdly, there was personal disagreement within the coalition government, 
mainly between the Sakigake President Takemura and the Shinseito s Ozawa, with the 
JNP President Hosokawa in between. The Sakigake was upset by Ozawa's autocracy 
42 
style of politics and urged to form a merger with the lNP. However, the lNP was eager 
to remain a good relationship with the Shinseito and therefore the lNP-Sakigake 
merger plan failed (Reed, 2003, p.25). The Sakigake, together with the JSP and DSP, 
formed the anti-Shinseito-Komeito bloc eventually. 
Power struggle and internal conflict led to fragmentation within the coalition 
government. Conflict between the two blocs did not come to an end after Hosokawa 
resigned as Prime Minister in April 1994. In order to unify the coalition, Hata from 
the Shinseito was elected as the new Prime Minister. However, right after Hata was 
chosen as the PM, a new joint parliamentary faction was formed between the 
Shinseito, the lNP and the DSP, together with several newly formed minor parties, 
calling themselves "Kaishin" (Reform). Ozawa planned to exclude the JSP from the 
Hata government since Ozawa believed the JSP was problematic in the Hosokawa 
government. This movement upset the JSP and the JSP quitted the non-LDP coalition. 
The Hata government became a minor government, and a motion of non-confidence 
introduced by the LDP was passed in June 1994. The JSP moved to join the LDP to 
form a coalition government, with the Sakigake acted as the bridge (Tanaka, 2005, 
p.197-204). 
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As Reed (2003, p.31) points out, the LDP-JSP-Sakigake coalition is not about 
policy substance but about policy-making procedure, since the LDP and the JSP have 
no common ground in policy. The JSP had to abandon the policy of opposing the Self 
Defense Force and the security treaty with US. The LDP also compromised in the 
compensation to foreign "comfort women" and atomic boom victims during the 
Second World War, as well as revising the guidelines on military cooperation with the 
US and forming unofficial relationship with North Korea. The formation of coalition 
government between two permanent oppositions in the 55' system has a significant 
impact on future Japanese politics, as the traditional ideological cleavage on 
constitutional revision and national security was blurred, if not eliminated, when the 
JSP decided to compromise on these issues. The declining confrontation and 
importance of traditional issues on national political agenda provide a space for new 
issues to arise, such as political reform, center-Iocal government relationship reform 
and economic reform, as Hrebenar (2000, p.166) notes that the new party system "has 
a decidedly right-right axis that has changed the nature of Japanese political debate". 
2.3.4 The NFP Internal Fragmentation 
After the LDP- JSP-Sakigake coalition government formed in June 1994, Ozawa 
maneuvered to merge the opposition parties and formed the New Frontier Party (NFP). 
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The NFP included nine parties: the Shinseito, the JNP, the DSP, the HR part of 
Komeito, the Liberal Party (different from Ozawa's Liberal Party formed in 1998), the 
Shinto Mirai (both the Liberal Party and the Shinto Mirai are defectors from the LDP), 
and the Liberal Reform Alliance (Jiyu Kaikaku Rengo) which was formed by former 
LDP Prime Minister Kaifu Toshio together with 20 LDP defector. The NFP officially 
formed in 10th December, 1994, and Kaifu was elected as the first party leader with 
Ozawa backing him (Reed, 2003, p.32-39). Despite the fact that the NFP recorded a 
victory in the 1995 He election and had 214 Diet members in total compare with the 
LDP's 295 Diet members, the NFP started to collapse in late 1996 after only winning 
156 seats (comparing with 178 seats after the party was formed) in the 1996 HR 
election and eventually dissolved in January 1998. There were three problems in the 
NFP party organization: failure to build the party identity, failure of a complete 
merger and power struggle within the party. 
First of all, the NFP failed to establish its own identity. As Hrebenar (2000, p.156) 
points out, the NFP was a merger of various parties which lied on both ends of the 
ideological spectrum, from very conservative groups such as the Ozawa group and the 
LDP splinters, to fairly liberal groups such as the Komeito group. The party had 
unclear ideology in several important areas. In national security issue, there was a 
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conflict between Ozawa's "normal country vision" and the Komeito s idea of "the 
party for peace". Ozawa also wished to eliminate the vest interest of public sector 
union and agricultural-and-small-business sector, which contradicted with the interest 
of labor union in private sector and small-and-medium firm owner that the DSP 
represented. The conflict among interests and visions of different parties within the 
NFP resulted in an unclear policy position, which led to the NFP failure to develop a 
clear vision and a concrete gr{)up identity. 
Secondly, the NFP failed to complete the unification of various party 
organizations into the new party. The Komeito only allowed its HR members and the 
1995 elected He members to join the NFP, and remained the old Diet members, local 
office members and the Komeito organization separated from the NFP. The local 
organization of the Komeito strongly opposed to the merger with the NFP and 
eventually the Komeito did not keep their promise to merge completely with the NFP. 
As a result, other parties also refused to transfer their own funds and assets to the NFP. 
The NFP had to rely on external organization such as individual koenkai, the Komeito 
and the DSP-backing Yuai Kurabu in the election campaign and daily activities 
(Otake, p. 61). The NFP was unable to operate smoothly, built up its own supporting 
bases, established its own party organization and therefore lack sustainability. 
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Thirdly, there was a serious power struggle evolving around Ozawa in the NFP. 
There were many leaders in the NFP, including three former Prime Ministers: 
Hosokawa of the JNP, Hata of the Shinseito and Kaifu of the LDP, and chairman of 
different parties: Ozawa of the Shinseito, Yonezawa Takashi of the DSP, and Ichikawa 
Yuichi of the Komeito. The struggle for leadership power among these leaders 
endangered the party's internal coherence. For instance, after the 1995 He election, 
Kaifu's leadership was questioned by the members, Hata ran for the presidential 
election and announced that he would not reappoint Ozawa as the secretary-general if 
he became the president. A new presidential election method which allow the party's 
general membership to vote was applied in 1995, Ozawa received over 1.1 million 
votes and defeated Hata as he only received 0.56 million votes. In the selection of the 
party committee, the Hata group and the former DSP group were excluded (Hrebenar, 
2000, p.153-156). The NFP failed to unify the party by comforting different interests, 
balancing internal power among different groups and building a party organization 
that allow grievances to be expressed. 
After a series of conflicts in the NFP, Hata left the NFP with 10 followers and 
formed the new party the Taiyoto (the Sun Party) in December 1996. Hosokawa left 
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the NFP in June 1997 and formed the From Five. By September 1997,12 NFP 
members rejoined the LDP and enabled the LDP to regain majority in the HR. The 
NFP dissolved from December 1997 to January 1998 and divided into several new 
parties: the Ozawa group formed the Liberal Party (LP) with 42 HR members and 12 
HC members; the Kano Michihiko group formed the Kokumin no Koe with 15 HR 
members and 3 HC members; the DSP group formed the Shinto Yuai with 14 HR 
members and 9 HC members-; the HC members of Komeito group formed the Dawn 
Club while the HR members formed the Shinto Heiwa and they later rejoined the 
Komeito; Ozawa Tatsuo formed the Reformer Club with 9 HC members. Some of 
these new parties joined the DPJ later in 1998, and some parties rejoined the LDP or 
the Komeito (Hrebenar, 2000, p.157; Tanaka, 2005, p.200-202). A coalition 
government between LP and LDP was formed in 1999 and later transformed into the 
LDP-LP-Komeito coalition. The LP left the coalition government later and part of the 
LP split to form the Conservative Party which later merged with the LDP. The LP 
stayed in the political arena until 2003 when it merged with the DPJ. 
The NFP merely existed for three years from 1994 to 1998. Nevertheless, the 
NFP experience was important for the formation of the "new" Democratic Party of 
Japan, as internal incoherence of the NFP provided a warning for the DPJ leadership 
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that ineffective party organization, lack of party identity, imbalance in distribution of 
power and lacking grievance channel would endanger the survival of the party. 
The NFP experience coincides with the opposition fragmentation argument, as 
the party's stability was hindered by personal dispute and factional interest. The party 
was unable to come up with a coherence policy platform that accommodates different 
ideologies within the party. The NFP failed to win over the LDP in 1996 HR election 
and eventually fell apart. It is true that the opposition parties are rigid or lack of 
coherence in ideology, and was unable to form a comprehensive alternative program 
for office and aiming to take office in order to implement it (Stockwin, 2006). 
However, fragmentation within opposition parties, especially the Socialist parties and 
the NFP also lead to their failure to challenge the LDP. 
2.4 Opposition Failure and the DP J 
Opposition fragmentation and various structural and environmental limitations 
prevent opposition parties from effectively challenge the LDP. The NFP experience 
especially worth attention: the "umbrella party of oppositions" faced ideological 
conflicts, personnel conflicts with a weak party organization, and the failure in the 
1996 HR election led to its breakdown. One may logically suggests that the DP J also 
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faces the same challenges of party unification and electoral advancement, as the party 
is also regarded as an "umbrella party of opposition,,6. The DPJ is formed from a 
merger and actually compose of the similar groups of politicians as in the NFP. 
However, reality shows that the DP J is able to prevent from disintegration throughout 
the party history and in times of difficulties. Before this dissertation move on to 
explore the reasons of internal coherence and electoral performance of the DP J, a 
brief history of the DP J will be presented. 
2.4.1 The Emergence of the DPJ 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was formed in 1996 from a splinter of 
various opposition parties. The "re-reshuffle" of opposition parties (the first reshuffle 
refers to the formation of the NFP), essentially characterized the DP J as a party 
containing different groups with a wide spectrum of ideology, which is superficially 
the same as the NFP. However, this dissertation argues that, the DP J leadership 's 
manipulation leads to a very different development path of the DPJ. Before the 
argument is presented in the succeeding chapters, it is important to be familiar with 
the formation history of the DPJ. 
6 For example Kabashima, 1999a; Nakajyo, 2000; Kollner, 2004; Mori , 2006 ; Tamura, 2006, 2007; 
Shiota, 2007 have disused the internal fragmentation and the characteristics of umbrella of opposition 
forces in their works. 
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The idea of a new party began with the discussion of forming the "third pole" in 
oppose to the LDP and NFP. In the very beginning, the new party movement involved 
a reformation of the Socialist party. However, the proposal failed due to internal 
conflicts and the JSP eventually only changed its name into the Social Democratic 
Party of Japan (SDPJ). The new party movement did not stop here, as there was a 
proposal of merger between the Socialist party and the Sakigake. Unfortunately, the 
merger proposal failed again due to opposition within the Sakigake, as they suspect 
the merger would not form a brand new social democratic liberal party since they 
would still depend on union and could not build a new image. Finally, the idea of a 
Sakigake-based new party surfaced (Shiota, 2007, p. 82-86). 
The proposal of forming the Democratic Party of Japan originated from 
Hatoyama Yukio of the Sakigake, and supported by his brother, Hatoyama Kunio of 
the NFP, Kaieda Banri from the Citizens' League, Yamahana Sadao and Ohata 
Akihiro from the Socialist party and ex-governor of Hokkaido Yokomichi Takahiro. 
The original plan was to include most members of the Sakigake, the Yamahana Group 
of the JSP, the anti-Ozawa group within the NFP and the whole Citizen's League. 
However, as Hatoyama Kunio insisted to reject the Sakigake leader Takemura 
Masayoshi and the left wing of the Socialist party from joining the new party, and 
51 
Hatoyama Yukio insisted the principle of a "network party" which emphasized on 
politicians' individual participation, therefore many of the Sakigake members did not 
leave the party to join the DPJ (Shiota, 2007, p.86-92). The DPJ's clean and liberal 
image was damaged by the exclusion of Takemura. Fortunately, Kan Naoto's decision 
to join the DPJ gave a boost to the party. Kan Naoto was the Minister of Health and 
Welfare at that time, and was very popular among the public as he handled the 
AIDS-contaminated blood incident welC. The "old" DP J eventually formed in 
September 1996, just before the 1996 HR election, with several members from the 
Sakigake, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, the former JSP) and the 
Citizens League, with a total of 57 members (52 HR and 5 HC members) (Tanaka, 
2005, p.202). 
The DP J did not perform exceptionally well in the 1996 HR election by only 
maintaining their 52 seats in the HR, and failed to get their "new party boom". 
However, the party was able to become the third largest party in the Diet. The 
expansion of the party did not come to an end, as the breakdown of the NFP provided 
a chance for the party to further strengthen itself. As mentioned in the previous 
section, the NFP broke down after serious internal conflicts, and was divided into 
7 The history of party formation of the DPJ is recorded in details in Hrebenar (2000), Reed (2003) and 
Shiota (2007). 
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several new parties. In April 1998, the "old" Democratic Party and three other parties: 
the Minseito (a merger of the Taiyoto, the Kokumin no Koe and the From Five), the 
Shinto Yuai and the Democratic Reform Party, agreed to form the "new" Democratic 
Party of Japan. The DPJ became the second largest party in Japan after the merger, 
with 93 HR and 38 HC members (Tanaka, 2005, p.212-213). Right after the merger, 
the DP J faced the 1998 HC election and did well, partially because of poor economic 
situation and poor leadership of the LDP government. The "new" DP J was able to 
won 27 seats in the election and expanded its seats in the HC to 47 seats. The party 
transformed from a "third pole" to the second largest party. 
2.4.2 The Expansion of the DPJ 
The merger in 1998 fundamentally changed the balance of force within the 
party and made factionalism within the party become mare significant. Kollner (2004) 
argues that factionalism within the party became really obvious after the merger in 
1998. There was only the ex-Socialist group and ex-Sakigake group within the party 
in the 1996 composition, and intra-party groups based on former party affiliation 
became more established when the "new" DPJ was formed in 1998. Reed (2003, 
p.44-45) states that the proportion of ex-socialist within the party decreased from 49 
to 30 percent after the merger, ex-Sakigake members remained at about 25 percent as 
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some ex-Sakigake members joined in the "new" DPJ, another 25 percent was the 
ex-NFP politicians and the remaining 15 percent was occupied by ex-DSP members. 
After the LP quitted the LDP-LP-Komeito coalition, the DPJ searched for ways 
to cooperate with the LP. For example, young politicians of the DP J organized study 
seminars and communicated with Ozawa (Shiota, 2007, p.165). The president of the 
DP J, Hatoyama, found it was·a suitable time to discuss the possibility of merger 
between the DPJ and the LP. In December 2002, Hatoyama and Ozawa formed an 
agreement to merge the two parties. However, Hatoyama encountered vigorous 
resistance within the DP J and eventually led to his resignation as president. After Kan 
N aoto replaced Hatoyama as the president, the discussion on merger continued. 
Despite the fact that certain members within the DP J doubted whether the cooperation 
with the LP is a right step, in September 2003 the Ozawa's Liberal Party (LP) 
dissolved and joined the new Democratic Party of Japan. At the time of merger, there 
were 204 registered DP J Diet members, including 137 members (29% of seats) of the 
House of Representatives and 67 members of the House of Councilors (27% of seats) 
(Tanaka, 2005, p.227). 
One may logically predicts the DPJ faces the same problem of internal 
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incoherence as the NFP did, since the DP J formed from various mergers and the 
composition of the party is similar to that of the NFP. However, the party remains 
unified and is able to overcome electoral downturn. This dissertation intends to 
provide an alternative explanation to those provided by scholars on the consolidation 
of the DP J, where the DP J leadership actually plays an active role in manipulating the 
party organization, creating collective incentive and distributing balance selective 
incentive. On top of the ability to consolidate the party, the DP J is able to advance in 
election. This dissertation also tries to provide explanation from a media strategy 
perspective and argues the DP J leadership actively manipulated in forming and 
altering the DP J media strategies in response to external electoral environment 
changes. 
2.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, the relationship between opposition fragmentation and the DP J 
has been presented. As the DP J is formed from mergers of party closely related to the 
NFP, the DP J also shares the problem of internal fragmentation as the NFP did. 
Opposition fragmentation is not new in Japan, as presented in the history of post-war 
Japanese politics, there are many occasions that the opposition parties fragmented 
internally and externally. The Socialist Party split into right-wing and left-wing and 
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were unable to cooperate smoothly. Other opposition parties under the 55' system 
such as the Komeito, the NLC and the JCP seldom cooperate with each others, 
resulting in the LDP domination. Opposition coalition once succeeded in 1993, but 
soon failed because of failure in cooperation and the exclusion of the JSP. After that, 
opposition parties came together to formed the NFP but again hindered by internal 
fragmentation. Of course, opposition fragmentation is not the only reason of 
opposition failure in Japan. As presented in the beginning of this chapter, scholars 
outlined various explanations concerning opposition failure in Japan. In short, there 
are various external environmental constraints related to electoral system, center-Iocal 
fiscal system, the LDP party organization, voting behavior and media press club 
system. 
In the next chapter, theories and methodology of this dissertation will be 
presented. In the study of party politics, party system and party organization are two 
major concerns by scholars. The following chapter will present the four attributes of 
party system: number of parties, relative strength and size, structure of competition 
and cleavage system. Moreover, theories on party system change will also be 
presented, as scholars debates whether party system change is a result of electoral and 
societal change or a result of interaction among parties. Party organization theories 
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can also be concluded in three perspectives: electoral competition approach, 
sociological approach and institutional approach. After that, a research agenda on the 
media, including a brief discussion on the media role (role of neutral transmitter, 
servant, watchdog and trickster) and the media effect (short term and long term) will 
be presented. Lastly, methodology of this dissertation will be discussed. 
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Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology 
In the study of party politics, party system and party organization are two major 
concerns by scholars. Party system is closely linked to electoral choices, 
government formation and having effects on system stability and quality of 
democracy (Wolinetz, 2006, p.51). On the other hand, political party is the basic 
unit of party system and performs various functions in a democratic society . . 
Party is group of complex organization which faces internal conflicts and 
external constraints. Different typologies of party system and party organization 
are concluded by scholars, allowing students of political science to have a more 
systematic way to understand the dynamics of party politics. At the same time, 
mass media is becoming more and more important in Japan, as ((mass media 
takes an active part in processing political issues"; (politicians and the mass 
media monitor people s feelings more carefully than is usual" in unsettled times 
(Tan iguch i, 2006). In brief, scholars debate on various roles of media and 
identify different media effects. In the following, different approaches in the study 
of party system and party organization will be briefly reviewed and criticized. 
After that, a research agenda on the media will be presented, including a brief 
discussion on the media role and the media effect. Lastly, methodology and 
limitation of this dissertation will be discussed. 
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3.1 Party System 
Party system basically defines as "forms and modes of parties' coexistences" and 
"a particular relationship" among characteristics such as "numbers, respective sizes, 
alliances, geographical localization, political distribution and so on" (Duverger, 1959, 
p.203). On the other hand, Sartori (1976, p.44) defines" ... party system is precisely 
the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition". Scholars tries to 
generate various typologies of party system, as party systems can have numbers of 
distinctive features as a result of different electoral environment and relationship 
between parties. The classification of party system generally base on number of 
political parties, relative strength and size of political parties, structure of competition 
and cleavage system. Moreover, scholars seek to understand how do party systems 
change and stabilize and come up with two propositions: party system as a variable 
dependent on cleavage system or party system as an arena of interaction among 
political parties. 
3.1.1 Four Attributes of a Party System 
In the following, four attributes of a party system: number of political parties, 
relative strength and size of political parties, structure of competition and cleavage 
system will be briefly presented. 
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3.1.1.1 Number of Parties 
The simplest classification of party system is to distinguish among one-party, 
two-party and multiparty competition. However, this classification is too rough to 
describe the difference among party systems and risk to count-in extremely small 
parties. Therefore, it would be more sensible to exclude small and irrelevant parties, 
for example Ware (1996) only counts those parties with more than 3% of votes, 
Siaroff (2000) counts those parties with more than 3% of seats; Sartori (1976) only 
counts those parties with coalition or blackmail potential. Scholars also develop 
mathematical formula such as the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) and 
effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). The 
formula for ENEP is to divide 1 by the sum of the squares of proportions of votes, or 
seats won by each party for ENPP, to count the number of parties according to their 
relevant strength. 
3.1.1.2 Relative Strength and Size 
A more refining way to classify party system is to take relative strength and size 
of parties into account. One example of considering relative size and strength of 
parties in the classification of party system could refer to Blondel's (1968) 
60 
classification among two-party system, two-and-a-half party system, multiparty 
system with a predominant party and multiparty system without a predominant party. 
The smaller half party could either be a "hinge party" which is influential because 
they hold the casting vote, or a "wing party" which is less influential because their 
votes are neither needed in coalition formation nor passing a legislation (Siaroff, 
2003). Sartori (1976, p.120) defines a party as "relevant" if it either has a coalition or 
blackmail potential, in which coalition potential refers to the possibility to participate 
in a coalition government, and blackmail potential relates to its affect on the tactics 
and direction of party competition. In this sense, it is not only the relative strength and 
size that matters, but also the structure of competition should be taken into account. 
3.1.1.3 Structure of Competition 
Mair (2002) proposes the concept of "structure of competition" concerning the 
pattern of government formation. It varies between open and close competition for 
government. In any party system with alternation in government, there is either 
wholesale alternation or partial alternation. Wholesale alternation means set of 
incumbent parties is wholly replaced by former opposition parties, while partial 
alternation refers to a new government coalition involving at least one party from the 
former incumbent. 
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In a close competition for government, the pattern of party alternation is highly 
predictable, the range of parties involve is limited, new parties and "outsider" parties 
are impossible to breakthrough the threshold of government. In contrast, an open 
competition of government involves a more unpredictable form of alternation, or the 
"governing formulas" are more "innovative", new parties are relatively easier to get 
access to office (Mair, 2002, p.207 -211). 
3.1.1.4 Cleavage System 
Cleavage system concerns the issue dimensions and the degree of polarization on 
these issues. Issue dimension is not only counted as number, but can also be classified 
into various types, such as economical policy, social policy, central-local relationship, 
security policy, environmental policy, tax-and-spending (for example, see Laver and 
Beniot, 2005). Sartori's (1976) classification of polarized or moderate competition 
enables a distinction between centrifugal or centripetal competition, in which the 
former involve parties at the extremes compete with parties in the center, and the later 
involves parties on either side of the spectrum compete for votes in the center. 
In conclusion, party system is a system of competition among different party 
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organizations, where the system varies among number of parties which is relevant in 
coalition or influential in direction of competition. The pattern of competition 
involves the structure of competition which concerns the alternation of government, 
as well as the cleavage system which is the set of issues political parties compete on. 
3.1.2 Two Propositions of Party System Change 
The above factors are all-relevant in evaluation of a party system, but scholars 
seek to understand party system a step further: how do party system changes or 
stabilize? In this perspective, scholars come up with debates on whether party system 
is a variable dependent on cleavage system or party system is defined as an arena of 
interaction among political parties and focusing on parties' strategic capabilities to 
initiate moves and countermoves (Maor, 1997, p.31). 
3.1.2.1 Cleavage System as a Determinant of Party System 
Perceiving party system as a dependent variable on societal factor, or the 
"cleavage system", can refer to Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) work on the "freezing 
hypothesis", which argues two revolutionary changes, the National Revolution and 
Industrial Revolution, had consequence on the cleavage structure of each nation, and 
forming the initial format of the nation's party system. Party systems maintain 
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themselves as they are frozen by the catalyst of universal suffrage. Social cleavage is 
therefore responsible to shape the party system. 
According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the National Revolution and the 
Industrial Revolution had effects on shaping social cleavage of each nation. The 
National Revolution shaped the state-church conflict and the centre-periphery 
cleavage, while the Industrial -Revolution shaped the land-industry cleavage and the 
class conflict between middle class and working class. Scholars the Post-Industrial 
Revolution shaped the conflict between materialist and post-materialist, where the 
later concern on "new politics" of women's right, peace and ecology rather than 
economic growth (Maor, 1997, p.24). Although cleavage structure of each nation 
varies, mass democratic participation has a "freezing effect" on the cleavage system. 
That is, once a political party was formed according to the cleavage, it can survive 
and mobilize individual to participate in political activities and "freeze" the cleavage, 
even if the cleavage has become less salient. The validity of the "freezing hypothesis" 
is debatable, scholars such as Wolinetz (1973), Pedersen (1983) and Lane and Ersson 
(1994) question party system is not as stable as Lipset and Rokkan suggested (as cited 
in Maor, 1997). They apply the concept of electoral volatility of individual parties, 
which means "the propensity for individuals to vote for different parties at successive 
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elections" (Maor, 1997, p.28), and find that in long term, there is a prolonged pattern 
of party system instability. In contrast, Bartolini and Mair's (1990) research validates 
Lipset and Rokkan's theory, as they apply the concept of "bloc validity": parties in the 
same bloc share similar class orientation. They suggest the increase of volatility as 
argued by other scholars is a result of increasing electoral choice, such as number of 
competing parties, but not a change in loyalty to class or party. 
If it is possible that a party system "freeze" itself, then how could party system 
change be possible? Party system change can be explained by changes in cleavage 
system: development of social cleavages, decline of existing cleavage or substitution 
of cleavage in society (Maor, 1997, p.29). Scholars such as Flanagan and Dalton 
(1984, p.8-1 0) emphasizes the "cyclical pattern" of cleavage development, where a 
social cleavage sharply divides the society when first emerged, then there is a stage of 
convergence, then it become institutionalized and eventually come to a stage of 
dealignment as public shows less commitment to the cleavage. 
In conclusion, party system can be seen as a reflection of cleavage, developed 
from historical events or societal class, stabilized and "freeze" by universal suffrage, 
and party system change is a result of changes in cleavage system. Not all scholars 
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agree with this explanation of party system and party system change, as they believe 
changes in societal cleavage, as well as number of parties, their polarization and 
electoral volatility are essentially mediated through political parties (for example 
Smith, 1989, as cited in Maor, 1997). In the following, a famous work by Sartori 
(1976), which treats party system as a system of interaction among parties will be 
presented. 
3.1.2.2 Party System as a System of Interaction 
Sartori's (1976, p.44) framework perceives party system as a "system of 
interactions resulting from inter-party competition", and hence should focus on the 
strategic capabilities of parties. Party system changes only if parties lose control of 
their agenda-setting role. 
Sartori (1976) proposes party system as an "independent set of inter-party 
relationship". In investigating a party system, it is important to focus on the "strategic 
games" and "strategic capability" of political parties. It is because political parties do 
not automatically accept and adapt their strategies according to the environment and 
environmental changes. Political parties would try to "initiate moves and 
countermoves" (Maor, 1997, p.31), where cleavages exist in party system largely 
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because political parties make them to become salient. Party and party system may 
change if political party loses its control of agenda setting role, or linkage between 
political party and interest groups become weaken. 
Sartori analyses this "system of interaction" from two dimensions: number of 
parties (or fragmentation) and ideological difference (or polarization) among parties 
within the system. As mentioned before, number of parties in this schema does not 
count every party within the system, but only counts "relevant parties" with coalition 
potential or blackmail potential. In other words, those parties which are able to affect 
formation of government and policy-making process are included in a party system. 
The level of fragmentation is low if a party system consists of less than five 
"relevant" parties, and system with more than five "relevant" parties is a highly 
fragmented system. On the dimension of polarization, greater is the distance between 
polar parties, the more polarized the party system is. 
Base on these two dimensions, Sartori comes up with two basic types of party 
system. The first basic type consists of two-party system and moderate pluralist party 
system. In this first basic type, parties compete for centre votes, and the two systems 
differs on form of government formation, where the former has a viable alternative 
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and the later does not have a single party to govern alone. The second basic type is a 
fragmented and highly polarized party system. This system has two distinctive 
characteristics: the existence of "anti-system party" which "undermines the legitimacy 
of the regime it opposes" (Sartori, 1976, p.133) and the existence of bilateral 
opposition. Opposition parties are located on both side of the ideological spectrum 
with the governing party is in the middle of the two poles. 
Besides these two basic types, one special type of party system mentioned by 
Sartori is the predominant party system, which is specially explaining the 55' System 
in Japan before 1993. This is a party system with one major party that is strong 
enough to govern alone, and other parties are not effective enough to compete with 
the governing party, although they are fully legal and legitimate. The governing party 
is the only party that win majority consistently and therefore dominates the 
government. This type party system could be seen as stabilized if a party won four 
absolute majorities consecutively. 
In conclusion, Sartori's perception on party system as a "system of interaction" 
allows us to understand the mechanism in a certain party system. Societal cleavage 
does not automatically transfer into party system cleavage. Party system very much 
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depends on the actions taken by the parties in the system. At the same time, we should 
not perceive "a party" as "a unitary actor", as Str0m (1990, p.569) accurately 
criticizes, party organization is not a "unitary and unconstrained actor". Instead, 
political party is a complex organization, and there are internal constraints on party 
leader and external constraints on the party's freedom of action. In other words, the 
availability of strategies of a party in structure of competition is constrained by the 
party organization, for instant -mobilization ability of the party on the ground, 
ideological position and issues pursue is determined by the intra-party negotiation, 
and strategies of party is determined by autonomy of party leader. In the following, 
scholarly works on party organization theory will be briefly discussed. 
3.2 Party Organization 
Scholars try to understand party organizations and explain the difference 
between them through different typologies and perspectives. Among these works, the 
most famous ones are the elite party model, the mass party model, the electoralist 
catch-all model, and the cartel party model. These models are relating different 
aspects of party organization, and referring to "widely varying and inconsistent 
features" (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, as cited in Krouwel, 2006, p.249). However, 
scholarly works on party organization can be generally divided into three perspectives, 
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namely the electoral competition perspective, the sociological perspective and the 
institutional perspective (Ware, 1996, p.94-1 08). In the following, the three 
perspectives and the critiques will be presented. 
3.2.1 Electoral Competition Perspective 
According to Ware (1996), electoral competition perspective is represented by 
Duverger (1959) and Epstein (1967). From this approach, electoral competition in a 
specific way will push political parties to adopt a particular kind of party organization. 
In Duverger's (1959) work, besides distinguishing parties into "direct" structure and 
"indirect" structure, where the former is a unitary organization and later is union of 
other organizations, he also identifies four different "basic elements" of party, namely 
caucus, branch, cell and militia, and his assessment on party structure bases on 
electoral competitiveness. 
Caucus consists of a small number of members bases on political elites and seeks 
no expansion. Political elites control party affairs in their own territory and form 
linkage with other elites at national level. It is rather decentralized and weakly tied. 
Formal party organization at national level will be formed only if there is pressure for 
political mobilization. Most caucus party is internally created as it is created by 
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political elites. Branch refers to mass membership party, as branch tries to recruit 
members in order to obtain more resources. Branch party is quite centralize and is 
regulated by a central party. Branch party is externally created as it is mostly created 
by organizations excluded from political power, such as Socialists party. 
Cell party and militia party are two special organizational types related to 
Communist party and Fascists- respectively. Cell parties concerns with quality instead 
of quantity of members, cnd is controlled by the party center. The major 
organizational unit is at working place instead of geographical location, since working 
class is better mobilized at working place. On the other hand, militia party is 
organized to perform unconventional electoral politics, and is structured in a military 
form, base on very small groups which build up into pyramids to form larger units. 
Duverger (1959) sees branch party as the best organizational structure, because 
branch parties is the best to compete for votes in terms of mass mobilization, as well 
as retain support of party loyalists. This enables political parties to acquire more 
political resources for development. Caucus party will eventually transform into 
branch party or intake features of branch party when facing electoral pressure. Cell 
and militia party are special types of organization for specific goal and hence 
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unsuitable for most parties. Ware (1996, p.96) makes a notion that Duverger fully 
recognizes the importance of organizational history in affecting party structure, as 
well as different ways in which a branch party could be structured. However, 
Duverger's central argument is that branch party is the most suitable form of party 
organization as it provides greater opportunities for acquiring resources required in 
electoral competition. In other words, electoral competition is an important factor in 
constructing party organization. 
At the same time, Epstein (1980) also recognizes party organization is primarily 
a response to competition of votes. He argues in modern electoral campaign, such as 
television advertisement and modern electoral strategies need huge amount of money 
resources, the best model of party organization is American-type party, where 
resources is acquired from interest groups and individual donors, instead of mass 
membership. Despite Epstein admits in his later work that he overestimated the 
pressure of electoral competition on European parties to move towards the direction 
of an American-type party (as cited in Ware, 1996, p. 97, 101). In other words, 
although Epstein's and Duverger's argument are different, they both agree electoral 
competition is a major factor in affect the form of party organizational structure. 
72 
Criticism towards the electoral competition approach is straightforward. Political 
parties do not transform themselves simply because of the electoral environment, 
there are many constraints that political parties face that may refrain them from 
transformation. For example, Ware (1996, p.1 02) argues that party faces different 
organizational weakness. Reform of party organization depends on resources it has 
and substitutability of various resources. At the same time, any reform in political 
party links to various interests-within the party, and may face opposition during the 
course of reform. Therefore, electoral competition need is not crucial enough for us to 
understand a particular party organization. In the following, sociological perspective 
and its usefulness in understanding party organization will be briefly discussed. 
3.2.2 Sociological Perspective 
Sociological perspective argues that certain kinds of resources available to a 
party limits and provides opportunity for a political party to organize into the form it 
is. The idea of sociological perspective is that, party organization has to perform 
various activities, for example conducting election campaign, mobilizing public 
support, conducting policy research and public opinion poll, and so on. All these 
activities require resources to operate, such as money resources, labor or membership 
resources, charismatic leader, and linkage with interest groups and so on (Ware, 1996). 
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Resources such as money and membership can be used to perform some tasks or 
acquire other special resources, but money and membership may not always be 
substitutable, for example a party receives large amount of donation may not be able 
to attract working class member. 
Therefore, resources that a party own and potential of new resources after reform 
determine the response of a party towards electoral challenge. Present form of a party 
affects its motivation and direction of transform, because different form of 
organization may be affected differently by the same change (Ware, 1996). Consider a 
party which relies much on its own resources and a party which money and 
membership resources depends on an affiliated organization. Decline in membership 
and votes would have different impact towards two parties. The one which rely on its 
own resources may response quickly to the change, while the later may not be 
seriously affected or even constrained by the demands from its sponsor and hence 
react reluctantly. 
In this sense, there is no such kind of optimal party organizational structure, as 
different parties have different resources. Katz and Mair's (1995) cartel party model 
precisely refers to this perspective. According to Katz and Mair, cartel party is a new 
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party model emerging in liberal democracies, which is characterized as 
"interpenetration of party and state" and "a pattern of inter-party collusion". One of 
the most important features of cartel party is that, parties use their power to get 
resources from the state and maintain their cooperation to prevent new political 
parties from rising. At the same time, those resources provided by the state can 
substitute those provided by members, and hence discourage parties to develop their 
membership base. 
Another feature of Katz and Mair 's (1995) cartel party model is the state control 
of mass media. Especially electronic media is now under heavier regulation and 
access to electronic media is limited to those parties which are privileged in power. 
Parties at margin are always excluded. Limited access to media, combine with 
increasing importance of electronic media in modem electoral campaign, offers party 
in power "a resource which was previously inconceivable" (Katz and Mair, 1995, 
p.16). The style of campaigning is becoming more and more capital-intensive, 
focusing more on non-partisan communication networks, and depending more on 
professional and centralized style of campaign (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.19). This 
phenomenon requires political parties to input more resources in campaigning and 
hence increasing the influence of resource in party organizational development. 
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It is plausible that a development of party organization depends on resources 
available, as well as potential resource it may gain after reform, as smooth operation 
of any political party needs various resources. Electoral success, as well as availability 
of electoral strategy, very much depends on the resources available to the party. 
However, problem of sociological perspective is that party is not a unitary actor, even 
if a party acquires financial or-Iabor resources, intra-organizational conflicts which 
fight for power and autonomy will not be solved. On the other hand, recognition of 
the role and importance of media certainly provide insight for this thesis, as the role of 
media is increasingly important in Japan8• In the later part of this thesis, the 
importance of media in Japan will be emphasized. In order to search for more 
convincing alternatives to understand party organization, the institutional perspective 
will be discussed. 
3.2.3 Institutional Perspective 
Panebianco's (1988) framework on genetic model and institutionalization 
clarifies many important features of internal life political parties. In this framework, 
there are two variables: the genetic model and level of institutionalization. 
8 For example, the Japanese Journal of Political Science has published a series of article discussing the 
changing media in general and in Japan. See Japanese Journal of Political Science 8 (1). 
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3.2.3.1 Genetic Model 
Genetic origin refers to how do the party originated and how do it consolidate. 
Genetic origin is important in analyzing party organization since characteristic of a 
party organizational depends on its history (Panebianco, 1988, p.50). Genetic origin 
could be analyzed from three perspectives: organizational construction, existence of 
external "sponsor" and role of ~harisma in party formation (Panebianco, 1988). 
1. Organizational construction 
Organizational construction can be divided into territorial penetration and 
territorial diffusion. Territorial penetration means a more centralized control 
during the construction of the party. As a result, development of the local 
party organization would be directed by the center. On the other hand, 
territorial diffusion refers to construction of party organization by local 
elites and later integrates into a larger national organization. For 
organization of the penetration type, party organization tends to be more 
centralized and close, while diffusion type tends to be more distance from 
the state and more inclusive in nature. 
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2. Existence of "external" sponsor 
This factor directly relates to the source of legitimation of leadership, since 
the existence of "external" sponsor would make the party become a 
"political arm" of the sponsor, loyalty towards the party would be indirect 
and leadership's legitimation would be external. 
3. Role of charisma 
This factor is to evaluate possibility of the party organization to become a 
vehicle of charismatic leader and hence the autonomy or control capacity of 
leadership. The more dependence on charisma in party formation and 
development is, the more likely a leader is able to mold the organization 
according to his wish. 
3.2.3.2 Institutionalization 
Institutionalization of a party refers to making the party lose its characteristics as 
a tool and become valuable in and of it, and its goals become inseparable and 
indistinguishable from the party (Panebianco, 1988, p.53). Level of 
institutionalization affects a party's ability to defense environmental changes and 
uncertainty. The degree of institutionalization is a continuum from "strong 
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institutionalization" to "weak institutionalization". Institutionalization level is related 
to the degree of autonomy and degree of systemness. 
Organization's degree of autonomy in relation to the environment concerns 
whether a party can directly control over the exchange process with external 
environment. High controlling power over the exchange process means high 
autonomy, for example financial resources, external organizations and electoral 
support. Low degree of actonomy to the environment results to a party organization 
that must response and adapt to environmental changes. 
Degree of systemness focuses on internal structural coherence of an organization. 
It depends on whether internal subgroups have high autonomy or not. High 
systemness in the organization also means existence of homogeneous sub-group 
within the organization, as well as a more centralized control of resources. Low 
degree of systemness decreases autonomy of the party towards the external 
environment. 
3.2.3.3 Implication of the Institutional Perspective 
The genetic model and institutionalization in Panebianco's framework have two 
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implications. Firstly, the gene of an organization is critical to the party's 
characteristics and way of consolidation. More diffuse the party is in its formation 
stage, lower the degree of internal coherence it has. It is because internal groups will 
struggle for power within the party (Panebianco, 1988, p.51). Although the DP J is not 
a party with "territorial diffusion", its formation history of various splinters produces 
a similar result. The issue of internal coherence will be the focus of Chapter 4. 
Secondly, party organization has to experience a "qualitative leap" from a 
"consumable" organization (as a pure means to certain ends) to an institution, and 
become valuable in and of it (Panebianco, 1988, p.53). In order to institutionalize, a 
party has to distribute both collective and selective incentive. Collective incentive has 
to distribute equally to all members in order to create a community of fate, which is 
the base of institutionalization. At the same time, a party has to distribute selective 
incentive to some of the members in order to develop an "organizational interest". 
The party will then set up a procedure of distribution of organizational interest which 
led to institutionalization. Although this dissertation will not deal with the issue of 
institutionalization of the DP J party organization, both the distribution of collective 
incentive and selective incentive in the DP J party organization will be investigated. 
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3.2.3.4 Conclusion 
Panebianco's framework emphasizes on the importance of party organizational 
history, as the pattern of relationship within the party, relationship with external 
environment, as well as development of organization, very much affected by the 
initial party organization. As Ware (1996, p.1 00) describes, this approach is both an 
"institutional" one and draws heavily on the "weight of the past", as the "defining 
moment" of the party limits its subsequent development. 
Although Panebianco's study is often criticized as limited to four cases: France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. The model is also "over-theorized" that does 
not fit party organizational development in the real world. At the same time, the 
model pays insufficient attention towards the adaptation to response to the changes in 
the electoral market (Ware, 1996). These are all valid criticism towards Panebianco's 
framework. Nonetheless, it does not reject the usefulness to investigate the party 
organization from within. In this dissertation, the formation history of the DP J which 
signifies the gene of "umbrella organization" of diverse force, and its party 
organization development, especially the issue of factionalism which is related to the 
degree of systemness will be the focus of investigation. 
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3.3 Media 
As mentioned by Katz and Mair (1995), control of media by the state enables 
party in power to gain advantage and exclude those marginalized ones. This is one of 
the factors that consolidate the LDP regime under the 55' system, as media faces 
institutional constraints by the press club system. However, the fall of the LDP from 
power in 1993 led to debate on whether media is as strictly controlled as it had been 
as the scandals are revealed by media. If we take one step backward, we should ask 
what the role of media in Japan is. Is it a neutral transmitter as presumed in most of 
the political science literature? Is it a servant of the state as many scholars of Japanese 
media studies argued? Is it a watchdog as the media itself claimed? Or is it a 
"trickster" that having a dynamic role in the society? After a brief discussion on the 
media role, the literature on media effect will be presented. Media effect can be 
divided into short term and long term effect. Short term effect includes agenda setting, 
framing and promotion of image campaign, while long term effects refers to impact 
on political involvement. 
3.3.1 Role of Media 
Literatures on media role can be divided into media as neutral transmitter, media 
as watchdog, media as servant and media as "trickster". 
82 
3.3.1.1 Media as Neutral Transmitter 
According to Freeman (2000, p.6), the field of media studies, political science 
and sociology is greatly affected by the Lazarsfeld's Columbia school from 1940s to 
1960s. Paul Lazarsfeld and other Columbia school scholars, concludes media has 
"minimal or no effects". It is because they believe media is merely a neutral and 
passive conduit in the process of transmitting information. Among various "real 
players" in political arena, media is only regarded as a neutral player for channeling 
information that serves no particular political interest. 
Moreover, from a cognitive consistency theory point of view, individuals that 
possess core beliefs and attitudes tend to resist discrepant information. Individuals 
would select information that coincide with their pre-existent perception rather than 
change their belief (Flanagan, 1991, p.298-299). In the same way, schema theory also 
argues that individuals would develop a "pyramidal cognitive structure" from 
previous experiences in order to select and identify important information, as well as 
interpret information to fit their established perception (Graber, 1984, as cited in 
Flanagan, 1991). These arguments on insignificant effect of media on voters' attitude 
contribute to the argument of minimal effect of media. 
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The neutral role of media hypothesis was heavily challenged by the revisionist 
school, arguing that media has an influence on attitude change, or media plays an 
important role on agenda setting and political mobilization. However, impact of the 
neutral media role is so profound that media is often marginalized or considered as 
peripheral. Pharr (1996, p. 20) also comments general literature of political science 
ignores the role of media in political process, coincide with the "spectator approach" 
that implies a minimal rol~ of media. 
3.3.1.2 Media as Watchdog 
One revisionist school argues media actually influences attitude of individual, 
but with a localized effect or direct to a specific media user subgroup. Another 
revisionist school emphasizes on other important function of media other than 
influencing political attitude, such as agenda setting and framing effect. These 
functions will be discussed in the later part of this chapter. 
The viewpoint on media as watchdog sees media as an independent critical force 
representing the public. The watchdog role of the media means media can be a major 
force in political change and reform. Graber (2001) founds that in the Watergate affair, 
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media's investigative reports stirred up public reaction and demand for political 
reform, forcing political elites to propose solution to relief the situation. Some 
literatures on Japan focus at the media's "mission as systematic and continuous 
criticism of the government in power" (Ward, 1978, p.52-53; as stated in Pharr, 1996, 
p.22). One example is the Lockheed scandal where media reports heavily decreased 
the supportive rate of the LDP and affected voters' choice in the 1976 HR election. 
During that period, voter's demand on corruption-reform issue was significantly 
affected by media. More recent example is Prime Minister Abe 's resignation after a 
series of scandals discovered by the media. Some scholars even argues under the long 
era of single-party ruling in Japan, weak opposition parties have very limited effect in 
monitoring the LDP government, therefore media has replaced the opposition parties 
to monitor the government (Lee, 1985). 
Under this perspective of media role, media is an active actor in the political 
arena. Media does not only passively transmitting political information, but having 
some political influence. 
3.3.1.3 Media as Servant 
In contrast, "media as servant" stresses the institutional and structural constraints 
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on media that makes media eventually serve for the interest of the state or business. 
Media is still seen as an active player in the political arena, but performing an 
opposite role in the democratic process when comparing with the "media as 
watchdog" perspective. 
This perspective questions the independency and autonomy of media, and asks 
whose interest in the end media serve for. Scholars argue media is an instrument of 
the state to promote prevailing social values and political arrangements and media can 
be seen as a dependent entity to the state (Freeman, 2000, p.16). The state has power 
over media's information dissemination and as a result asserting influence on media to 
trivialize issues and ideology that violates the state's interest. A similar argument is 
observed under the Japanese context, where media is very much depends on the press 
club system. Political information disseminated and membership of press club is 
deliberately controlled by the state, media is very much a dependence entity on the 
state. 
Obviously, not all scholars see media as a servant agree that media retain no 
autonomy at all. This is the problem of how much autonomy does media have. In a 
capitalist society, it is unlikely that media transmit only state propaganda. There must 
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be some autonomy lies on their staff, organization and business revenue. 
3.3.1.4 Media as "Trickster" 
Therefore, it is impossible to conclude media acts a single role as a watchdog or 
a servant, since there are a lot of actors in media politics: journalist, news source, 
businessman, bureaucrat, politician, political party, and etc. For example, media in 
Japan faces institutional setting of press club system, industry association and election 
laws. In order to construct a more dynamic picture of media politics, which is closer 
to reality than the "watchdog" or "servant" type of ideal perspective, this dissertation 
suggests Susan Pharr's (1996) metaphor of "media as trickster" can provide valuable 
insight. 
The "media as trickster" metaphor suggests an ambiguous "insider-outsider" role 
of media in relation with various political forces: politician, bureaucrat, civil society, 
citizen. The role of media is hard to manage and predict, as it does not serve for any 
interest, and escape from control by any group. It possesses a multiple and dynamic 
relationship with the society and positions in a "betwixt-and-between position" in the 
social structure. It is because media cannot be independent from the structure, but at 
the same time has complex relationship with the society. For example, although 
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mainstream media acts as an insider with a strong institutionalized linkage with the 
state through the press club system, they can still become "outsider" in presenting less 
uniform and less predictable ideas, for example liberal-mind journalists would 
contribute articles anonymously in non-mainstream media (Farley, 1996, p.140) and 
journalist's manipulation in presentation of contents (Tanaka, 2006). 
In conclusion, media offers a "mosaic of idea and image" to the public, which 
consists of various and often contradicting images to the public. This means it is 
impossible to capture the "real" role of media, as the trickster role implies a dynamic 
and changing role of media and relationship with other actors and institutions. 
3.3.2 Media Effect 
If we accept media somehow plays an active role in the political arena, consists 
of multiple actors under institutional constraints, and serves no single and particular 
interest, it would be worthwhile to investigate political impact induced by media. 
Media effect could be divided into short-term effect and long-term effect. Short-term 
effect includes agenda-setting, framing effect and promoting image campaign. 
Long-term effect refers to media effect on political involvement. 
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3.3.2.1 Short-term Effect 
3.3.2.1.1 Agenda-Setting 
Agenda-setting means "how media coverage can define the set of issues 
considered to be important by citizens and government officials" (Hamilton, 2007, 
p.17). In other words, it concerns about the learning effect of media on audience to 
makes them aware and concern about a particular issue (political agenda) at a time. 
McCombs and Shaw (1972) conduct a research on agenda-setting effects of media in 
the 1968 US presidential ~lection. They believe that voter's perception on important 
issues very much depends on amount of news coverage on these issues, and they 
discovers there is a strong positive correlation between the media ranking of issues 
and voter's ranking of issues. They conclude mass media has significant cumulative 
effect on audiences' cognition, although media seems to have little direct influence on 
audiences' opinion. Agenda-setting is critical in electoral campaign, as the party that 
successfully claiming the agenda-setting role tends to win in elections, as 
demonstrated in the 2005 HR and 2007 HC election. The agenda-setting strategy of 
the DP J will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
3.3.2.1.2 Framing 
Framing refers to the way an event is described in news coverage and its impact 
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on public reaction. Cappella and Jamieson (1996) identify two kinds of frames: 
game/strategy framing and issue/substance framing. Jamieson (1992) notes that there 
are several characteristics of strategy framing: 1. Victory and defeat as the central 
focus of coverage; 2. Using language of competition, games and war; 3. Mention of 
performers, critics and audience (or voters); 4. News emphasize on performance, style 
and perception of the candidates, and 5. Greater weight in news coverage is given to 
public opinion polls and position in evaluating campaigns and candidates. On the 
other hand, issue/substance framing concerns on policy content, effect of policy and 
characteristics of politicians (Kabashima, Takeshita and Serikawa, 2007, p.130). 
There is a debate on whether way of framing has any effect on politics. 
Traditional analysis holds that the way media cover politics has no significant effect 
on politics. However, Cappella and Jamieson (1996) argue news framing on 
politicians, policy, election campaigns and governance would have effect on quality of 
democracy and perception of press. They find that strategy frame may remind 
audience that political actors are self-interest oriented in election campaign or in 
public policy. When both sides in the debate are colored by self-interest motivation, 
cynicism would be a reasonable reaction which dismisses both sides in the debate and 
eventually the debating process. This kind of simple reduction of political action and 
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process into single motivation of winning for power would result in public's cynicism 
towards every aspect of politics: election campaign, policy debates, political parties, 
politicians, the government, and eventually the media. 
3.3.2.1.3 Promote Image Campaign 
Voting decision of individual is influenced by his media exposure. Graber (1980) 
find that if an issue is well-known by the audience, such as party position, issues, and 
party platform, where the audience holds stereotyped beliefs about the issue, he would 
take a "perceiver-determined" perception to derive information from media coverage. 
On the other hand, if he is not familiar with the issue, lack personal experience or 
guidance from social contacts, such as candidates' characteristics and ability, image 
would be derived from media coverage through "stimulus-determined" perception. 
Voter's perception on candidates ' and parties' image is very much shaped by the 
media. Some researchers such as Fujitani (2005, p.1 06-107) and Otake (2003) find 
that there is an increasing tendency that audience makes use of politician's image as a 
voting criterion. It is because in Japan, there is an increasing importance of television 
as a channel of transmitting political information. Television news is more effective in 
providing audience personal characteristics and help building up clear image of 
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politicians, as it is better in transmitting image than hard factual information. 
Television audience tends to make use of politician's image as a voting criterion. 
Promotion of image campaign is critical in the DP J media strategy, as the party 
actively seeks different ways to promote themselves in the early stage of their media 
campaign. This will be discussed in detailed in Chapter 5. 
3.3.2.2 Long-term Effect 
3.3.2.2.1 Political Involvement 
Scholars debate whether media has a positive or negative impact towards 
political involvement. Some scholars suggest media exposure would increase level of 
political knowledge and awareness, hence has a positive impact in political 
involvement. On the other hand, some scholars regard media has negative impact 
towards image of politics and hence reduce political involvement. In fact, media 
impact on political involvement might differ among social groups, as increasing 
choices permit audience to freely select information they would like to receive, and 
hence widen the gap of information and political involvement. 
Some scholars find that higher level of political information lead to higher level 
of political involvement. Individuals with higher rate with media possess higher level 
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of knowledge, and show more accurate, deeper and broader understanding towards 
political issues, even if education level and other demographic variables are controlled 
(Miyake, Kinoshita and Aiba, 1967). Media could also stimulate political involvement 
by arousing interest in election campaign, and in return seeking more information 
from media (Lazarsfeld et aI., 1944; Berelson et aI., 1954; as stated in Flanagan, 
1991). 
On the other hand, Jamieson (1992) and Patterson (1993) argue game/strategic 
frames would guide public to be distanced from politics and see election as a game 
that winning is the primarily concern, which lead to political distrust on campaigns. 
Patterson (1996) also argues that the "bad-news tendency" of US media, which has 
been negative in tone in news coverage about presidency and the Congress, is a major 
factor of negative impression towards politics in elections since the 1980s. 
Prior (2005) argues that increasing media choice has widen the gap of political 
knowledge among audience. People interest in politics would have more chance to 
access to political information, while others may voluntarily select non-political 
information. Based on the "theory of least objectionable program", audience no 
longer unintentionally exposed to political information because of few choices of 
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channels, and therefore less chance of passive learning. As a result, the information 
gap between audience interested in and not interested in politics is widened. Since 
exposure to political information increase political knowledge, and increase in 
political knowledge would increase political turnout, the segment of population which 
is interested in politics would increase political participation, while the others would 
diminished political participation. 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Assessing Party Organization 
In this dissertation, institutional approach will be applied to investigate the 
Democratic Party of Japan. As Panebianco (1988, p.7) emphasizes, the "real aim of an 
organization is never determinable a priori". There is plurality of aims in an 
organization, and there is complex relationship among different actors pursuing 
different goals simultaneously. The DP J has a complicated intra-organization 
relationship, as the party has various factions and is fragmented in three dimensions. 
The issue of internal coherence will be one of the focuses in this dissertation. 
Therefore, instead of referring to a particular set of party model to fit the party 
organization of the DPJ, this dissertation applies various methods such as interview, 
documentary research, content analysis and counting in distribution of posts to 
94 
analyze the DPJ party organization. 
3.4.1.1 First-hand and Second-hand Interview 
This dissertation applies both first-hand and second-hand interviews. In an 
interview with a DP J officer, policy-making process of the DP J is revealed. Details of 
the bottom-up policy-making process would be applied on the argument of 
leadership's manipulation in maintaining internal coherence, as it provides a 
grievance expression channel within the party. Moreover, various second-hand 
interviews with politicians (who are difficult to reach) will be employed to explain the 
party's goal, leadership system and manipulation in maintaining internal coherence of 
the party. 
3.4.1.2 Documentary Research 
Documentary research will be widely applied in this dissertation. In assessing 
party organization of the DPJ, party documents are the major primary source. These 
documents include party's year plans, activity reports and party news. Moreover, 
publications such as books and articles published by politicians, as well as newspaper 
articles will also be included. Internet resources, such as politician's homepage and 
blog will also be analyzed. Party documents will be presented in the leadership 's 
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manipulation in party organization, creation of collective incentive and distribution of 
selective incentives. 
3.4.1.3 Content Analysis on Politicians' Statements 
Content analysis will be applied in proving the existence of collective incentive 
in the party, as the thesis argues there is a common goal among politicians, which is 
pursuing a decentralized and civil-society based society. The DP J manifestos and 
political belief of individual politicians that announced in their own website will be 
analyzed. In details, a list of word will be produced in analyzing the politician's 
attitude, a set of sample including both DP J's HR and HC politicians will be analyzed 
and counted in order to confirm a positive attitude towards decentralization and 
civil-society based participatory style of politics. If there is a high conformity among 
politicians on these issues, we can conclude there is an existence of collective 
incentives within the party to maintain internal coherence. 
3.4.1.4 Counting on Distribution of Posts 
For evaluating distribution of selective incentive, counting on distribution of 
posts will be applied. There are three sets of sample to be analyzed: top leadership 
party posts, Next Cabinet posts and Diet posts (Committee Chairman and Director in 
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HR and HC). In details, seven appointments of top leadership party posts will be 
selected, while all NC appointments and the current Diet posts will be analyzed. 
In each set of sample, two issues will be addressed. The first concern is about 
distribution of posts among factions and the second concern is about distribution of 
posts among different generations. In short, factions will be categorized by former 
party affiliation, since politicians may join multiple factions. Generation will be 
divided into three categories: young politicians who are 1 st - 2nd termers, 
middle-ranking politicians who are 3rd - 4th termers and veteran politicians who are 5th 
termer or above. The number of posts distributed to each "former party affiliation" 
and generation will be analyzed if there is a balanced distribution of post and hence a 
balance distribution of selective incentive. 
3.4.2 Assessing Media Strategy of the DPJ 
3.4.2.1 Documentary Research 
Chapter 4 will mainly apply documentary research. In this chapter, the major 
argument is that the DP J leadership actually aware of the importance of media 
strategy and deliberately develops different strategies throughout the history of the 
DP J. Through examination on party documents such as party year plan, party activity 
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report, news articles released by the party, second-hand interviews, newspaper reports 
and politicians' publications, three stages of media strategies can be identified. This 
dissertation further investigates the media strategy of the DP J and the development of 
Japanese political environment, and argues it is the leadership awareness of external 
electoral environment changes lead to the adjustment of media strategy of the DP J. 
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, vario:.ls theories about party system, party organization and media 
role and effect are presented. Party system is the foundation of research on party 
politics. However, as party is not a unitary actor, internal mechanism of political 
parties must be investigated. Scholars present various perspectives for party 
organization, and this dissertation will apply institutional perspective as represented 
by Panebianco. On the other hand, media is increasingly important in Japan. Scholars 
debated on various roles of media, and Pharr precisely concluded the role of a 
"trickster" that plays an ambiguous "insider-outsider" role in relation with various 
political forces. At the same time, there are researches on various media effects, 
including short-term effects such as agenda-setting, framing effect and promoting 
image campaign, and long-term effect in political involvement. Finally, methodology 
of this dissertation is briefly presented. In chapter 3, various methods such as 
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first-hand and second-hand interviews, documentary research, content analysis and 
quantitative research will be applied, in order to investigate the factors of maintain 
internal coherence of the DPJ. In chapter 4, documentary research will be applied to 
discover the media strategy of the DPJ. 
In the next chapter, the first argument of this dissertation will be presented. The 
DP J organizational fragmentation can be identified in three dimensions. This 
dissertation suggests that the DP J leadership actually plays an active role in 
maintaining internal coherence of the party. First of all, following the NFP failure, 
they noticed the importance to maneuver the DP J party organization. In order to 
maintain internal coherence, they constructed a bottom-up policy making procedure, 
created an open leadership system and manipulated in the merger with the Liberal 
Party (LP). Moreover, the DPJ's collect incentive actually inherits from the leaders: 
decentralization is inherited from Hatoyama and civil-society-Ied style of politics is 
inherited from Kan. The leadership tries to differentiate the DPJ from the LDP 
through the two issues to form a common identity. Finally, the DP J leadership 
deliberately distributes a balance personnel policy comprehensively, and acts as a 
selective incentive system to maintain the party's unification. 
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Chapter 4: Internal Coherence of the DPJ 
"The true objective of an organization is not pursuing the manifested aims for 
which the organization was established, but rather that of ensuring the 
organization s survival" (Panebianco, 1988, p. 7). The aim of organizational 
survival for the DP J does not only concern about electoral advancement, but 
more fundamentally, preventing the party from disintegration. The DP J has a 
gene of diverse force and -organizational fragmentation can be identified in three 
dimensions: traditional ideological conflict, former party affiliation conflict and 
generation conflict. This dissertation suggests the DP J leadership actually plays 
an active role in maintaining the internal coherence of the party. First of all, 
following the NFP failure, they noticed the importance of maintaining internal 
coherence. They constructed a bottom-up policy making procedure, an open 
leadership system and manipulated in the merger with the Liberal Party (LP). 
Moreover, the DP J s collect incentive actually inherits from the leaders: 
decentralization is inherited from Hatoyama and civil-society-Ied style of politics 
is inherited from Kan. The leadership tries to differentiate the DP J from the LDP 
through the two issues to form a common identity. Finally, the DP J leadership 
deliberately distributes a balance personnel policy comprehensively, and acts as 
a selective incentive system to maintain the party s unification. 
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4.1 F actionalism in the D P J 
One of the most prominent features of party organization of the DP J is the 
factionalism within party. Factionalism within the party signifies a low degree of 
systemness, as there are heterogeneous groups within the party. Kollner (2004) 
concludes that there are numbers of factions in the DPJ. The two factions under 
umbrella of union, the Domei-affiliated Minsha Kyokai (or Yuai Kurabu in his work) 
and the Sohyo-affiliated Shinseikyoku Kondankai, are regarded as institutionalized 
faction, while other factions are much less institutionalized than the two factions. In 
fact, there are nine major factions within the DPJ, with different size, ideology, 
generation and former party affiliation. In brief, the Ozawa group is currently the 
largest group, while Hatoyama group, Kan group, former JSP group, Maehara group, 
Noda group and former DSP group have similar number of members. On the other 
hand, there are six conservative groups and three progressive groups within the party, 
and there are three groups consist of significant amount of young-middle ranking 
politicians. It should be noted that many factions actually have a close relationship 
with former party affiliation. A brief introduction to the factions in the DP J is 
illustrated in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Factions within the DPJ 
-
I 11 




Name Representative Membership Notes 
Party 
-
Around 40-50 A group formed by former LP or 
'sh in Kai Ozawa Ichiro Conservative Young LP Ozawa Ichiro Political School 
)zawa Group) members 
members. 
~iken Kodai wo 
Hatoyama Around 30 
A conservative group evolves 
l itsugensuru Kai Conservative Inclusive NFP around Hatoyama. Close relationship 
Yukio members 
-Iatoyama Group) with other conservative groups. 
~iken Senryaku Veteran 
Hata Tsutomu, Around 18 Conservative groups of members 
"enkyukai Conservative lead the Minseito 
Okada Katsuya members with Minseito background. 
-lata Group) group 
youn Kai Conservati ve, Young- Conservative and young group. 
Maehara Seij i, Around 30 Sakigake, 
vlaehara- Edano Non- middle Non-mainstream group since Ozawa 
Edano Yukio members lNP 




Yoshihiko, Around 25 Middle- Conservative group with close 
hishi no Kai Co nservati ve background 




linsha Kyokai (DSP 
Former DSP members, with a strong 
iroup I Kawabata 
Kawabata Around 25 
Conservative Inclusive DSP 
iroup) Tatsuo members support from the Domei union. 
~uni no Katachi JSP, 
~enkyukai Kan Naoto, Eda Around 30 
Progressive and liberal faction with 
Progressive Inclusive Democratic 
Kan Group) Satsuki members anti-constitutional revision stance. Reform Party 
-
Uberaru no Kai 
NIL (Young 
Group of young liberal members 
Hiraoka- Kondo Hiraoka Hideo, Around 15 
politicians 
with anti-constitutional revision Progressive Young 




(enkyukai (JSP Former JSP members and supported Takahiro, Around 30 by the Sohyo. Anti-constitutional 
}roupl Y okomichi Progressive Inclusive JSP Akamatsu members 
}roUp) revision. 
:::::::-- Hirotaka 
Source: Kollner (2004); Tamura, (2007, p.42-43); Yomiuri Shimbun, 6th November, 
2007, I /J\~fi~j~1~ J R±~~:g~I;t-tf~¥A 
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In defining and categorizing faction, there is one valuable definition propose by 
Beller and Belloni (1978, p.419), where a faction is "any relatively organized group 
that exists within the context of some other group and which competes with rivals for 
power advantages within the larger group of which it is apart". They classify factions 
into three categories: 
1. Cliques and tendencies' 
This kind of group is either almost totally unorganized or short-lived, as its 
aim mainly is to fight for single issue or electoral campaign. Group 
members are not recruited in a coordinated manner and leadership is only 
on an ad hoc basis. Hierarchical structure and formal office may not exist, 
and there is no formal group identity or membership. 
2. Personalized factions 
This kind of group base of clientelism, as it serves as a device for 
mobilization and there is an asymmetrical exchange for power resources. 
The group has a vertical hierarchy and lead by charismatic leader, the group 
fate is limited to political life of the leader. 
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3. Institutionalized factions 
There is a kind of well organized group, as there is high degree of 
bureaucratization and recruitment is a non-personal basis. Although the 
group's political ambitions depend on the leader, survival of the group is 
independent of a particular leader, as there is a common identity to the 
group by the members. 
According to K6llner (2004), the Domei-affiliated Minsha Kyokai (or Yuai 
Kurabu) and the Sohyo-affiliated Shinseikyoku Kondankai are regarded as 
institutionalized faction. It is because both Minsha Kyokai and Shinseikyoku 
Kondankai have their own infrastructure (for example their own office), keeping 
membership records, and charges a membership fee. Moreover, they have a stable and 
adequate amount of funding to operate. It is especially true for Minsha Kyokai as the 
fund already operates at the time when the DSP is still a party. The fund is use for 
daily operation of the organization, holding conference, publishing organizational 
magazine and support candidates for electoral campaign. The Shinseikyoku 
Kondankai, although does not have the adequate amount of resources as the Minsha 
Kyokai has, is still regarded as an institutionalized faction (K611ner, 2004). 
104 
Other intra-party groups in the DP J are less institutionalized as the two 
union-affiliated groups are. These groups often have fluid membership and members 
may belong to different groups at the same time. The regulation within the group is 
loose or even non-exists. These groups usually evolve around a particular politician 
(or few politicians), for example the Seiken Kodai wo Jitsugensuru Kai evolves 
around Hatoyama Yukio; the Kuni no Katachi Kenkyukai evolves around Kan Naoto 
and Eda Satsuki; the Isshin Kai evolves around Ozawa Ichiro and the Ryoun Kai 
evolves around Maehara Seiji and Edano Yukio. Although K6llner (2004, p.97) states 
that these groups "can be easily categorized as cliques or tendencies", members in the 
Ozawa group and Kan group is said to be more closely linked within the group, and 
these groups may have some characteristics of a personalized faction. 
4.2 Three Dimensions of Conflict 
Complex factionalism in the DP J is represented by a three dimensional conflict 
within the party, namely the traditional ideological conflict, the former party 
affiliation conflict and generation conflict. This piece of evidence shows that there are 
heterogeneous group within the party, and the degree of systemness is low in the DP J 
party organization. 
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4.2.1 Traditional Ideological Conflict 
The first dimension is traditional ideological conflict lies on the constitutional 
revision issue and the national safety issue, as identified in the 
progressive-conservative axis. It is "traditional" in the sense that these issues have 
long been the most important cleavage in the 55' System, where the conservative LDP 
and the progressive JSP always debate on. This traditional ideological cleavage has 
transferred to the new party system, as debate on the constitutional revision, the 
Japan-US relationship, as well as the role of Self Defense Force and the role of Japan 
in the United Nation are still in progress. As the Table 4.1 shows, there are three 
progressive groups (Kuni no Katachi Kenkyukai, Riberaru no Kai and Shinseikyoku 
Kenkyukai) which take the stance of anti -constitutional revision, while other 
conservative groups have different proposals on the constitutional revision and 
national security issue, for example Hatoyama published his own constitutional 
revision draft9, Ozawa (1993 , 2006) published his work explaining his stance of 
"normal country" and Maehara has a pro-America stance. Kabashima's (1999a) 
investigation on legislators ' ideology finds that the DP J has a low level of ideological 
coherence. Other scholars such as Nakajyo (2000), Hrebenar (2000) and Kollner 
(2004) also recognize this traditional ideological conflict within the DPJ. 
9 From Hatoyama's personnel homepage, http ://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/cont03/tes_frame.html. 
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4.2.2 Former Party Affiliation Conflict 
The second dimension of conflict is former party affiliation. This refers to the 
groups of members formerly belongs to different parties as the DP J is a merger of 
different parties. In this dimension, two internal conflicts can be observed, namely the 
"union allergy" and the "Ozawa allergy". The former is about conflict between union 
and non-union members and the later is about conflict between pro-Ozawa and 
anti-Ozawa members. 
For the "union allergy", after former JSP and DSP members joined the DPJ, 
conservative members within the DPJ concerned about the close relationship between 
the DP J and unions (Kollner, 2004, p.96). Conservative members such as Maehara 
tried to minimize the Socialist and union influence within the party, as he afraid labor 
union would heavily influence the DPJ and turned the DPJ into a Socialist platform. 
His intention to diminish union influence within the DP J led to a strong confrontation 
within the party (Shiota, 2007, p.221). On the other hand, when Ozawa's LP joined 
the DP J, the former NFP members expressed their concern about Ozawa, and this 
distrust is named as "the Ozawa allergy" (Shiota, 2007, p.30). One example of 
"Ozawa allergy" is that when President Hatoyama suggested a merger with the 
Ozawa's LP, there was strong opposition within the party, and eventually Hatoyama 
107 
has to resign from presidency. Even after the LP joined the DPJ, Ozawa did a lot to 
diminish the anti-Ozawa sentiment within the party (Shiota, 2007, p.30-33). This 
dissertation regards the action of Ozawa as the leadership maneuver to promote 
internal coherence of the party. 
4.2.3 Generation Conflict 
The third dimension of the internal fragmentation of the DP J is the generation 
conflict. Nakajyo (2000) indicates there is a two-layer structure in the DPJ, where the 
confrontation between "young politicians" (wakate gUn) and "middle-ranking 
politicians" (chuken gUn) is the major conflict within the DPJ (Nakajyo's definition 
on generation is different from that in this dissertation, as she defines 4th - 10th termer 
as middle-ranking, where this dissertation define middle-ranking as 3rd - 4th termer 
and 5th termer or above as veteran politicians). For those "middle-ranking" politicians, 
since they are relatively easy to get reelected, they joined the DPJ mainly due to 
ideological reason, for example aim at creating an effective two-party system. On the 
other hand, young politicians with little resources have lower possibility to be 
reelected, and therefore they joined the DP J mainly due to electoral reason, or seeking 
for an "official label" . In other words, conflict between middle-ranking politician and 
young politician lies on the existence of ideological incentives. On the other hand, 
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Mori (2006) discovers in the 2005 HR election, 230 out of 299 candidates have only 
served for the DPJ in their entire political career. He argues that the two-layer 
structure of the DP J lies on young politicians who have only served the DP J in their 
political career and veteran politicians that came from different parties before joining 
the DPJ. These young members have inadequate experience in politics and party 
management, and therefore have limited influence in the party's operation. In fact, 
conflict between veteran politicians and young politicians escalated on party line and 
management style. When Ozawa succeeded Maehara to become party leader in 2006, 
young and middle-ranking politicians continue to seek for political influence within 
the party (Shiota, p.241). 
The above factors signified a low degree of systemness within the DPJ, as the 
party consists of numbers of heterogeneous groups and internal coherence become an 
issue within the party. 
4.3 Leadership of the DPJ 
Another feature of the DP J party organization is the frequently change in 
leadership. The DP J experienced 7 generations of top leadership in its 12 years of 
history. This piece of evidence may be interpreted as lack of autonomy in leadership 
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within the OPJ. However, this dissertation argues the OPJ leadership has a certain 
degree of autonomy and plays an active role in maintaining internal coherence and 
manipulating media strategy. By applying the OP J's former Kokutai Iincho (Chairman 
ofOiet Strategic Committee) Noda words in an interview (Shiota, 2007, p.235), 
short-lived leadership of the OPJ is mainly due to lack of "followership" instead of 
lack of leadership. The lack of "followership" is demonstrated by the fact that OP J 
members easily withdraw their support from the leader, making the party become 
fragmented and unstable. He suggests that the OP J leaders are able to duly perform 
the role of leadership in most of the time, but facing a constraint that in times of 
difficulties, as followers may withdraw their support from the leader. In the following, 
the history of OP J leadership change will be briefly introduced. 
When the old OP J was formed in 1996, the OP J ran a dual leadership system, 
with Hatoyama Yukio responsible for internal affairs and Kan Naoto responsible for 
external affairs. However, this leadership system just ran for one year, and Kan Naoto 
became the only leader of the DPJ in 1997. Kan was reelected in January 1999 as he 
defeated Matsuzawa Shigefumi in the presidential election. 
In September 1999, the DP J held another presidential election, and Hatoyama 
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Yukio defeated Kan and Yokomichi to become the president again. From 2000 to 
2002, Hatoyama was the party leader and the party leadership experienced a relatively 
stable period. However, right after Hatoyama was reelected in September 2002, a 
series of confrontation within the DP J led to his resignation, and Kan was elected as 
the new president in December 2002. 
From 2002 to 2004, Kan acted as the president and completed the merger with 
the LP. It was not until M~y 2004, when Kan Naoto involved in the unpaid pension 
problem and resigned his presidency. Okada Katsuya was elected as the new president 
in the same month. This signified a generation change of leadership as a there is no 
other politicians has became the DP J president besides Hatoyama and Kan, and 
Okada is a fresh fifth-termer when he was elected as president, which is relatively 
young for party leader. However, Okada's presidency did not last for long, as he 
resigned in September 2005 due to poor election result in the 2005 HR election. 
Maehara Seiji, also a fifth-termer of the HR, was elected as president in the same 
month, as he defeated Kan in the president election. 
Unfortunately, Maehara's presidency was even shorter than Okada, as Maehara 
resigned in March 2006 as a result of the "trouble of fake email". In April 2006, 
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Ozawa Ichiro was elected as president, as he defeated Kan N aoto in the election. This 
signified an end to the young-generation leadership in the party. Ozawa invited Kan to 
be the deputy Chairman and Hatoyama as Secretary General of the party, which is the 
so-called "troika system". Ozawa stays in presidency till now and performs well, 
despite there is a resignation shock happened in late 2007, due to a conflict on the 
party line of cooperation with the LDP, some commentators regard his threaten of 
resignation as a tactic of reinforce his presidencylo. 
By applying Panebianco's (1988, p.l4-15) words, there is always an 
organizational dilemma between leadership's freedom of action and organizational 
constraints, as "leader's freedom of choice .. .is never totally non-existent" and at the 
same time "there are always many actors pursuing different goals". The degree of 
freedom of choice, from determining key organizational decisions, relationship with 
other organizations, to management of internal order, always faces internal tension. If 
we look into the mode of change in leadership, only Hatoyama's resignation is a result 
of internal conflict. Kan and Maehara resigned because of involvement in political 
problem and Okada resigned because of poor election result. Resignation after poor 
election result and political problems is a norm in Japan (as demonstrated by the LDP 
10 From Asahi Shimbun, 7th Noy 2007, http: //www.asahi.com/speciall071102/TKY200711070002.html 
112 
change in leadership) and should not be regarded as an evidence of low leadership 
autonomy. There may be constraints face by the DPJ leadership in party management 
and making decisions, as there are multiple interests within the party. However, the 
DP J leadership is still exercising critical power in formulating the party goal, 
modeling the party organization, distributing selective incentives and directing the 
party's media strategy. 
In conclusion, the DP J party organization is with low degree of systemness, as 
the party has nine major factions and with three dimensions of fragmentation. On the 
other hand, the DP J leadership seemingly has low level of autonomy, as there is 
frequent change in leadership. However, this dissertation argues the DP J leadership 
has certain level of autonomy in manipulating the party organization. 
4.4 Existing Literatures Explaining the DP J Unification 
In answering the question "how do the DP J unify", scholars come up with 
several explanations, which can be concluded into internal balance of selective 
incentive and electoral system. However, these explanations are not fully convincing 
and conclusive. In the following, these explanations and critiques will be presented. 
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4.4.1 Electoral System 
The new single-member district electoral system is said to be a disincentive for 
politicians to leave the DPJ, or in other words an incentive to make them stay in the 
DPJ. Kollner (2004, p.1 02) insists electoral system is an important force for keeping 
the DP J together, since there is a "centripetal force emanating from the current 
electoral system for the Lower House". He continues to explain the two implications 
of the electoral system unifying the DP J. 
Firstly, the SMD electoral system prevents party members to compete with each 
other in election, as compare with the multi-member district system which permitted 
such phenomenon before 1994. This means conservative members within the DP J is 
very unlikely to leave the DP J to join the LDP, since there is no room to accommodate 
them in their own district. The only possibility for the DP J politicians to leave the 
party and join the LDP is that, there is an open opportunity for them when the LDP 
does not place any candidate in that district. The current electoral system provides a 
disincentive for politicians to leave the DPJ and hence unify the DPJ. 
Secondly, according to the Duverger's Law, a single-member district electoral 
system would lead to a two-party system. Being a member in one of the two major 
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parties, the DP J politicians enjoy the advantage if they choose to stay in the DP 1. In 
order to increase the chance of being reelected, they are encouraged to stay in the DPJ 
instead of leaving the party to form a new small party. 
4.4.2 Internal Balance of Selective Incentives 
Besides electoral system, balancing distribution of selective incentive is also 
regarded as a factor to unify the DPJ. Selective incentive refers to benefits that 
organization distributes o!1ly to some of the participants and in varying amounts, 
concerning on power, status and material resources (Panebianco, 1988, p.1 0). Various 
scholars mention the balancing personnel policy within the DPJ as a major factor 
unifying the DP J together. Personnel policy does not only limit to internal personnel 
policy, but also applied in distribution of Diet posts, for example Committee 
Chairman and Director. 
Otake (1999, p.127) recognizes there is a pronounced balancing allocation of 
party post in party's Vice-Chairman (Fuku Daihyo), Secretary General (Kanjicho ), 
Chairman of Executive Council (Somukaicho) , Chairman of Political Research 
Committee (Seichokaicho), Chairman of Election Strategy Committee (Sentaiincho), 
and Chairman of Diet Strategy Committee (Koktai Iincho) , where the later five posts 
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are regarded as the five top leadership post of the party (Togoyaku). Kabashima 
Semina (2000, p.367) discovers important posts within the DP J are equally distributed 
among former party top members. On the other hand, Tamura (2000) also comments 
that there is a "perfect balance of personnel policy" within the party, as the 
"Togoyaku" is nearly equally distributed among the DSP Group, the JSP Group and 
the old DP J Group members. Kollner (2004, p.1 02) also concludes that the DP J has 
"tried to integrate the various factions by means of a balanced personnel policy". 
The party also manipulates in the distribution of Diet posts. Although number of 
posts occupied by a particular party in each committee is decided according to 
number of seats of that particular party, appointment of Committee Chairman and 
Director within the committee is freely decided by the party. Therefore, there is a lot 
of room for party to manipulate the allocation of posts. Tamura (2000, p.163) suggests 
there is a balancing appointment in committee director among two largest 
composition of the party, the DSP Group and the JSP Group, while former Sakigake 
politicians awarded a significant number of posts as a selective incentives to them. 
4.4.3 Criticism towards Existing Explanations 
Criticism towards the electoral system explanation is straightforward. The 
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electoral system does not necessarily provide disincentives for politicians to leave the 
party. As Kollner (2004, p.1 02) admits consequence of electoral system should not be 
treated too deterministically, as "there will always be cases in which politicians will 
act. . .in a seemingly 'irrational' manner". In fact, the Kokumin Shinto (People's New 
Party, PNP) lead by Watanuki Tamisuke, formed in 2005 with four members from the 
LDP and one member from the DP J left their respective party. It is because besides 
the single-member district system, there are also seats for proportional representative, 
and the PR seats could ac~ as a safety net for small parties to survive. The PNP 
actually able to maintain their 4 seats in the HR as they only place candidates in PR 
blocs. At the same time, the party is able to win extra seats in the He, since the He 
election is still operating under a MMD+PR system. In conclusion, electoral system 
may not necessarily provide disincentive for the DP J members to stay in the party, 
neither does it provide incentives for them to stay if they dissatisfy with the party. The 
PR system in the HR and the MMD+PR system in the He election actually provide a 
safety net for them to survive if they insist to leave the party to form new small 
parties. 
On the other hand, internal balance of selective provides a plausible account to 
explain why the DPJ members do not leave the party. However, as Panebianco (1988, 
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p.10) argues, a party must distribute both collective incentives and selective 
incentives in order to make the party organization run smoothly. Collective incentives 
here refer to "benefits or promises of benefits that the organization must distribute 
equally among the participants. These collective incentives include: 
1. Incentives of identity which means one participates because one identifies 
with the organization; 
2. Incentive of solidarity which means one participates because one shares the 
political or social goals of the other participants; and 
3. Ideological incentive which means one participates because one identifies with 
the "cause" of the organization. 
Although behavior of party elites can be explained by selective incentives, 
nonetheless, for any organizations, it is the best to allocate both selective incentives 
and collective incentives, as "selective incentives can only reinforce identifications 
produced by the distribution of collective incentives" (Panebianco, 1988, p.1 0). If the 
DP J unites purely base on selective incentives without distribution of collective 
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incentives, for instance ensuring the chance of re election but lacking a common goal, 
it would be striking that the party did not fall apart when it experienced a historical 
defeat in the 2005 HR election. It is historical in the sense that the party has never 
experienced a defeat in elections, and the DPJ's seats in the HR decreased 
significantly by 36%, from 177 seats to 113 seats. Even so, there is no major defection 
occurred and the D P J remains unify. 
It is true that the DP J is fragmented in terms of traditional cleavage, namely the 
constitutional revision issue and the national security issue. It is also true that the 
DP J's unification depends on selective incentives within the party, for instant party 
posts, Diet posts and other material incentives. However, this does not mean the party 
is totally lacking of collective incentives, as it is essential for a party to have a sense 
of solidarity and identity. Scholars tend to focus on "traditional" ideological cleavage 
and overlook the possibility of new rising political goals that unify the DP J. At the 
same time, the selective incentive mechanism in the DP J party organization is not 
fully understood, including the distribution of party post such as Standing Officers 
Council Posts and Next Cabinet Posts; Diet Posts including Committee Chairman and 
Direct posts according to factions. The manipulation of the DP J leadership in 
maintaining internal coherence of the party also lacks adequate attention. In the study 
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of DP J party organization, scholars have paid insufficient notice to the policy-making 
process, especially the bottom-up-policy making process and the role of the Next 
Cabinet, which is a party organ serving an important role on policy decision process. 
In the following, this thesis would provide an argument that there are three factors 
that unify the DPJ. 
4.5 Three Factors Unifying the·DPJ 
This dissertation argues that the role of leadership is crucial in maintaining 
internal coherence of the DPJ, and there are three factors that contribute to unification 
of the party. The first factor is the leaders' manipulation in party organization, as 
leaders of the DP J pay their primary concern on the party unification during the 
development of the party organization, as they regarded the NFP failure as a warning 
to the DPJ. The DPJ party leaders formulated a bottom-up policy making process, 
which enables different voices in the party to articulate at the initial stage. At the same 
time, the leadership system balances different interests within the party and allows 
younger generation politicians to lead the party. Finally, the leadership made special 
effort in the merger with the LP in order to prevent the DP J from breakdown. 
Secondly, the party leadership actually created and developed a collective 
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incentive that binds the party together. The collective incentive includes 
decentralization that inherits from Hatoyama and civil-society based participatory 
style of politics that inherits from Kan Naoto. Scholars argue the DP J does not have 
common ground in ideology and the party is act as an "umbrella organization that has 
brought diverse forces together" (Kabashima, 1999a). It might be true in terms of 
traditional conservative-progressive spectrum which primarily concerns about 
constitutional revision issues and national security issue. However, as Kato (2005, 
p.60-84) and Scheiner (2006, p.227) recognize, there is a new yet fluid ideological 
spectrum developing in Japan since the 1990: the decentralization issue which 
concerns about "Centralized Bureaucratic Power (shuken kanji) versus Decentralized 
Politician Power (bunkenjiji)". Base on the decentralization and civil-society based 
participatory style of politics, which concerns the development of civil society and 
NGOs, the DP J creates a clear anti-LDP opposition stance when contrast with the 
traditional LDP style of bureaucratic-led, centralized politics. In other words, the 
issues are providing a significant identification for the DP J members to differentiate 
from the LDP. Scheiner (2006, p.194-202) discovers the DP J members found 
themselves very different from the LDP on the issue of decentralization. However, 
Scheiner does not recognize the decentralization issue actually acts as a collective 
incentive that bond the party together. This thesis argues the issues of decentralization 
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and a civil-society based participatory style of politics actually share among the DP J 
politicians and act as the collective incentives to unify the party. 
Thirdly, the DP J leadership also deliberately distributes a balancing selective 
incentive to the DP J politicians in order to maintain the party's solidarity. As 
mentioned before, scholars such as Tamura (2000) investigates the personnel policy of 
the DP J and discovered that there is a balance personnel policy in both the 
appointment of party and in Diet posts. However, as these researches were conducted 
in the early days of the DP J history, and those researches neither analyzed in a time 
series nor including the Next Cabinet. In this research, appointment of Standing 
Officers Council posts, Next Cabinet posts and Diet posts will be analyzed according 
to former party affiliation. 
In the following section, original investigation on the above factors will be 
presented. The materials are mostly from party documents, newspaper reports, 
first-hand and second-hand interviews, and originally created data. It should be 
noticed that, since party documents before 1998 are not available, the discussion and 
analysis in this section will mainly focus on the "new" DP J, which is the DP J after the 
second merger with the NFP splinters. 
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4.5.1 Leadership Manipulation in Party Organization 
The DP J leadership has aware of the internal unification of the party. In many 
occasions, they consciously regard the NFP failure as a warning to the party. One 
important piece of evidence is a party document released just before the merger in 
1998 11 , the DP J leadership recognized the NFP internal conflict and inability to unify 
was a result of fundamental conflict on ideology, expectation towards the role as a 
opposition party (the relationship with the LDP government), and party operation that 
occasionally violate internal democracy. The DPJ leadership urged ex-NFP members 
within the DP J to reflect on the NFP failure, and warned the party to learn the NFP 
experience in order to successfully transform the DP J into a governing party. Ozawa 
also admitted internal conflict within the NFP is a factor of the 1996 HR election 
defeat, and in order to unify the DPJ after the merger in 2003, Ozawa decided to "act 
as one soldier in the DPJ,,12. These statements clearly showed the DPJ leadership 
regarded the dissolution of the NFP as a result of inability of the party to unify 
internally, and the DP J has to maneuver to avoid a repetition of history. In brief, the 
DP J leadership structured the party organization in three areas: policy-making 
procedure, leadership system and arrangement of merger. 
11 From the DPJ homepage, http: //www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=11 623. 
12 According to a secondary interview, from http: //ozawa-ichirojp/massmedia/2003 /03 .9.12.htm. 
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4.5.1.1 Bottom-up Policy Making Process 
In an original interview, one DP J officer reveals the party's decision-making 
process, which is described as a bottom -up, "democratic" decision-making style 13. 
The DP J very much depends on democratic rules within the party. In the very 
beginning of decision making, there are various departmental committees 
(Bumon Kaigi) ... those legislators attending council meetings are free to voice 
out their opinion ... Conclusion or proposal has to seek approval from the Seicho 
Yakuinkai (Policy Research Committee) . And then the proposal is sent to the Next 
Cabinet meeting and again being discussed. After the Next Cabinet come up with 
a conclusion ... it will send to the Chairman for approval and become the policy 
of the DPJ 
... We always have the mind of majority consensus within the party ... majority 
voice within departmental committee will follow the formal route and discussed 
by the Next Cabinet ... the DP J requests the members to following the party 
decision and it is against the rule if they vote differently from the party line ... 
13 Interview record, see Appendix I. 
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Of course sometimes there is disagreement within the party, and individual 
legislator may vote differently from the party line, but this is not the case in most 
of the time ... There may be different opinions during the discussion process, but 
in fact this is good for the party ... 
In details, the decision-making procedure begins from various Departmental 
Committees (Bumon Kaigi), which focus on different policy areas and work at 
parallel level. Under each Departmental Committee, there are various working teams 
which are responsible for basic policy formation. Departmental Committees are lead 
by respective Next Cabinet Minister and Vice-Minister, and politicians are free to join 
any committee meetings. Within a committee, politicians discuss problems and 
policies related to the specific area. Those legislators attending the Departmental 
Committee meeting are free to voice out their opinion and eventually come up with a 
proposal or conclusion. This is the first stage of the decision making process 14• 
Then, the conclusion or proposal determined within Departmental Committee 
will be sent to the Seicho Yakuinkai (Policy Research Committee) and seeks approval. 
The Seicho Yakuinkai is responsible for making up a conclusion of policy or 
14 The detail of policy formation process is fully revealed in a first-hand interview with the DPJ officer. 
See Appendix 1. 
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proposal1 5. The proposal is then sent to the Next Cabinet (NC) meeting and again 
being discussed. According to Okada (2002, p.14-17), the NC is responsible to 
formulate a more general party direction, and policies in different areas must 
coherence with the party's direction. If the NC has dispute on the policy, the proposal 
will be discussed again by the Departmental Committee. Finally, party President will 
approve the proposal and become the policy or bill of the DP J. 
The bottom-up policy making process relieve conflicts in ideology, as members 
with different stance are allowed to involve in the discussion process. This is 
fundamentally different from a top-down decision by leaders. In fact, the DP J sees 
different opinion during the discussion process is good for the party, as the party 
represents citizens with wide range of interests (Okada, 2002, p.18). Moreover, this 
policy making process ensures lower ranking politicians have a channel to voice out 
their opinion. This process can be seen as a grievance expression channel as members 
can voice out their dissatisfaction in Departmental Committee and leaders have to 
response in the NC level. Original interview with the DP J staff clearly reveals that the 
DP J noticed the importance of majority opinion and stick to a democratic style in 
decision making process. The Ne is reluctant to make a decision which is strongly 
15 Refers to news from the DPJ, http://www.dpj .orjp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=13312. 
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opposed within the party, even if a NC Minister wishes to do so, as there will be huge 
resistance within the party, especially in Departmental Committee level. On the other 
hand, the DP J requests its members to follow the party decision. It is because a 
legislator should voice out his opposition in Departmental Committee and try to gain 
support from fellow legislators. The DP J believes in a democratic style of decision 
making and expects its legislators to accept a decision which went through the 
democratic process 16. It is against the party rule if a legislator votes differently from 
the party line, for instance 2 HC legislators are severely warned and suspended their 
membership for 3 months after they violate the party decision to reject a bill proposed 
In conclusion, the policy-making process of the DP J different from the NFP. In 
contrast to the NFP's top-down organizational structure which enhanced internal 
conflict on both ideology and mother organization, the DPJ applied a bottom-up 
decision-making procedure. More importantly, Okada recognizes the DPJ has a 
comparatively good communication within the organization, for instance there are 
many debates within the party before decisions are made 18. 
16 Interview record, see Appendix I. 
17 From Asahi Shimbun, 13 th May, 2008, 
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0513/TKY200805130359 .html 
18 Second-hand interview with Okada Katsuya, from http://www.katsuya.netlhatu17.html. 
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4.5.1.2 Balanced Leadership System 
The DP J leaders also developed a leadership system that balances different 
interests within the party. The party applied a "dual leadership system" when the "old 
DP J" was formed in 1996, where President Hatoyama was responsible for internal 
affairs and President Kan was responsible for external affairs. Hatoyama is the 
founder of the new party (the DPJ was described as "the Hatoyama New Party" by 
mass media) and Kan was the Minister of Health and Welfare with high popularity at 
that moment. The dual leadership system rewarded Kan a top party post and 
maintained the leadership of Hatoyama, illustrated a balancing interest of the two 
leaders 19. Besides interests of the leaders, the dual leadership system also balance 
other interests of the party, for example Igarashi (1996, p.98) and Shiota (2007, p.145) 
distinguishes Hatoyama and Kan in terms of ideology, where Hatoyama is an idealist 
with a more conservative stance in national security issue, while Kan is relatively 
progressive and realist. The appointment can be seen as a complement of different 
directions within the party. 
After several alternations of leadership between Hatoyama and Kan from 1996 to 
2004, there was severe internal conflict within the party, especially between the 
19 In fact, when the "Party Establishment Committee" was found in 17th September 1996, both 
Hatoyama and Kan were elected as president of the committee. 
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younger generation politicians and veteran politicians. For instance, Hatoyama reveals 
that in 2002, when he proposed the merger with Liberal Party, younger generation 
politicians such as Maehara and Genba requested Hatoyama to resign from president 
or they would call for a petition campaign2o. There was also conflict between Kan and 
Noda, a young generation politician taking the post of Kokkai Taisaku Iincho 
(Chairman of the Diet Strategy Committee), on whether the DP J should be a 
confrontation or constructive opposition party on Diet strategy. Younger generations 
such as Okada and Noda also aimed at "generation alternation" within the party 
(Shiota, 2007, p.204). The leadership system finally opened to younger generation in 
2004, when President Kan was discovered that he did not join the pension scheme 
during the appointment of the Minister of Health and Welfare, and was forced to 
resign from the presidency. A younger generation politician, Okada Katsuya was 
elected as president without competition. At that time, Okada was only a fifth-termer 
HR legislator at the age of 50, who was relatively young in terms of experience and 
age to become president of a political party. After Okada resigned from presidency 
after the 2005 HR defeat, another younger generation politician, Maehara Seiji, 
defeated Kan and became the President of the DPJ. Maehara was 43 years old and 
also a fifth-term er. Maehara appointed several young generation politicians to fill the 
20 From Interview by Oshita, 2003, from http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/cont03 /massm2/031002.html 
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top posts in the DPJ, for example Matsumoto (a third-term er) was appointed as Seicho 
Kaicho (Chairman of Policy Research Committee), and Noda (a forth-termer) was 
appointed as Kokutai Iincho (Chairman of Diet Strategy Committee). Okada states 
that it is the "gamble on Maehara's youthfulness and ability to breakthrough,,21. The 
two consecutive appointment of younger generation politicians as party president in 
times of difficulties can be seen as a balance between the younger generation and 
veteran politicians in the leadership system, as chances are open to them under the 
leadership election system. 
Maehara was forced to resign from presidency after the "trouble of fake email,,22 
and Ozawa became the President as he defeated Kan in the president election. After 
Ozawa became the president, he adopted the "troika leadership system". President 
Ozawa is responsible for election-related issues, Deputy President Kan is responsible 
for Diet-related issues, and Secretary General Hatoyama is responsible for internal 
affairs. Besides, all Next Cabinet members appointed by Maehara remained in their 
position after Ozawa became the President. As Ozawa emphasized in his party reform 
proposal, the DP J has to "unify the party organization and make use of the wisdom of 
21 From the DPJ homepage, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=5769. 
22 The "trouble of fake email" is about a DPJ politician, Nagata, used a fake email as an evidence to 
question a corruption scandal in the LDP. The email was proved as fake and Nagata resigned from HR 
post. Maehara was also forced to resign from presidency due to poor leadership. 
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veteran politician, power of younger politicians and idea of the youth members,,23, 
and conform the "Kyoto Icchi Taisei" (the system of unifying the whole party) within 
the DP J. In other words, the "troika leadership system" can be considered as aiming at 
unifying the party by a balanced distribution of power and responsibility, showing the 
awareness of the leadership to unify the party through leadership appointment. 
4.5.1.3 Arrangement in the Merger with LP 
The proposal to merge the DP J with the LP aroused discontent within the party 
and split the party into pro-merger group and anti-merger group. The anti-merger 
group noticed Ozawa's autocratic leadership style previously in the NFP era and his 
cooperation with the LDP in the LP era. According to Oshita's interview with 
Hatoyama, although the proposal of merger was coordinated with other leaders, there 
were voices within the party that the proposal was "too abrupt,,24. As a result, 
Hatoyama resigned from president after a meeting with Hata, Kan, Noda and 
Yokomichi. Although the merger with the LP eventually achieved after Kan replaced 
Hatoyama as the President, the coherence within the party was seriously damaged and 
the DP J leadership has to make their effort to reunify the party. The effort can be 
identified in two ways: arrangement of party post and formulation of coherence 
23 From the DPJ homepage, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/files/2006041311 0746 .pdf 
24 From http ://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/cont03/massm2/031002.html. 
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policy. 
In the beginning, some members in the DP J who has experienced Ozawa's 
autocratic leadership style concerned whether Ozawa would become the leader of the 
DP J and were reluctant to cooperate with him. Even Ozawa himself admits there is an 
anti -Ozawa sentiment in the party. In order to "keep the party unify" and to "build a 
concrete and coherence command system", he has to "serve the DP J as one of the 
soldier" (Ihheisotu de Yarz,:), and he would follow the order from the DP J president25 . 
This also represents Ozawa's reflection towards the failure in the Hosokawa regime 
and in the NFP era. In fact, in order to minimize the distrust towards him, Ozawa did 
not request to change the name ofDPJ, which implies the merger is DPJ-Ied and the 
LP is absorbed into the DPJ. Moreover, Ozawa was cautious about his action in order 
not to involve in power struggle, factionalism and splitting the party. Even after he 
became the president of the DP J in 2006, Ozawa was also cautious in distribution of 
party post. Ozawa appointed Kan, his competitor in the presidential election, as the 
Deputy President and Hatoyama as the Secretary General, and confirmed the "troika 
system" as mentioned before. This is to balance interests of different faction and 
prevent internal conflict within the party. It is because conflicts often occurred due to 
25 From http://ozawa-ichiro.jp/massmedia/2003/03.9.12.htm. 
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appointment of party post, as demonstrated by Hatoyama's appointment of Nakano as 
Secretary General in 2002 which is one of the reason led to Hatoyama's resignation. 
Ozawa also maneuvered in maintaining policy coherence of the DPJ. Firstly, 
Ozawa totally accepted the DP J policies in the merger talk. In fact, according to an 
interview, Ozawa admits he did not debate on the policy direction with the DP J in the 
merger talk because he has to tolerate in order to replace the LDP regime, despite he 
has his own theory of policies which is different from the DP J one (lokibe, Ito and 
Yakushiji (Eds.), 2006, p.176-178). Another effort Ozawa made is forming policy 
agreement within the DP J. As national security and constitutional revision issues are 
the major disagreements within the party, and the leftist faction within the DP J 
worried about Ozawa's conservative stance on these issues. In March 2004, Ozawa 
and Yokomichi (leader of the former-JSP faction) reached an agreement on the stance 
of these issues, naming the "Fundamental Principle on the Japanese National Security 
and International Cooperation" (Nihon no Anzen Hosho, Kokusai Kyoryoku no Kihon 
Gensoku). The agreement is about the position of Self-Defense Force (SDF) under the 
Article 9 of the Constitution, where the SDF should be solely concern on defense. A 
new troop responsible for international activities should be created and work under 
the leadership of United Nation. Ozawa also made the same agreement with the 
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Hatoyama group and former-DSP group, in order to resolve the internal disagreement 
within the party (Shiota, 2007, p.238-240). 
4.5.1.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the DP J leaders recognize the NFP failure and try to prevent the 
DP J from repeating the NFP failure. There are various evidences showing the 
leadership's manipulation in the DPJ party organization in order to maintain internal 
coherence of the party. One of the most prominent movements is formulating the 
bottom-up policy-making procedure, where every politician is freely to participate in 
the early stage of policy formation. This can be regarded as a participatory system and 
a channel of grievance expression. Secondly, the DP J applied a leadership system that 
can balance different interests within the party, for instance the dual leadership system 
that balanced interests between Hatoyama and Kan. Younger generation politicians 
are able to become a leader of the party in time of difficulties. The "troika system" 
also balances power of different factions. Finally, Ozawa's manipulation to maintain 
internal coherence of the DPJ after the merger can be observed, as he noticed the 
distrust towards him and manipulated in personnel policy in order to prevent power 
struggle within the party. He also noticed the cleavage of national security and 
constitutional revision issue within the party and work hard to reach agreement with 
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different factions. This shows leadership of the DP J notices the dangerous of internal 
dispute and fragmentation, and hence tries to minimize the fragmentation within the 
party through various measures. 
4.5.2 Collective Incentive of the DP J 
The DP J leadership also plays an active role in creating collective incentive of 
the DPJ. Although the DPJ is always regarded as an "umbrella party" of opposition 
forces, this dissertation argues there must be some kind of common goal for the DPJ, 
and the common goal is created and inherited from the leaders. As Panebianco (1988, 
p.53) clearly states, ideology plays an important role in a newly-formed organization 
and determining its collective incentive, and leadership plays an important role in 
forming ideological aim of the party. Collective incentives, together with selective 
incentives, are important for an organization to consolidate and institutionalize. The 
process of institutionalization is important for a party organization, as qualitative leap 
from a "consumable organization" to an "institution" makes an organization become 
valuable in it and survival becomes a goal of the organization. In other words, it is 
necessary for the party to possess both collective incentive and selective incentive in 
order to keep the DP J to survive through the process of institutionalization. Therefore 
it is doubtful to conclude that the party is merely an "umbrella organization" without 
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sharing a common identity which is provided by the collective incentive. 
One may argues the DPJ identity bases on the goal to replace the LDP and 
become a governing party, as the DP J and its leaders always urge for a "reshuffle in 
Japanese politics" (Seikai Saihen). This argument is true yet trivial, as any opposition 
political parties shall set their goal as vote seeking, office seeking or policy-seeking, a 
more concrete ideology is necessary in order to provide an identity to party members. 
This dissertation argues there is an ideal society the DP J and its members would like 
to pursue, and this ideal society actually inherit from the leaders. This ideology does 
not necessarily follow the traditional progressive-conservative cleavage which 
concerns the peaceful constitution and national safety issue or capitalist-socialist 
cleavage. The collective incentive differentiates the DP J from the LDP is on the "style 
of politics", as the DP J pursues a decentralized, civil-society based participatory style 
of politics, which is in contrast with the LDP centralized, iron-triangle-Ied 
(bureaucracy-LDP-business), and behind-the-door style of politics. 
There are two essences of the DP1-style ideal politics: decentralization and 
civil-society based participatory politics. Decentralization refers to delegating more 
power to local government and limiting the power of the bureaucracy, increasing the 
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efficiency of the central government. Civil-society based participatory politics refers 
to a NPO (non-profit organization) centered, civilian-oriented participatory style of 
politics. In the following, the creation of party ideology from the leaders, the 
transformation of ideology into collective incentive through differentiation and the 
conformity on politician level will be analyzed. 
4.5.2.1 Role of Leadership in Collective Incentive 
If leadership plays an important role in forming the ideological aim in formation 
stage of the party as Panebianco (1988, p.53) states, then the analysis of party's 
ideological aim from a party level should start from the leadership of the DPJ. 
Decentralization goal of the DP J can be found in President Hatoyama Yukio 's 
famous work "Waga Riberaru Yuai Kakumei" (Our Liberal Fraternal Revolution)26. 
Hatoyama emphasizes the idea of" Yuai" (fraternity), "Jiritsu" (self-help), "Sekinin" 
(responsibility) and "Kyosei" (co-existence). Among his idea, "self-help" does not 
only relate to a liberalism ideology, but also relate to decentralization. Under the 
Japanese context, Japanese style of politics is very much bureaucracy-dependence, 
and he regards "self-help" as: "political 'self-help' that free from dependence on 
26 http://www.hatoyama.grjp/cont03/speech/ot02_3.html. 
137 
bureaucracy which lead to civilian 'self-help', and Japan can eventually gain its 
autonomy,,27. In 1990s, Japan experienced a lengthy economic downturn and series of 
political scandals, for example the polluted blood problem, Jyutaku Kinyu Senmon 
Kaisha problem28 and the Monjyu nuclear power plant problem, which revealed 
problems of unclear information disclosure, close relationship between bureaucracy 
and business sector and unclear responsibility of supervision and management. In 
response to various scandals and problems in the central government, Hatoyama 
believes there is a necessity to conduct a reform in politics, administration and finance. 
In his work, Hatoyama proposes a drastic reform to restructure the central government, 
transferring political power and financial power to local government and privatization 
of public sector29. Decentralization is a solution to solve the close 
bureaucracy-business relationship by limiting the power of central government and 
bureaucracy, and the DP J regarded itself as the party to pursue a "real" 
decentralization when compare with the LDP. 
On the other hand, the goal of civil-society based participatory style of politics 
inherits from another President Kan Naoto. Before joining the Sakigake and then 
became president of the DPJ, Kan Naoto was a member of a small party the Social 
27 From an interview with Hatoyama, http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/cont03/massm2/0205.html. 
28 A political problem of using public funding to save a bankrupted loan providing companies. 
29 Details can be found in Hatoyama and Kan (1997) . 
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Democratic Federation (SDF). Kan also participated in various social movement such 
as student movement and women right movement before being elected as HR 
legislator. His experience in social movement directly related to his believe in 
participatory style of politics, pursuing a self-help society and believe in the power of 
civil society. For example, Kan emphasizes the concept of "self-governance by the 
civilian" in an ideal society in his publication (Kan, 1997, p.1 02-1 04). In fact, other 
leaders such as Yokomichi Takahiro, a leftist leader in the DPJ, also suggested the 
idea of building a civil-society based participatory self-help society in his book 
"Daisan no Kyoku" (The Third Pole) (1995, p.124-140). The DPJ adopts Kan Naoto 
idea of civil-society based participatory politics and become the party's fundamental 
principle of "aiming at a self-help and co-existence society". 
From party documents in the early stage of party formation, we can discover the 
fundamental principle of the party. For example, the Party Formation Declaration in 
1998 clearly proposes the idea of decentralization and civil-society based 
participatory style of politics. In brief, the DP J aims at: 
... Breaking the bureaucracy-led politics, limiting functions of central 
government and delegating power to local government and civil society ... the 
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role of government should be promoting a self-help and co-existence society ... 
the party is seeking to widen the function of NPO in the society and archiving a 
more gender equal society ... pursue the goal of decentralization and civil-society 
based participatory politics ... 30 
In order to strengthen the legislative ability of local politicians and activate 
legislative activities in local councils, the DP J formed the "Chiho Jichitai GUn 
Foramu" (Local Councilor Forum) in 1999. The forum holds study groups for local 
councilors and shared information among different communities31 . In 1999, the forum 
attracted more than 1800 local councilors to register, and the number of participant 
increased to 2622 in 200632.Moreover, in response to the LDP decentralization 
proposal in 2004, the DP J executed a questionnaire to investigate the impact of the 
reform to local government33 . The DP J also held study groups and conventions on 
local manifesto as to strengthen the relationship between the DP J and progressive 
leaders in local governments. 
At the same time, the DP J strives to strengthen the relationship between the party 
and the civil society. In 1999, the DPJ started the "Shimin Seisaku GUn Kondankai" 
30 Party Formation Declaration, http://www.dpj .or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num= 11623. 
31 Activity Report 1999, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8822. 
32 According to Activity Report 2006, http ://www.dpj.or.jp/gover_taikai_y07_3.html. 
33 From Activity Report 2004, http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover_taikai_y05_3.html. 
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(Civilian Policy Meeting) which aims at building a network between the DP J and civil 
society. The meeting invites various interest groups to review the current policies and 
provide opinion for the DP J to formulate policies34 . In terms of party organization, the 
DP J set up the "Dantai Iinkai" (Interest Groups Committee) to organize activities 
such as meeting and study groups with NPOs and interest groups, aiming at building a 
cooperative relationship between the party and civil society35. The DP J also proposed 
to support NPOs activities through tax reduction and funding, and held various 
symposiums, hearings and forums with various NGOs since 2001 36 . In conclusion, 
various activities show the DP J intention to achieve the proclaimed goal. 
4.5.2.2 Differentiation with the LDP 
In building up a sense of identity through party goals, it is important for the party 
to differentiate itself from the opponent. The DP J leadership used the goals of 
decentralization and civil-society based participatory style of politics to differentiate 
the DP J from the LDP in order to build a sense of identity through this ideology. Since 
1998, the DP J continuously appeals itself as the party to promote a "true and 
fundamental decentralization reform" in contrast to the LDP 's "bureaucracy-led, 
34 Details can be found in Activity Report 1999, 
http ://www.dpj .or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8822 . 
35 According to personnel appointment announcement, 
http ://www.dpj.orjp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=81 07. 
36 From Activity Report 2001 , http ://www.dpj.orjp/gover_taikai_yOl.html. 
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incomplete structural reform". For example, in response to the LDP proposal of 
central government reform in 1998, the DP J leader criticized it as "lacking the 
viewpoint of decentralization and it is impossible to achieve a real reform in central 
government without decentralization,,37. The DP J Next Cabinet report also criticized 
that Koizumi' s reform is not a real reform as local government has not been given 
executive and financial power in 2001 38 . In 2005, Koizumi proposed the postal reform 
and won the HR election. The DP J leadership recognized it is a major crisis to the 
DPJ as it is not only a major lost in election, but also revealed a need for the party to 
reclaim the "reformist" identity. The DPJ leadership regards the greatest difference 
between the DPJ and the LDP is on the vision of future Japan society, where 
strengthen of local government is the basis of administrative and financial reform of 
the central government. Therefore, it is necessary for the DP J to reinforce its stance in 
response to the change in the LDP39. 
On the other hand, the DP J regards itself as a party of "a partner of citizens and 
shared by citizens" (Shimin no Kyodo, Kyoyu Seito) and in order to achieve this goal, 
the DPJ has to cooperate with local citizens and NPOs4o. The DPJ also claims the 
37 From Kan Naoto's May Day Speech, 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=12166. 
38 From the DPJ homepage, http://www.dpj.orjp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num= 1 0932 
39 From Maehara's speech, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=5528 
40 From "the DPJ Future Direction" (Minshuto Kongo no Arikata), 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=113 81 
142 
party is "reconstructing the society" and making "individual and local community as 
the leading character of society" in contrast to the LDP bureaucracy-led politics41 . 
This clearly shows that the DP J is desperate to build up its own identity through 
differentiate itself from the LDP on the issue of reform, especially the decentralization 
and NPO issues. 
4.5.2.3 Politicians' Conformity 
After confirming the DPJ leadership's role in making "real" decentralization and 
civil-society based participatory politics as the party goal, and trying to make these 
two goals become the identity and collective incentive of the party, it is necessary to 
investigate whether its members share the same identity. In fact, Scheiner (2006, 
p.196-199) the DP J members do not see themselves as an "umbrella party". In his 
survey conducted in 1999, around 47% of the DPJ members differentiate themselves 
from the LDP through the issue of decentralization and limiting power of bureaucracy, 
in contrast politicians from other parties differentiates the DPJ from the LDP through 
constitutional revision issue and military policies. Scheiner (2006) confirms the DP J 
members intend to differentiate themselves from the LDP through undercut the 
clientelist tradition of the LDP, since the DPJ cannot benefit from centralized 
41 http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=114 72 
143 
clientelist politics, decentralization and limiting power of bureaucracy can increase 
the power of politicians. Ex-LDP politicians that joined the DPJ are also unhappy 
with the LDP on the decentralization issue, therefore the DP J members have a high 
cohesiveness on the decentralization issue. 
This dissertation did not intend to investigate the reasons why there is a high 
level of conformity within the DP J on the decentralization issue, but to explore 
whether the decentralization issue, together with the civil-society based participatory 
style of politics, is built as a common identity within the party. It is because Scheiner 
(2006) conducted his survey in early stage of the new DPJ, and the 2003 merger with 
the Liberal Party added more conservative politicians into the party which may affect 
the distribution of collective identity of the DP J. It is necessary to conduct the 
investigation in again in a more comprehensive manner. 
This dissertation will perform original investigation on the belief of individual 
politician in order to analyze politicians' conformity on these two issues. Through 
their personal manifesto (or fundamental beliefs, promises and similar items) released 
in their personal homepage, stance and belief of individual politician is revealed. 
Content of their personal homepage basically does not bond to any limitation from the 
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party, as they may choose not to mention the decentralization and civil-society based 
participatory style of politics if they think these issues are not important, or they 
simply do not believe in them. Moreover, items in their personal homepage, for 
example personal linkage with NPO groups, official position in NPO groups, 
providing a link to NPO in personal website and participating in NPO-related 
legislation, will also be served as an evidence that the politicians agree with the 
party's goal of proposing a civil-society based participatory style of politics. In the 
following, politicians from the House of Representative and House of Councilor will 
be analyzed. The sample consists of 224 DP J politicians, including 114 HR members 
and 110 HC members42 . 
4.5.2.3.1 The Analysis 
In the total population of 224 politicians, there are 1 73 politicians (or 77%) who 
have either published their personal manifesto in their homepage, or have personal 
linkage with NPOs. Among these 173 valid samples, 83 are HR member (or 73% of 
total HR members) and 90 are HC members (or 82% of total HC members). The 
remaining 51 invalid samples are those politicians who did not publish their own 
manifesto in their homepage, did not have a personal homepage, or the homepage 
42 The data is collected from 30th-31 st May, 2008. 
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cannot be accessed by the time of data collection. 
Content analysis is applied to analyze personal manifesto of these politicians. In 
brief, a set of words is selected to represent a positive attitude (or supporting) the 
decentralization and civil-society based participatory style of politics as proposed by 
the DPJ. For those politicians who explicitly stated that they support decentralization 
or a civil-society based participatory style of politics, one can logically expect they 
follow the stance of the DP J that differentiate themselves with the LDP with a "real 
decentralization" and "civil-society versus bureaucracy" style of politics, and hence 
possess the same goal with the DPJ. Collective incentive based on these two goals is 
then possible. In details, the following set of words is selected for content analysis: 
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Table 4.2: List of words in content analysis 
Decentralization Civil-society based participatory style of politics 
7tm1f£$ Decentral izati 0 n if7/T17 Volunteer 
revolution 
tiQ1J7tm Decentralization ffr±~~1JD Social participation 
tiQ1J:=tti Local autonomy NPO N on-profit organization 
~1HfffU System of Do and Shu ~~ Co-existence 
$* · tiQ1JO)f5l~t1JJ Reallocation of tax and 1±.§YrfJ ~~1JD Civilian participation 
~c7t income from central to 
local government 
tiQ1J'~ti~N t ~t1JJ~ Delegation of power ~F~~O)mm Making use of 
~Bj and income from civil-society 
central to local 
government 
tiQtgt 0) :=t 1* ti/*fti Subjectivity/ ~~13"J ftt±~ Pluralistic society 
characteristics of 
region 
7tmoo* Decentralized country ~F~~:=t2J Civil-society-Ied 
tiQtgt:=t ti Regional autonomy ~F~~~A Civil-society 
participation 
tiQ1Jff1& Local administration rtJ~§m Civilian autonomy 
Ji1JJ ~ tiQtgto) § *~ C Make use of resources rfJ~:=t1~ Civilian-led 
mm from a regional point 
of view 
tiQlC~~±ml Ordering from locals ~F~~7tti Delegation to civil 
society 
4.5.2.3.2 Analysis Result 
Among the 173 samples, there are 134 politicians, or 77%, explicitly show a 
positive attitude towards either decentralization or civil-society based participatory 
style of politics and collective incentive distributed by the party can be identified. 
This figure is especially high for HR members as more than 82% of HR politicians 
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show their conformity on the two goals of the party. The percentage of He politicians 
is slightly lower, but still archives 73% of the total valid sample. In short, the figure 
confirms a high level of conformity among the DP J politicians on the two issues, as 
most of them shows positive attitude to either one of the goal and collective identity 
set by the party. 
When the figure is further analyzed, a similar level of conformity on the two 
collective incentives can be found. There is around 60% of politicians explicitly states 
their ambition to achieve a "real decentralization", and there is also around 60% of 
politicians urges for a civil-society based participatory style of politics. In details, HR 
and He politicians show similar level of conformity on the goal of civil-society based 
participatory style of politics (59% for HR members and 57% for He members), 
while the difference is greater among them on the decentralization goal (66% for HR 
members and 50% for He members). One possible explanation is that since He 
election applies an electoral system of multimember district based on prefecture and 
nationwide PR, He politicians generally have a weaker relationship with local 
government. In contrast, HR politicians from single-member electoral district have a 
closer relationship with local government and hence have a stronger incentive to 
pursue the decentralization issue. The result suggests that the two goals are generally 
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accepted by a significant amount of DP J politicians and the two goals are equally 
important in constructing the collective incentive of the DP J politicians. The figure 
also confirms the level of conformity is even higher than the figure of 47% that 
Scheiner found in 1999, showing the DP J politicians are not as disperse in party 
identity as scholars suggested. 
Finally, figure of positive-attitude towards both decentralization and civil-society 
based participatory style of politics represents those "core" politicians supporting the 
DP J value and shares the highest degree of party identity in terms of agreement in 
party goals. In general, there is around 40% of "core" supporter of the party goals. 
The figure reaches as much as 43% for HR politicians and one-third for He 
politicians. Unlike economic issues or pension issues, which are directly related to 
livelihood of general public, and hence widely adopted by politicians on their 
manifesto, the goals of decentralization and civil-society based participatory style of 
politics is more like an ideal society the politicians would like to pursue, therefore a 
percentage of 40% of "core" politicians is acceptable and reasonable. 
4.5.2.3.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the DP J politicians generally have a high level of conformity on 
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the party goals and hence demonstrate a wide spread of collective incentives based on 
decentralization and civil-society based participatory style of politics within the party. 
There is a higher percentage among HR politicians showing positive attitude towards 
both issues, and this might be related to the difference in electoral system between HR 
and HC election, where HR politicians have a closer relationship with local 
government and local community than HC politicians. On the other hand, the goal of 
decentralization and civil-society based participatory style of politics are equally 
important in constructing the collective incentive among DPJ politicians, as the two 
goals are widely accepted as a differentiation with the LDP style of politics. Finally, 
there are around 40% of "core" politicians that support both party goals. This figure is 
reasonable, since the two goals represents an ideal society the politicians pursue but 
not issues that attract attention and support from general public. 
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Table 4.3: Analysis result on politicians' conformity towards party goal 
Total number Total number Total number 
of politicians of HR ofHC 
(%*) politicians politicians 
(%*) (%*) 
Positive attitude towards 134 (77%) 68 (82%) 66 (73%) 
either decentralization or 
civil-society based 
participatory style of politics 
Positive attitude towards 98 (570/0) 53 (66%) 45 (50%) 
decentralization 
Positive attitude towards 100 (58%) 49 (590/0) 51 (57%) 
civil-society based 
participatory style of politics 
Positive attitude towards both 66 (38%) 36 (43%) 30 (33%) 
decentralization and 
civil-society based 
participatory style of politics 
* Percentage of politicians among valid samples 
4.5.2.4 Conclusion 
The above analysis confirms there is a collective incentive among the DP J 
politicians: an ideal society of decentralized and civil-society based participatory style 
of politics, and this ideal society actually inherit from the leaders. In party documents 
and publications by politicians, we can clearly observe the two collective incentives 
are closely related to Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto. Party documents also clearly 
stated the above goals and party organization is adjusted in order to achieve these 
goals. At the same time, the DP J leadership intends to differentiate the DP J from the 
LDP through the two issues in order to build up a sense of identity. Through criticisms 
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towards the LDP "fayade reform" and claiming themselves as the "true reformist", the 
identity of reforming the "LDP bureaucracy-led corrupted style of politics" is created. 
Undoubtedly, collective incentive can never be formed without conformity among 
politicians. Through original investigation on politicians' belief and manifesto, this 
dissertation confirms there is a high level of conformity among politicians on the two 
issues. There is almost 80% of politician who shows a positive attitude towards either 
decentralization or civil-society based participatory style of politics. There is also 
around 400/0 of "core" politician shows positive attitude towards the two issues at the 
same time. This analysis confirms the existence of a collective incentive among DP J 
politicians. 
4.5.3 Selective Incentive of the DPJ 
Besides distribution of collective incentive as confirmed in the above section, 
this dissertation argues the DP J leadership also distributes a comprehensive and 
balance selective incentive to the members in order to maintain internal coherence. 
Although selective incentive can refers to various interests such as material interest, 
party funding and other rewards, this dissertation focuses on distribution of post. 
Distribution of selective incentive through posts is very comprehensive in order 
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to unify different groups in the party, for instance besides post of the DP J Standing 
Officers Council43 (Jonin Kanjikai) and Committee Chairman and Director44 in both 
Houses of the Diet, the Next Cabinet Posts also provide an important channel of 
incentive distribution. These posts have significant power and honor for politicians, 
for instance the Standing Officers Council posts can make important decisions on 
party issues; the Next Cabinet is the potential cabinet if the DPJ replaced the LDP 
government and is responsible for deciding policies of the party 45; Committee 
Chairman and Director are responsible for operation of various committees in both the 
HR and HC. Details of these three categories will be presented in respective section. 
Selective incentives are distributed in order to solve two internal cleavages: 
factional cleavage and generation cleavage. As mentioned before, the DP J is divided 
into various factions, and these factions have fundamental difference in former party 
affiliation, ideology or generation. However, many factions are loosely organized and 
often members are free to join other factions with close relationship, therefore it is 
impossible to analyze the distribution of selective incentive according to factions. 
In the following analysis, former party affiliation and number of terms served in 
43 Translation of the posts refers to the DPJ homepage, http://www.dpj .orjp/english/about_us/sob.html. 
44 Translation refers to the HR homepage, http://www.shugiin.gojp/index.nsf/htmllindex_e_guide.htm. 
45 Responsibility ofNC refers to http://www.dpj .or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8822. 
the HR will be applied. Since former party affiliation is closely related to factions 
within the DPJ, for example former DSP members mostly belongs to the Minsha 
Kyokai and former JSP members mostly belongs to the Yokomichi Group, former 
party affiliation can act as a substitution for factional affiliation. Former party 
affiliation of politicians is categorized as follow46 : 
• Members from the "Old" DPJ: 
• A: Formerly affiliated to the JSP 
• B: Formerly affiliated to the Sakigake 
• c: Other than A and B 
• Members from the "New" DPJ 
• D: Formerly affiliated to the Minseito 
• E: Formerly affiliated to the Shinto Yuai (New Fraternity Party) 
• F: Formerly affiliated to the Minshu Kaikaku Rengo (Democratic 
Reform Party) 
• G: Formerly affiliated to the Liberal Party 
• H: Members cultivated by the DP J with no former party affiliation 
• I: Others 
46 Categorization with reference to Tamura (2000) and revised. 
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F onner party affiliation is dividing into 9 categories, with 3 categories from the 
"old" DPJ (1996-1998) and 6 from the "new" DPJ (1998-now). In the first three 
categories, A and B is related to the JSP and the Sakigake respectively while C is 
affiliated to other parties, such as the Citizen's League, unaffiliated politician or new 
politician that joined the "old" DP J. In the other six categories, D is affiliated to the 
Minseito which composes of cc>nservative politicians. The Minseito is a merger from 
the Taiyoto (the Sun Party), the Kokumin no Koe (the People's Voice) and the From 
Five, which are conservative parties split from the NFP. E is affiliated to the Shinto 
Yuai, which composes of members from the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and is 
the rightist socialist. On the other hand, F is affiliated to the Minshu Kaikaku Rengo, a 
group related to the Rengo union. G is affiliated to the Liberal Party, which is a 
conservative party led by Ozawa Ichiro, and joined the DPJ in 2003. Finally, His 
members cultivated by the DP J and I is other politicians that joined from parties did 
not mentioned above after 1998. 
In resolving generational conflict, this dissertation argues party and Diet posts 
are also distributed to young to middle ranking politicians and posts of the Next 
Cabinet are mainly distributed to middle-ranking politicians and some young 
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politicians in order to allow them to participate in party and Diet operation. According 
to Noda Yoshihiko, a DPJ politician, third- and forth-termers are regarded as 
middle-ranking politicians47, where first and second termers are regarded as young 
politicians and fifth termer or above are veteran politicians, and this dissertation 
would follow this classification. HC politicians and politicians with both HR and HC 
experience will not be categorized since it is impossible to count in the above 
categorization method. In the following section, the distribution of DP J Standing 
Officers Council posts on former party affiliation and generation will be analyzed. 
Then the Next Cabinet (NC) posts in the party and Diet posts of Committee Chairman 
and Director will also be analyzed from the same aspects. 
4.5.3.1 The Analysis on Party Post 
The analysis on party post can be divided into Standing Officers Council posts 
and Next Cabinet posts. 
4.5.3.1.1 Standing Officers Council Post 
In this section, seven sets of Standing Officer Council appointment will be 
analyzed, and the list of appointment in each set is obtained from the DP J official 
47 From Noda's homepage, http://www.nodayoshi.gr.jp/report/k_kaiken/kaiken _ 002-024.html. 
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homepage. Party post will be divided into top leadership post (T) and Committee 
Chairman Post (C). The distribution of the two posts to each "former party affiliation" 
category will be added up (A) for analysis. In each set, the following posts will be 
analyzed48 : 
Top Leadership: 
• Presidents: 1. Daihyo (President); 2. Daihyo Daiko (Deputy President); 
3.Tokubetsu Daihyo (Special President); 4. Fuku Daihyo (Vice-President); 5. 
Saiko Komon (Chief Advisor); 
• Secretary Generals: 6. Kanjicho (Secretary General); 7. Kanjicho Dairi (Deputy 
Secretary General); 8. Hitto Fuku Kanjicho (Head of Vice-Secretary General); 9. 
Fuku Kanjicho (Vice-Secretary General); 
• Policy Research Committee: 10. Seisaku Chosa Kaicho (Chairman of Policy 
Research Committee); 11. Seisaku Chosa Kaicho Dairi (Deputy Chairman of 
Policy Research Committee); 12. Seisaku Chosakai Hitto Fuku Kaicho (Head of 
Vice-Chairman of Policy Research Committee); 
• Diet Strategy Committee: 13. Kokkai Taisaku Iincho (Chairman of Diet Strategy 
Committee); 14. Kokkai Taisaku Iincho Dairi (Deputy Chairman of Diet Strategy 
48 The list of posts is concluded from various appointment news released in the DPJ homepage. 
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Committee); 15. Kokkai Taisaku Hitto Fuku Kaicho (Head of Vice-Chairman of 
Diet Strategy Committee) 
• Election Strategy Committee: 16. Senkyo Taisaku Iincho (Chairman of Election 
Strategy Committee); 
• Executive Council: 17. Somukaicho (Chairman of Executive Council); Somu 
Yakuinshitsu Tanto Dari (Deputy Representative of Executive Council). 
Committee Chairman: 
1. Soshiki Iincho (Chairman of Organization Committee); 2. Zaisei Iincho 
(Chairman of Financial Committee); 3. Kikaku Iincho (Chairman of Project 
Committee); 4. Koho Iincho (Chairman of Public Relations Committee); 5. 
Kokumin Undo Honbucho (Chairman of Popular Movement Headquarter); 6. 
Otoko-onna Kyodo Sankaku Honbucho (Chairman of Equality of Sex 
Headquarter); 7. Dantai Koryu Iincho (Chairman of Organization 
Communication Committee); 8. Kigyo Dantai Koryu Taisaku Iincho (Chairman 
of Business Communication Strategy Committee); 9. Seiken Seisaku Iincho 
(Chairman of Regime Policy Committee). 
The reason of selecting seven sets of list but not analyzing all appointment is that 
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there are at least 21 top leadership changes in the history of the DP J since 1996, and 
limitation on resources and time makes it impossible to analyze all appointments. 
Therefore it is more reasonable to analyze selective cases, for example those 
appointment after change in top leadership or after major political event of the party. 
The following seven sets of appointment will be analyzed49 : 
• April 1998 when the new DP J is formed 
• October 1999 when Hatoyama is elected as President 
• October 2001 wl1en Hatoyama is reelected after the 2001 HC election 
• December 2003 after the merger with the LP and the 2003 HR election 
• September 2004 after Okada replaced Kan as President 
• September 2005 after Okada resigned because of the 2005 HR election 
defeat and Maehara replaced him as president 
• August 2007 which is the latest appointment 
49 All appointments are released in the DPJ homepage. 
Table 4.4: Analysis Result on Standing Officers Council Post 
Apr 98 Oct 99 Oct 01 Dec 03 Sep 04 Sep 05** 
T* C* A* T C A T C A T C A T C A T C A 
A 1 2 3 1 2 3 3 0 3 4 2 6 3 1 4 1 1 2 
B 2 0 2 2 0 2 4 0 4 2 0 2 1 0 1 4 0 4 
C 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
D 3 2 5 6 1 7 6 1 7 7 1 8 3 1 4 2 0 2 
E 3 1 4 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 0 1 3 0 3 2 0 2 
F 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G N* N N N N N N N N 4 1 5 2 0 2 1 0 1 
H N N N 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
I 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 3 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Young 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Middle 2 1 3 3 1 4 4 1 5 8 3 11 3 2 5 4 0 4 
Veteran 7 1 6 7 1 8 8 1 9 9 2 11 7 1 8 6 1 7 
Excluded* 0 2 2 2 2 4 1 0 1 6 0 6 3 0 3 2 0 2 
*T: Top Leadership; C: Committee Chairman; A: All; N: Not Available; Excluded: 
HC politician and politician with both HR and HC experience 
* * A full list is not disseminated in the DP J homepage 

















Distribution of posts often follow cleavage among different "former party affiliation", 
"old" and "new" DP J members, union and non-union members, as well as among 
different generation. 
In the April 1998 appointment, distribution of posts is clearly following a 
















former JSP (2 posts in total, as Yamahana Sadao, categorized in C, was a JSP 
politician before joining the Citizen's League and then the "old" DP J) and Sakigake 
politicians. Moreover, former Minseito and Shinto Yuai also received 3 posts each. 
Even the small political group Minshu Kaikaku Rengo also received a top leadership 
post. On the other hand, former JSP members and former Minseito members are 
allocated two Committee Chairman Posts, while one post is allocated to Shinto Yuai. 
In general, the distribution of posts is very balance, with no group exceed the others 
(except the small Minshu Kaikaku Rengo) by more than one posts. 
The October 1999 appointment is not balanced at a first glance, as former 
Minseito politicians received more top leadership posts than any other political groups. 
However, balance between union and non-union members is preserved, as there are 
six union-related politicians (three former JSP and three former Shito Yuai politicians) 
appointed. The same trend can be observed in the October 2001 and December 2003 
appointment, as number of union-related politicians appointed is similar to the 
previous appointment. One possible explanation is that although Hatoyama wishes to 
propose a more conservative idea of national security and constitution50 and needs 
support from conservative politicians. On the other hand the party still relies on the 
50 From the DPJ homepage, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8577 
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mobilizing power of union in elections51 . Therefore although the former Minseito 
politicians received a significant portion of posts, union-related socialist politicians 
are also rewarded for some important posts in the party. Another phenomenon worth 
noticing is that in the October 2001 appointment, former Sakigake politicians are 
allocated with 4 posts in compare with 3 posts for former JSP politicians, while 
former JSP politicians are allocated with 6 posts (and two posts for former Sakigake 
politicians) in December 2003.-This may related to the shift from Hatoyama Yukio 's 
conservative leadership to a comparatively progressive leadership of Kan Naoto in 
2002. In fact, Kan Naoto 's faction has close relationship with other progressive 
factions and he appointed more former JSP members than former Sakigake members 
under his leadership in 1998. 
In the three appointments between September 2004 and August 2007, a 
balancing personnel appointment can be observed among politicians who joined the 
"new" DPJ. Former Minseito politicians and former Shinto Yuai politicians received 
similar number of posts, while former LP politicians received half of the number of 
post former Minseito politicians received. However, there is no balance personnel 
policy observed among politicians who joined the "old" DPJ, as number of posts 
51 For example, the DPJ made a policy agreement on the 1998 He election with the Rengo union, 
details refer to http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8831 . 
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former JSP politicians received exceed those received by former Sakigake politicians 
under the leadership of Okada Katsuya. The appointment reversed under the 
leadership of Maehara. This may be related to a relatively middle-of-the-road 
ideology of Okada and a more conservative leadership by Maehara, which might 
tends to limit the influence of former JSP politicians in the party decision making 
organization. The appointment by Ozawa in August 2007 shows former union 
members (category A and E) received a significant portion of post. This may relate to 
electoral success in the 2007 HC election and the need of the DP J to build a 
cooperative relationship with union as illustrated later in this chapter. 
In resolving generational conflict, appointment of Standing Officers Council 
mainly provides a participation channel in party operation and decision making for 
middle-ranking politicians. In contrast to top leadership posts that are mostly allocated 
to veteran politicians and a few are allocated to middle-ranking politicians, 
Committee Chairman Posts are mostly allocated to middle-ranking politicians and 
occasionally young politicians. Two special cases for young politicians to participate 
in top leadership are two first termers, Haraguchi Kazuhiro and Iwakuni Tetsundo, 
rewarded a top leadership post in the 1999 and 2001 appointment respectively. 
Standing Officers Council Posts are allocated to young politicians in the early years of 
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the party, and dropped to zero in the two latest appointments, as many young 
politicians are defeated in the 2005 HR election, which prevent them from rewarding 
party posts. At the same time, Ozawa Ichiro set up a number of new top leadership 
posts in order to accommodate veteran politicians, results in a disproportion between 
number of middle-ranking politicians and veteran politician in the latest Standing 
Officers Council appointment. 
4.5.3.1.2 Next Cabinet 
The Next Cabinet (NC) is an internal decision making organization set up in 
1999. The major function of the NC, according to an interview with a DPJ official, is 
to decide the policy direction and policy priority, as well as coordinating various 
interests within the party. Moreover, the NC is positioned as the "future cabinet" of 
the DPJ, once the DPJ replace the LDP-Ied government, the members of the NC is 
expected to become cabinet members52 . As a result, the NC position does not only 
represent a respective position within the party, but also being a potential 
advancement to become a minister of the government. Therefore, the NC provides a 
strong selective incentive for the DP J members and this dissertation argues the 
distribution of this selective incentive is balanced among different factions and 
52 According to the DPJ news, http://www.dpj .orjp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=811 7 
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generations. Since the Ne set up in 1999, there are 12 generations of appointments: 
• 1 st October 1999; 
• 9
th September 2000; 
• 8
th September 2001; 
• 3
rd October 2002; 
• 17th December 2002; 
• 28
th January 2004; 
• 26
th May 2004; 
• 20
th December 2004; 
• 20
th September 2005; 
• 12th April 2006; 
• 26
th September 2006; and 
• 5
th September 2007. 
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Table 4.5 Analysis result on Next Cabinet posts 
Oct Sep Sep Oct Dec Jan May Dec Sep Apr Sep Sep 
99 00 01 02 02 04 04 04 05 06 06 07 
A 4 4 1 4 6 1 3 3 3 3 2 5 
B 5 5 5 4 7 4 3 6 3 3 3 3 
C 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 
D 2 2 3 2 2 5 4 3 1 1 1 2 
E 3 2 3 3 2 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 
F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G N* N N N N 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 
H 0 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 7 7 6 4 
I 1 0 3 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 6 4 
Young 3 0 3 6 4 3 3 1 1 1 3 0 
Middle 5 6 5 6 9 8 9 8 7 7 8 6 
Veteran 3 3 4 2 2 6 5 6 3 3 5 6 
Excluded* 4 5 4 2 6 3 3 5 8 8 4 10 
N: Not Available; Excluded: HC politician and politician with both HR and HC 
expenence 
In general, the Next Cabinet provides a balance selective incentive to each 
faction. Most of the factions (besides those from the Minshu Kaikaku Rengo, as there 
are few members in this faction) receive at least one post in each Next Cabinet 
appointment, and the appointment is rather balanced in many occasions. At the same 
time, young and middle-ranking politicians are appointed in majority of posts, 
providing them a chance to participate in top policy-making organization within the 
party and a potential to become future Minister. In this sense, generation conflict 
could be minimized as young and middle ranking politicians are provided with 
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sufficient channel to participate in party policy decision with a future career path. 
In the October 1999 and September 2000 appointment, a balance distribution 
among factions is significant. As the "old" DP J members from the JSP and Sakigake 
received similar number of posts. It is also true for "new" DP J members, with 2-3 
posts for the former Minseito and Shinto Yuai politicians. The balance among 
progressive and conservative members is observed, as the politician in category I in 
October 1999 appointment is Eda Satsuki, a progressive politician from the Socialist 
Democratic Federation (and later joined the NFP), making progressive camp and 
conservative Minseito and Shinto Yuai shared a 5 members each in the appointment. 
At the same time, middle-ranking politicians took a main share in the appointment, 
while young politicians are also appointed in 1999. There are also 4-5 He members 
appointed in both appointments. 
The balance of appointment seems to be violated in the September 2001 
appointment, as the former JSP member only received one post, in compare with 5 
posts received by former Sakigake members. However, when the appointment is 
closely observed, one can discover the appointment is not that unbalance, as the two 
politicians categorized as "others" (category I) are Eda Satsuki and Tsutsui Nobutaka, 
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a former SDP and JSP politician who joined the DP J in 1998. Therefore, the number 
of post distributed to the progressive socialist is actually 3, a relatively balance 
appointment is achieved when compare with 5 posts for former Sakigake politicians. 
A balanced appointment ofNC members continued in the two appointments in 
2002, but disrupted in the January 2004 appointment. In the 2004 appointment, 
former JSP and former Shinto Yuai politicians are fewer than former Sakigake and 
former Minseito politicians. One may argue in the category C, Watanabe and Makino 
formerly affiliated to the DSP (and hence the Shinto Yuai) and the Citizen's League (a 
progressive political group) respectively, and Kondo is a progressive politician, 
therefore the proportion between progressive and conservative camp can still be 
achieved. Another point that worth mentioning is that the merger with the Liberal 
Party in 2003 and the electoral advancement in the 2003 HR election expand the 
influence of the Liberal Party group and new DP J cultivated politicians, therefore 
more posts has to distribute to them. At the same time, the distribution of posts among 
generation is still focusing on middle-ranking politicians and young politicians also 
have numerous chances to participate in the Next Cabinet between 2001 and 2004. 
At the time from May 2004 to April 2006, the DP J experienced a period of rise 
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and fall, as Kan Naoto resigned and Okada Katsuya became the President. Okada 
experienced a victory in the 2004 HC election but forced to resign after poor 
performance in the 2005 HR election. Maehara Seiji replaced Okada as the President. 
Maehara wished to reform the party by appointing young politicians in the top 
leadership, but he eventually resigned and was replaced by Ozawa Ichiro. Nonetheless, 
the Next Cabinet appointments continue to follow the balancing principle, except two 
appointments in December 2004 and September 2007. In December 2004, former 
Sakigake members exceed the number of former JSP member by 3, but again, a 
former Citizen's League politician Kaieda Banri, acted as a balance between the 
progressive and conservative camp. 
On the other hand, the September 2007 appointment inclines towards the JSP 
group, many HC politicians are rewarded a post in the Next Cabinet and no young 
politicians are appointed. There are several reasons explaining this appointment. 
Firstly, national organization such as labor union plays an important role in mobilizing 
votes in the HC election, and President Ozawa Ichiro hopes to turn union organization 
into local party organization of the DP J53. One example showing Ozawa's respect 
towards union is that when Ozawa visited all the provinces as a preparation of the 
53 From Tokyo Shimbun, 20th August, 2007. 
http://www.tokyo-np.cojp/article/politics/scope/CK2007082002042391.html. 
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2007 HC election, he invited union leader to come along with him throughout the 
whole journey (Shiota, 2007, p.74-75). Besides 5 former JSP and 1 former Shinto Yuai 
(DSP) politicians appointed in the NC, politicians such as Asao Keiichiro and Tsutsui 
Nobutaka who are formerly related to socialist parties (DSP and JSP respectively) also 
rewarded a NC post. This shows a more cooperative relationship between the DP J and 
union in the party policy-decision process. Secondly, one possible explanation to the 
appointment of more HC politicians than ever is that, the consecutive victory in 2004 
and 2007 HC election victory led to a necessity to increase rewards to HC politicians, 
as they become more important under current political situation. Thirdly, many 
influential young politicians lost in the 2005 HR election and those young politicians 
who were able to maintain their posts have turned into middle-ranking politicians 
after the 2005 HR election. This results in a declining influence of young politicians 
in the DP J and may lead to fewer appointments in the NC. 
4.5.3.2 The Analysis on Diet Post 
In this section, the appointment of current HC and HR committee post will be 
analyzed. According to the HR homepage54, there are currently 17 Committees and 6 
Special Committees and 1 Deliberative Council on Political Ethics. On the other hand, 
54 http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/htmllindex_e_officer.htm 
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HC currently has 17 Standing Committees, 5 Special Committees, 3 Research 
Committees and 1 Deliberative Council on Political Ethics55 . Committees are 
responsible to deliberate bills according to its policy area, for example finance, 
education, social welfare and so on. Each legislator has to join at least one Committee 
with no upper limit. The number of members in each Committee is distributed to each 
political group according to their percentage of seats in the Diet. In contrast to 
standing committee, special committee is responsible for deliberating specific bills 
and dissolved after the bill is passed. However, there is a tendency of setting up the 
same special committee in consecutive sessions (Tamura, 2000, p.159). 
Chairman of each Committee is either elected by respective committee members 
or delegated by the Speaker of the House. In many occasions, Committee Chairman is 
delegated by the Speaker after consultation is made in the Committee on Rules and 
Administration (Tamura, 2000, p.159). Since the LDP is the largest political group in 
the HR, most Committee Chairman Posts are distributed to the LDP politicians and a 
few are distributed to the DPJ. On the other hand, the DPJ win a majority in the HC 
and therefore possesses more Chairman Posts. Committee Chairman hold the power 
of regulating meeting and dismiss committee member who does not follow his order, 
55 http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/member/index.htm 
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therefore the Chairman is in an important position in the Diet56 . On the other hand, 
Director in each Committee is being consulted on daily operation of the Committee 
by the Chairman. Daily operation of the Committee actually bases on the consultation 
result and therefore Director is also influential in the Committee (Tamura, 2000, 
p.163). Although the number of Directors is distributed according to the percentage of 
seats of each political group, political parties are free to distribute these posts to its 
members. Therefore it is a useful way to distribute selective incentives to its 
members. 
56 A detail discussion on function of Committee Chairman can be found in Tamura (2000, p.159). 
Table 4.6: Analysis result on HR and HC posts 
HR Post * HC Post * 
Chairman Director** Chairman Director** 
A 1 4 1 5 
B 2 4 1 2 
C 0 6 1 2 
D 1 4 2 3 
E 0 1 2 1 
F 0 1 0 0 
G 0 3 3 7 
H 0 16 5 38 
I 0 6 1 6 
Young*** 0 6 1 26 
Middle*** 0 28 5 18 
Veteran*** 4 10 4 5 
Excluded**** 0 1 6 15 
* HR Post on 3rd March 2008. HC Post on 14th March 2008. 
* * Including Director of Standing Committee, Special Committee, Research 
Committee and Secretary of Deliberative Council 
*** For HC politicians, young refers to first term er, middle refers to second termer 
and veteran refers to thir~ termer or above (not directly comparable with HR 
politicians) 
* * * * Refers to politician with both HR and HC experience 
4.5.3.2.1 HR Post 
F or HR Post, as the DP J is heavily defeated in the 2005 HR election, the party 
only able to get 4 Committee Chairman Positions. Chairman post is distributed to 1 
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former JSP politician, 2 former Sakigake politicians and 1 former Minseito politician. 
One point worth noticing is that all Chairmen are fifth termers, a beginning stage of 
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veteran politicians. Although the sample is too small to determine a balance 
distribution of posts, one can conclude Chairman Posts are allocated to potential 
leaders who freshly become fifth termers. 
F or Director Posts, there are 46 posts in total with 45 politicians filling the posts 
(Watanabe Shu filled two posts, including Director of the Committee on Security and 
the Special Committee on Prevention of International Terrorism and Japan's 
Cooperation and Support; Humanitarian Assistance for Reconstruction in Iraq). 
Among the 46 posts, former JSP and former Sakigake politicians received 4 posts 
each. In category C, 5 "old" DP J cultivated politicians and 1 former DSP politician 
who joined the DP J in 1996 (Watanabe Shu, counted twice as he filled two posts) are 
appointed. On the other hand, all political groups in the "new" DP J are allocated with 
at least one post, where former Minseito and former LP politicians received 4 and 3 
posts respectively. The posts are quite evenly distributed among politicians in these 
groups. 
An interesting phenomenon is that there are 16 "new" DP J cultivated politicians 
receive a Director Post in the HR, one reasonable explanation is that these young to 
middle-ranking politicians compose of a majority in the party, as the party constantly 
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recruit new candidates standing for elections (Mori, 2006). Therefore, Director Posts 
are allocated to these "new" DP J cultivated members in order to resolve generational 
conflict within the party. Counting on distribution of posts according to generation 
confirmed this argument. Among the 46 Director Posts, 6 are distributed to young 
politicians (1 for first termer and 5 for second termer), 29 are distributed to 
middle-ranking politicians (17 for third termer and 12 for forth termer) and 10 are 
distributed to veteran politicians57 . We can confirm that Director Posts of the HR is 
applied as a selective incentive for young and middle-ranking politicians, as majority 
of posts are allocated to them. 
4.5.3.2.2 HC Post 
In contrast to HR Posts, the DPJ has a large room to manipulate HC Posts, as the 
party won a landslide victory over the LDP in the 2007 HC election. The DP J is able 
to get 16 Committee Chairman Posts and 64 Director Posts. For Committee Chairman 
Posts, former JSP, former Sakigake and other politicians joined the "old" DP J is 
allocated one post each. Former Minseito and Shinto Yuai politicians have two posts 
respectively, while former LP politicians are allocated for three posts. The "new" DP J 
cultivated politicians have a largest share of five posts. The posts are quite equally 
57 The politician excluded in counting is Okumura Tenzo, who is a second termer in the HR and served 
for one term in the He. 
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distributed among different political groups, while "new" DP J cultivated politicians is 
rewarded more post as there are numerous HC politicians who were elected in 1998 
and 2001 HC election have turned into second termers in 2004 and 2007 respectively. 
In terms of generation, one Chairman Post is distributed to young generation (first 
termer), nine to middle-ranking HC politicians (second termer) and four to veteran 
politicians (third termer or above). The distribution clearly shows Chairman Posts are 
mainly distributed to middle-ranking politicians who were elected in 1998 and 2001 
HC election (mainly "new" DP J cultivated politicians). 
For the 64 Director Posts, as many as 38 posts are distributed to "new" DPJ 
cultivated politicians. The reason of this distribution is similar to the reason of 
distribution of Chairman Posts, as the DP J win over the LDP in both 2004 and 2007 
HC election, and there are many first termers that require the DP J to distribute 
selective incentives to them. For the remaining posts, seven are distributed to former 
LP politicians and six are distributed to former JSP politicians (including 5 who have 
joined the "old" DPJ and one joined the "new" DPJ). Three are distributed to 
DSP-related politicians (one from the Shinto Yuai and two affiliated to the DSP 
formerly), and three are distributed to former Minseito politicians. One may notice a 
significant share of posts is distributed to former socialist politicians. In fact, as 
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mentioned in the previous section, Ozawa wishes to build a cooperative relationship 
with the unions and hope to make them the DPJ's local party organization. There are 
as much as 17 politicians in either Chairman or Director Posts (5 for Chairman and 12 
for Director Post) are directly related to labor unions, and the distribution of post 
shows a friendly attitude towards unions. In terms of generation, 26 Director Posts are 
distributed to first termer, 18 are distributed to second term er and veteran politicians 
received 5 posts. This coincides with the phenomenon that many posts are distributed 
to "new" DP J cultivated politicians. 
4.5.3.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, a balanced personnel policy on the appointment of Standing 
Officers Council posts, NC posts and Diet posts can be observed. For Standing 
Officers Council posts, there is a clear balancing personnel appointment under Kan 
Naoto leadership in 1998, as each political group is rewarded a similar amount of 
party posts. When the leadership turned to Hatoyama Yukio, there are more former 
Minseito politicians appointed than any other groups, while union-related politicians 
are able to maintain a significant number of posts within the party. This may be 
related to the balance between Hatoyama's interest to promote a new constitution and 
the DP J interest in dependence on union in elections. This trend continues until the 
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appointment in September 2004 as the DP J entered an era of instability in that year. A 
balanced appointment can be observed among the "new" DP J politicians, but the ratio 
between former JSP and former Sakigake appointment fluctuated as a result of change 
in leadership. In terms of resolving generational conflict, appointment of Standing 
Officers Council mainly provides a channel for middle-ranking politician to 
participate in party decision making, as a significant portion of post is allocated to 
middle-ranking politicians in most of the time. Sometimes posts are also offered to 
young politicians, especially in appointments of the early days. Recently, 
appointments are more inclined to veteran politicians, as many top leadership posts 
are set up to accommodate them. 
F or the Next Cabinet appointment, a general trend of balance appointment can be 
observed. Although unbalance appointment in facade can be observed occasionally, a 
balanced personnel policy is still maintained in terms of proportion of progressive and 
conservative members, and some politicians categorized as "others" are actually 
related to the JSP, the DSP (Shinto Yuai) or the progressive camp. Distribution of 
selective incentive to young and middle-ranking politicians is obvious in all 
appointments, as they make up the largest portion of appointment in most of the time. 
Finally, some politicians from the House of Councilor are rewarded for Ne posts, 
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especially after the 2007 HC victory as the DP J replaced the LDP and become the 
largest political group in the HC. 
Diet posts are distribute to each political groups in a balance proportion in 
general, except a higher proportion is given to "new" DPJ cultivated politicians and 
socialist party related politicians. It is because there are a large number of young 
politicians cultivated by the "new" DP J in these years and there is a need to resolve 
generational cleavage. Moreover, there is a strategic need to build a cooperative 
relationship with labor union in order to absorb their organization base to become the 
local party organization of the party. Generational conflict is noticed by the leadership, 
therefore a significant portion of HR and HC posts are distributed to middle-ranking 
politicians and young politicians respectively. 
4.6 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, the role of leadership in maintaining internal coherence of the 
DP J is presented. Despite the DP J is divided into factions with three dimensions of 
fragmentation: ideology, former party affiliation and generation, and the leadership 
faces constraints in actions, the DP J leadership can still make critical decisions to 
unify the party. 
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In the beginning, two features of the DP J organization: factionalism within the 
DP J and leadership system is presented. There are nine major factions within the party 
and internal fragmentation of the party is characterized as difference in ideologies, 
generations and former party affiliation. At the same time, there are frequent changes 
in party leadership that superficially suggests a low autonomy of leadership. However, 
this might not be necessarily true since all other leadership changes are "normal" 
under Japanese context besides Hatoyama's resignation in 2002. This dissertation 
suggests although there is limitation towards leadership's freedom of action, the 
leadership is playing an active role in maintaining internal coherence of the DP J. 
Scholars provide various explanations on internal coherence of the DP J, but 
these explanations are neither convincing nor conclusive. This dissertation argues 
there are three factors to maintain internal coherence of the party: leadership 
manipulation in party organization, existence of collective incentive and a 
comprehensive and balance distribution of selective incentive. Through original 
investigation in party documents, news reports, first-hand and second-hand interviews 
and generating original data, the role of leadership in manipulating a comprehensive 
program to maintain internal coherence of the DP J is confirmed. 
180 
In the next chapter, the issue of media strategy and electoral performance of the 
DP J will be addressed. Chapter 4 will argue that, the DP J leaders deliberately promote 
the party through different media strategy and adjust the party's media strategy in 
response to external electoral environmental changes. In the beginning of the next 
chapter, electoral performance of the DP J and explanations on the electoral 
performance of the DP J provided by scholars will be presented. These factors 
includes structural factor such as electoral system and change in societal ideology, 
party organization and voting behavior. After that, support base of the DP J will be 
analyzed and literatures on unaffiliated voters will be discussed, as unaffiliated voter 
is recognized as the core supporter of the DP J and are highly sensitive to media. 
Finally, through original investigation on party reports and news reports, this 
dissertation attempts to argue the DP J has adopted different media strategies in 
different stages, and the DP J's media strategies will be analyzed. 
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Chapter 5: Media Strategy and Electoral Support of the DP J 
The DPJ is currently the largest opposition party in Japan. Scholars provide 
various explanations towards electoral performance of the DP J However, these 
explanations paid no attention to the DP J actorness and unable to fully explain 
the DP J electoral performance, especially why the DP J can attract a relatively 
stable support from unaffiliated voters. This dissertation argues that, it is the 
media strategy of the DP J illustrates the "actorness" of the party and plays a 
key role in obtaining support from unaffiliated voters. In short, the DP J leaders 
deliberately promote the party through different media strategy in response to 
environmental changes. Through original investigation on party reports, news 
reports and politician s publications, this dissertation discovers there are three 
stages of media strategies throughout the DP J history, namely the popularity and 
image campaign, policy-oriented campaign and strategic promotion campaign. 
5.1 Electoral Performance of the DPJ 
Electoral result of the DP J in House of Representative (HR) elections since its 
emergence in 1996 is shown in Table 5.1. The DP J is tripling its number of seats in 
the HR in the first three elections, from 52 seats in the 1996 HR election, 127 seats in 
the 2000 HR election and advanced to 177 seats in 2003. The DPJ came closest to 
challenge the LDP's majority in 2003, with only a difference of 70 seats between two 
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parties. However, in the 2005 HR election, the DPJ suffered a heavy defeat, gaining 
only 113 seats and is 183 seats behind of the LDP. It seems that the DP J faces a 
destiny of declining support as the NFP did, in which the NFP has decreased its 
number of seats from 178 members at the party's formation to only 156 seats in the 
1996 HR election and eventually dissolved. 
Electoral system has changed from a SNTVIMMD system to a SMD-PR system 
in 1994. Although the DP J suffered a heavy lost in the 2005 HR election, electoral 
record of proportional representative (PR) section in the HR election (as shown in 
Table 5.2) suggests the DPJ actually gains a stable support from all over the country. 
PR section of the HR election was introduced in 1996, where the DP J was able to win 
35 seats from the PR section in that year. The number of PR seats advanced to 47 and 
72 in the 2000 and 2003 HR election respectively. It is worth noticing that the DP J 
win 3 more PR seats than the LDP in the 2003 election. Although the DP J suffered a 
heavy lost in 2005, it could still maintain the number of seats obtained in PR at 61 
seats, when compare to the LDP advancement from 69 seats in 2003 to 77 seats. The 
result shows electoral support of the DPJ has not drastically decrease, and the heavy 
lost may due to the "winner-takes-all" single-member district (SMD) system. Under 
the SMD system, only one seat is rewarded to the winning party in each electoral 
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district, and the remaining votes won by other parties are discarded. For instance, the 
DPJ actually won 36.4% of votes in the SMD section, but only winning 52 SMD seats 
(17.3%). On the other hand, the LDP is able to win 219 (73%) SMD seats with only 
47.7% of votes. The 2005 HR election result is seriously distorted by the electoral 
system. 
The DP J is performing even better in House of Councilor (HC) election as 
shown in Table 5.3. The DP J participated in the HC election for the first time in 1998 
and won 27 seats, and the party gained another 26 seats in 2001. In 2004, the DPJ 
won 50 seats and surpassed the LDP by 1 seat. The DP J advanced even further in the 
2007 election, when the DP J won 70 seats and win 23 more seats than the LDP. Two 
consecutive victories over the LDP make the DP J become the largest party in the HC. 
Although one may argue the HC does not hold any real power as the HR holds the 
ultimate right to pass bills. Nevertheless, the result of HC election shows the DP J is 
capable to challenge the LDP. Opposition parties, which are lead by the DPJ, now get 
a majority in the HC, and continuously exerting influence in the policy making 
process, by bargaining with the LDP-Komeito coalition government, and occasionally 
rejecting bills introduced by the government in the HC. 
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Table 5.1: Electoral Record of HR Election from 1990-2005 
1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2005 
LDP 275 223 239 233 237 296 
DPJ 0 0 52 127 177 113 
Komeito 45 51 0 31 34 31 
JSP/SDPJ 136 70 15 19 6 7 
JCP 16 15 26 20 9 9 
Shinseito 0 55 0 0 0 0 
lNP 0 35 0 0 0 0 
DSP 14 15 0 0 0 0 
Sakigake 0 13 2 0 0 0 
NFP/LP 0 0 156 22 0 0 
Others/Independent 26 34 10 28 17 24 
Total 512 511 500 480 480 480 
Table 5.2: Electoral Record of PR section for HR election from 1996-2005 
1996 2000 2003 2005 
LDP 70 56 69 77 
DP] 35 47 72 61 
Komeito 0 24 25 23 
]CP 24 20 9 9 
SDP] 11 15 5 6 
NFP/LP 60 18 0 0 
Others/Independent 0 0 0 4 
Total 200 180 180 180 
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Table 5.3: Electoral Record of HC Election from 1992-2007 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
LDP 68 46 44 64 49 37 
DPJ 0 0 27 26 50 60 
Komeito 14 0 9 13 11 9 
JSP/SDPJ 22 16 5 3 2 2 
JCP 6 8 15 5 4 3 
Shinseito 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JNP 4 0 0 0 0 0 
DSP 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Sakigake ' 0 3 0 0 0 0 
NFP/LP 0 40 6 6 0 0 
Others/Independent 8 13 20 4 5 10 
Total 126 126 126 121 121 121 
In contrast, traditional opposition party, the SDPJ (the former JSP) is suffering 
from a continuous decrease in number of seats in both the HR and HC. As electoral 
record shows, the Socialist party declined significantly after the "Doi boom" in late 
1980s, and further suffered from the new party boom. Although the party eventually 
took part in both the non-LDP-non-JCP coalition as well as the LDP-JSP-Sakigake 
coalition, the party actually performed worse than ever. The fortune of the Socialist 
party, as well as the JCP, seems inevitably decline as the DP J grows. Since the 
elections from 2001 onwards, both the SDP J and the JCP is unable to recover from 
the declination and only record single digit victor in both HR and HC elections. 
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The DP J undoubtedly outplayed the traditional opposition parties in recent 
elections. In fact, electoral record shows that the DP J has outperformed the Socialist's 
best performance. The JSP gained a highest of 35.55 percent of seats in the 1958 HR 
election, and the DPJ win 36.88 percent of seats in the 2003 HR election. Even the 
DP J is defeated in the 2005 HR election, the party actually won 23.54 percent of seats, 
which is performing better than most of the elections the Socialist had since the 1970s 
(performance of the Socialist party refers to Kamijyo, 1991, p.39-43). In conclusion, 
the DP J is significant for investigation in the sense that it is the most influential 
opposition party in Japan, and is as influential as the traditional opposition parties in 
the "parity period" in the Japanese political history. 
5.2 Explanations towards the DP J Electoral Performance 
In brief, explanations provided by scholars on the DP J electoral performance can 
be divided into structural perspective, party organization perspective and voting 
behavior perspective. 
5.2.1 Structural Perspective 
Explanations from structural perspective include electoral system and changing 
societal ideology. 
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5.2.1.1 Electoral System 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, electoral system in the HR election has 
changed from a single-nontransferable voting system (SNTV) under multi-member 
district system (MMD) (or SNTV IMMD system) to a hybrid system of single-member 
district (SMD) and proportional representative (PR) system (or SMD-PR system). 
Electoral system, does not only "translate" vote share into number of seats obtained 
by a particular party, but also affect the distribution of vote per se as well as share of 
seats among parties (Matoba, 2003, p.209). This means structure of competition in a 
party system is affected by the electoral system. The DPJ, being the largest opposition 
party after the NFP dissolved, benefits from the electoral system because the SMD 
section tends to produce a two party system. 
According to the Duverger's Law, single-member district electoral system tends 
to produce a two party system (Duverger, 1954; Riker, 1986; as stated in Reed, 2003). 
In fact, number of parties competing in electoral district has decreased under the new 
party system. Under the old MMD system, competition is more fierce as there were 
over 70 percent of districts have more than 4 parties competing the seats. The figure 
decreased to fewer than 40 percent of districts under the new SMDIPR system and 
over half of the districts have only three parties in competition (Matoba, 2003, p.227). 
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The decrease in number of parties in competition is mainly due to the effect of SMD 
section, which prevents smaller parties to participate in district level election. Matoba 
(2003, p.228) suggests that it is because smaller parties recognize their chance of 
winning in the district level is very low, therefore they may only participate in a few 
districts that they have a chance to win. Reed (2003, p.188-192) also confirms the 
trend of a bipolar competition is becoming more significant in the SMD section. The 
LDP always places candidates in all electoral districts, but smaller opposition parties, 
such as the SDP J, tends to place fewer candidates in electoral districts, for instance 
they only placed candidates in less than 25 percent of SMD in 2000 HR election. In 
contrast, the DP J increases the number of electoral district that the party placed a 
candidate, as in the 1996 HR election, DP J has placed candidates in only 43 percent 
of SMD. The figure increased to 80 percent in 2000, and reached 97 percent in the 
2005 HR election. As a result, the electoral system excludes smaller opposition parties 
like the SDPJ from competition, "anti-LDP" votes will probably vote for the DPJ. 
Moreover, smaller parties are heavily punished by the SMD section of the 
electoral system. As the SMD section is a "winner-takes-all" game, the LDP or the 
DP J always win the only seat in most SMD districts. Even if the smaller parties are 
able to win a sizeable portion of votes nationwide (for example the JCP won 12-13 
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percent of SMD votes in 1996 and 2000), the party is not guarantee to win a seat in 
the SMD section (the JCP did not win a SMD seat even ifit won 12 percent of seats 
nationwide in 2000). As a result, smaller parties are marginalized in the SMD section. 
Termination of local network and lost of support from locals may be resulted, since 
these parties can no longer fight for the locals' interests. The domination of the SMD 
seats by two major parties, the LDP and the DPJ is resulted. 
Table 5.4: Percentage of votes and seats won in SMD section, 1996-2005 HR 
election58 
1996 HR 2000 HR 2003 HR 2005 HR 
LDP 39% (56%) 41% (59%) 44% (56%) 48% (73%) 
DPJ 110/0(60/0) 280/0 (27%) 37% (35%) 36% (17%) 
SDPJ 20/0 (1 %) 4% (10/0) 3% (0.30/0) 1%(0.3%) 
JCP 13% (0.6%) 12% (0%) 8% (0%) 7% (0%) 
0/0: percentage of votes; (0/0): percentage of SMD seats 
Table 5.5: Percentage of votes and seats won in PR section, 1996-2005 HR election59 
1996 HR 2000 HR 2003 HR 2005 HR 
LDP 33% (35%) 28% (31%) 35% (38.3%) 38% (42.7%) 
DPJ 16% (17.5%) 25% (26%) 370/0 (40%) 31 % (33.8%) 
SDPJ 6% (5.5%) 9% (8.3%) 5% (2.7%) 5.5% (3.3%) 
JCP 130/0 (12%) 11%(11%) 8% (5%) 7.25% (5%) 
0/0: percentage of votes; (%): percentage of PR seats 
At the same time, the above effects of SMD in HR election which cultivates a 
two-party system have expanded to the He election. Reed (2004) suggests that the 
single-member district of the HC election should become more congruent with the 
58 Data from Tanaka, 2005. 
59 Data from Tanaka, 2005. 
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party system and the multi-member districts to be more divergence with the system. 
The 2004 He election is the first election that "presented us what two-party elections 
might look like in future upper house election", as the LDP and the DP J won over 
96% of seats in the district section and 71 percent in the PR section. In the 2007 He 
election, the result is similar to the previous election, as the two major parties added 
up to 89 percent of seats in the district section (2 seats to the Komeito and 7 seats to 
the independents) and 69 percent in the PR section. In details, single-member districts 
are mainly a competition between the two major parties, and all two-member districts 
are shared by candidates from the LDP and the DP 1. Even though other smaller 
parties might be able to win one seat in three-member or two seats in five-member 
districts, the percentage of seats in total is very low, as the two major parties often 
able to win all three seats in a ratio of 2: 1. Small parties would only able to survive 
marginally in the PR section. In conclusion, the new electoral system creates a 
tendency of two major party system in favor of the LDP and the DP J in recent HR and 
He elections. 
5.2.1.2 Changing Societal Ideology 
Another set of explanation provides an insightful explanation towards electoral 
performance of the DP J from a societal cleavage perspective. This explanation argues 
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as old cleavages diminished, emerging cleavages opened up chances for new parties 
to appeal to eligible voters, serving as a background factor for the DP J electoral 
performance. According to Hirano (2006, p.73), the importance of traditional 
progress-conservative ideology has significantly decreased since late 1980s, 
especially on the national security issue. On the other hand, new axis on 
"neo-conservative" issues which concerns about small government and a self-help 
society is emerging. At the same time, there is an emerging cleavage on the issue of 
public works (Reed, 2003, p.197), or "clientelism versus anti-clientelism" cleavage 
(Scheiner, 2006). The interest of rural voters and urban voters is becoming a driving 
force in Japanese politics (Kabashima and Sugawara, 2004), where the LDP is 
depending on the clientelist system to maintain its support from the rural areas, while 
urban voters turns to the DPJ for anti-clientelist reason. Kabashima (2000) precisely 
points out that urban voter who did not get any special interest through the clientelist 
system, has turned away from the LDP since they felt the LDP government wasted 
their taxes on public works, damaged the environment and caused corruption. In 
conclusion, declining in existing cleavage and rising of new cleavage produce a 
challenge for traditional parties and chance for new parties, as parties have to 
response to new demands bring by the new cleavage, for example the DP J tries to 
establish its image as a party which opposes wasteful public works, and Koizumi led 
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the LDP to execute various reform in response to the demand of political and financial 
reform. 
5.2.2 Party Organization Perspective 
Scholars identify catch-all characteristic of the DP J party organization as a 
factor contributes to its electoral performance. The catch-all characteristic which 
emphasize less on ideology makes the DP J able to obtain support from a wide range 
of public on the ideological spectrum, as well as support from both urban and rural 
voters. At the same time, the merger with the LP benefits the party as the DPJ become 
a larger target for the anti-LDP voters to vote for. 
Kabashima (2001a) argues that the DPJ catch-all characteristics contribute to the 
support of the party. The DP J, especially after the merger with the Liberal Party, 
turned into a party that represents interests of both urban voters and rural voters 
(Kabashima and Sugawara, 2004). The rural support for the DPJ is strengthened as 
there is a strong Ozawa support among the locals in Tohoku area 60. Moreover, the 
party takes a middle-of-the-road ideology after the merger, as the DP J is originally a 
central-leftist party, while the LP is a more conservative one. The merger enables the 
60 Oshita, Interview with Hatoyama, 2003. 
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DP J to move towards the center in order to capture more votes (Kabashima and 
Okawa, 2007). 
In fact, the DPJ is the least disliked party among Japanese voters, indicates a 
possibility to obtain support from a wide range of public. In one survey (Kabashima, 
2001a), there are one-third of respondent say that they like the DPJ (33.2%), while 
only about 17.40/0 claim they dislike the DPJ. Even traditional LDP supporters, such 
as the self-employed, have a high percentage (42.8%) of respondents indicate they 
like the DP 1. In contrast, there is only 200/0 of respondent like the LDP, and more than 
400/0 dislike the LDP. Other political parties also suffer from a high rejection rate, for 
example the JCP is generally disliked by the LDP and Komeito supporters due to its 
Communist ideology, while the Komeito is disliked by the LDP, DP J and JCP 
supporters because of its religious background. Low rejection rate of the DP J is 
certainly an advantage for the party's electoral performance, especially when there are 
a large number of unaffiliated voters who have no party identification, and would tend 
to cast their vote to the least disliked party rather than a highly disliked one. 
At the same time, merger with the LP benefits the DP J from the "consolidation 
effect" which guide voters for tactical voting. There is also a "linking effect" that 
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campaign activities in district affect the voting behavior in PR ballot (Sugawara and 
Kabashima, 2004). In other words, anti-LDP votes now have a clear target to vote for 
as the opposition parties (the middle-of-the-road DPJ and the more conservative LP) 
became one larger party. The merger with LP enables the DP J to advance in expense 
of smaller parties (Kabashima and Sugawara, 2004). 
5.2.3 Voting Behavior Perspective 
Another explanation towards electoral performance of the DP J is from the voting 
behavior perspective. Scholars suggest voting behavior models in order to explain 
voting behavior in the new party system. In short, they can be divided into 
retrospective voting, prospective voting and candidate voting. Retrospective voting 
means voters evaluate past performance of political parties when deciding to cast their 
votes. Evaluation for party performance, especially for incumbents, is largely based 
on economic issues such as national economic performance, unemployment rate, own 
economic interests and so on. Prospective voting refers to evaluating promises made 
by candidates and choosing the one who has the closest issue position with them. 
Candidate voting refers to vote casting base on emotion and cognition factors, as well 
as personal characteristics of candidates. Of course, voting decision never bases on a 
single factor, and it is difficult to determine which factor is the most determining 
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factor in voting decision, thus it is more reasonable to accept multiple factors which 
might affect voting decision (Niemi and Weisberg (Eds.), 1993, p.13 7 -148). 
Retrospective voting is confirmed by Kabashima (1999) in the 1998 HC election. 
Voters evaluate performance of the ruling party based on their personal experience 
and media report, and decide to vote for the ruling party or punish its poor governance. 
In the 1998 HC election, economic issues such as poor economic performance and 
consumer tax issue were the focus of voters. Kabashima discovers voters who voted 
for the DP J has a higher awareness towards these issues than the LDP voters. Finally, 
among those voters who have abstained in the 1995 HC election decided to cast their 
vote in the 1998 HC election, over 27% voted for the DP J, while 16% voted for the 
JCP and only 5% voted for the LDP. This shows voters have a tendency to vote based 
on retrospective voting in the 1998 HC election. At the same time, dissatisfaction 
towards Obuchi's administration is also said to be the reason of the LDP defeat and 
the DP J advancement in the 2000 HR election (Kabashima, 2000). 
On the other hand, prospective rating is applied to explain the DPJ's poor 
performance in the 2001 HC election. PM Koizumi promised to conduct a "structural 
reform" and "destroying the LDP" in 2001, which successfully won a positive 
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expectation towards his policies (Kabashima, 2001 b). On the other hand, candidate 
voting is used to explain the electoral performance of the DP J in the early stage. It is 
because politicians that joined the DPJ also bring their supporters to the DPJ, 
therefore candidate voting is more important than party voting (Miyake, 1999). On the 
contrary, the DP J's defeat in 2005 is a result the "assassin" candidates and women 
candidates of the LDP, who attracts a considerate number of unaffiliated voters and 
women voters who based on candidate voting (Yamada, 2006; Kabashima and 
Sugawara, 2005). 
5.2.4 Criticism towards these Explanations 
The above explanations provide different level of analysis towards electoral 
performance of the DPJ. However, these explanations ignore the "actorness" and 
maneuver of the DP J leadership to obtain supports and the fluctuation of the DP J 
electoral performance. Electoral system only offers an institutional background which 
creates a tendency of bipolar competition and influencing the competition in HC 
election. Change in societal ideology did not focus on the DP J effort to obtain support 
and is unable to explain the fluctuation of the DP J electoral performance. Party 
organization level emphasizes on the catch-all characteristics also face the same 
problem. Voting behavior level explains the DP J electoral performance ignores the 
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tactics of the DPJ. In this dissertation, media strategy is argued to be the key to solve 
the above puzzle, where the DP J leadership deliberately applies media strategy to gain 
support from unaffiliated voters. At the same time, media strategy of the DPJ cannot 
ensure victory of the DPJ, as the LDP also compete with the DPJ in the media arena 
and there is constant change in electoral environment. The DP J leadership has to 
adjust the media strategy in response to external changes. 
5.3 Support Base of the DPJ 
Without investigating support base of the DPJ, one can never fully understand 
factors contribute to the electoral performance of the DP J. In brief, two important 
characteristics of the DPJ support base can be concluded: 
1. The DP J is able to win more votes than the LDP in highly-urbanized areas; 
2. The DP J constantly win a significant portion of support from unaffiliated 
voters. 
Kabashima and Sugawara (2004, 2005) analyze composition of the DP J seats 
and votes (including the Liberal Party in elections before 2003). They discover the 
DP J is able to gain a significant share of votes in urban area in every election. They 
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divide 300 single-member districts equally into three categories: urban, intermediate 
and rural area according to urbanization level. In the 2000 HR election, the DP J is 
able to win 50 seats in urban areas while the LDP can only win 34 seats. On the other 
hand, the LDP won 42 and 67 seats more than the DP J in intermediate and rural areas 
respectively. In the 2003 HR election, the DP J increase its advantage over the LDP in 
urban areas to a 29 seats difference, at the same time the difference in intermediate 
areas has reduced to 23 seats, but the DP J is still unable to challenge the LDP in rural 
areas. In the 2005 HR election, the DP J lost heavily to the LDP in all three areas, but 
the percentage of vote share can still remain at 37.4% in urban areas and 40.4% in 
intermediate area whereas the LDP get 49.1 % and 49.4% of votes in the election. 
If we turn the focus to the He election, the DP J advantage in urban area is more 
significant. Since electoral system of the He election is different from the HR election, 
method of categorizing electoral districts according to urbanization level would be 
slightly different: single-seat districts represent rural areas; two-seat districts represent 
intermediate areas; and districts with three or more seats represent urban areas. 
According to Sugawara and Kabashima (2004), in the 1998 He election, the DP J 
(including the Liberal Party seats) get more percentage of votes than the LDP in all 5 
urban areas, and get more percentage of votes than the LDP in 10 out of the 15 
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intermediate areas, while the LDP win over the DP J in 19 out of the 27 rural areas. 
Although the DP J is only able to share the same amount of seats in urban areas as the 
LDP in the 2001 HC election, urban area is still the stronghold of the DPJ. The DPJ is 
able to recover in the 2004 HC election. In this election, the DPJ again get more 
percentage of votes than the LDP in all 5 urban areas and in 13 out of 15 intermediate 
areas, while the LDP get more percentage of votes than the DPJ in 16 out of27 rural 
areas. The DP J continues to get more percentage of votes in the 5 urban areas in 2007, 
as well as 11 out of 12 intermediate areas. The DP J did impressively in rural areas in 
the 2007 election, by only allowing the LDP to win 6 out of 29 seats in rural areas. 
The above analysis reveals the DP J gains it support mainly from urban voters. 
The party is able to gain support from intermediate areas gradually and extends its 
influence to rural areas in 2007. It should be noted that the trend of increasing 
influence of the DP J in rural area could not be confirmed until further elections are 
held. From the very beginning, the DP J is able to get more percentage of votes than 
the LDP in urban area, and the support gradually increases and eventually contributes 
to its victory in the 2003 HR and the 2007 HC election. Although urban support of the 
DP J is never as stable as one might expect, as shown in the 2001 HC election and the 
2005 HR election, the DP J is still able to get a significant portion of support from 
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them in these defeats. Voting behavior of urban voters is closely related to the idea of 
unaffiliated voters, which is characterized as voters with low or no party loyalty and 
has a high volatility in voting decision (Hashimoto, 2004, p.58). 
5.3.1 Unaffiliated Voters and DPJ Support 
According to the Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai's survey in 200661 , there are 
constantly around 29 to 35 percent of voters that identify themselves as unaffiliated 
voters since 1993, in compare with 32 to 39 percent of voters that identified 
themselves as LDP supporters. The DP J supporters increased from 3.6% in 1996 to 
13.30/0 in 2000, 16.70/0 in 2003 and again dropped to 13.9% in 2005. Other surveys 
such as the Yomiuri public opinion poll even recorded a 500/0 of voters who identified 
themselves as unaffiliated voters in the late 1990s and remained at around 40% since 
2001 (Ida, 2007). In other words, the percentage of unaffiliated voters is close to the 
LDP supporters, and is much higher than the DP J supporters. 
Therefore, electoral advancement of the DP J is not only a result of increasing 
number of DP J supporters, but also a result of gaining support from a significant 
portion of unaffiliated voters. In fact, according to Kabashima (2001 b), 37% of 
61From Akarui Senkyo Shuishin Kyokai homepage, 
http://www.akaruisenkyo.or.jp/066search/pdf/44syu.pdf. 
201 
unaffiliated voters voted for the DPJ in the 2000 HR election while only 14% voted 
for the LDP. Even in the 2001 HC election where the LDP benefited from the 
"Koizumi Boom", there were still 280/0 of unaffiliated voters voted for the DP J while 
only 25% voted for the LDP. More recent data from the Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai 
survey in 200562 and 2006 shows that, in the 2004 HC election, there were around 
260/0 and 24% of unaffiliated voters voted for the DP J in electoral district and 
proportional representative section respectively, while the LDP only gained 9.2% and 
7.80/0 respectively. In the 2005 HR election where the DPJ is heavily defeated, there 
are still 18.50/0 of unaffiliated voters voted for the DPJ in the SMD section and 17.2% 
in the PR section (compare with 25.7% and 25.5% in 2003 election respectively), 
while the support for the LDP has increased to 23.2% in the SMD and 20.7% in the 
PR section (compare with 13% and 8.5% in the 2003 HR election respectively). 
While other opposition parties such as the SDP J and the JCP can only able to obtain 
1-20/0 of support from unaffiliated voters in both the SMD and PR district in 2005. 
The above analysis shows there is a significant portion of unaffiliated voters 
among the eligible voters in Japan, and voting decision of unaffiliated voters has a 
considerable influence towards election result. In those elections regarded as 
62 From Akarui Senkyo Shuishin Kyokai homepage, 
http ://www.akaruisenkyo.or.jp/066search/pdf/20san.pdf 
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"victory" of the LDP, there is an increase in percentage of unaffiliated voters who 
voted for the LDP, where in contrast defeat of the LDP is characterized by a 
substantial decrease in percentage of unaffiliated voters voted for the LDP. On the 
other hand, the DP J is able to gain a relatively stable support from unaffiliated voters, 
even in the heavily defeated 2001 HC and 2005 HR election. Therefore, besides the 
increase in DP J supporters, the constant support from a significant portion of 
unaffiliated voters contributes to the electoral performance of the DP 1. Before 
proceeding to argue how the DP J is able to constantly mobilize a significant portion 
of unaffiliated voters in elections, it is necessary to explore the history and 
characteristics of unaffiliated voters in Japan. 
5.3.2 Characteristics of Unaffiliated Voters 
Unaffiliated voters are not a new phenomenon in Japan, as emergence of 
unaffiliated voters can be traced back to the late 1960s. Hashimoto (2004, p.45- 47) 
states that a significant portion of unaffiliated voter was identified for the first time in 
the 1969 election, where many former Socialist party supporters turned into 
unaffiliated voters. At the same time, there was also a decrease in party support for the 
LDP. In other words, both the Socialist party and the LDP experienced a significant 
decrease in party support. It is a result of rapid urbanization in Japan and the 
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disillusionment of leftist ideology due to a series of international and local incidents 
in late 1960s (Hashimoto, 2004, p.4 7 -48). Voting behavior changed from 
"confrontation voting" where voters tend to either choose the LDP or the Socialist as 
a result of ideological confrontation, to "confident voting" which expresses their 
confidence towards the party. The support towards the LDP is related to confidence 
towards the LDP governance. Poor governmental performance discourages their 
support towards the LDP, but not voting for the Socialist, as they lack confidence 
towards the Socialist party and hence tend to abstain from voting (Hashimoto, 2004, 
p.69-70). 
Voting behavior of unaffiliated voters changed again in the late 1980s, when the 
distrust towards the LDP intensified due to various political scandals and the 
introduction of consumption tax. Voting behavior of unaffiliated voters shifted from 
"vertical distribution" (either cast their vote for a party or abstain) to "horizontal 
distribution" (vote for different parties) (Hashimoto, 2004, p.58).This means the 
voters changed from either support the LDP administration or show no confidence 
towards the LDP governance, to a "LDP supporter versus unaffiliated voters". 
Dissatisfied unaffiliated voters choose to vote and support for a certain party only in 
time of election (Hashimoto, 2004, p.56). Unaffiliated voters may still abstain from 
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voting, but more often they would vote for a party other than the LDP if they feel 
dissatisfaction. 
In the 1990s, a new categorization of unaffiliated voters emerged. According to 
Kabashima and Yamada (1995), unaffiliated voters could be divided into "stable 
unaffiliated voters" and "floating unaffiliated voters". "Stable unaffiliated voters" 
refers to those unaffiliated voters who constantly do not have a supporting party. On 
the other hand, "floating unaffiliated voters" refers to those voters who frequently 
change their supporting party and sometimes refrain from supporting any political 
party. There are some characteristics concerning the two types of unaffiliated voters: 
firstly, floating unaffiliated voters and Socialist supporter show higher political 
awareness than stable unaffiliated voters and LDP supporters. Secondly, both floating 
and stable unaffiliated voters have a more progressive ideology than LDP supporter 
yet a more conservative ideology than Socialist supporter in traditional national 
security and constitutional revision issues. On the other hand, both floating and stable 
unaffiliated voters are more progressive than LDP supporters in economic reform 
issues. Thirdly, floating unaffiliated voters and Socialist supporters show higher sense 
of obligation towards voting than stable unaffiliated voters and LDP supporters. 
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In conclusion, there is a growing portion of unaffiliated voters in Japan since its 
emergence in late 1960s, and now there is around 40 percent of unaffiliated voter in 
Japan. In terms of voting behavior, unaffiliated voters have shifted their tendency 
from abstain towards voting other parties if they are dissatisfy with the LDP 
government. Ideological speaking, these voters are more progressive than LDP 
supporters yet more conservative than Socialist supporters. Among unaffiliated voters, 
floating unaffiliated voters have a higher political awareness and higher sense of 
obligation to vote than stable unaffiliated voters. 
5.3.3 Mobilization of Unaffiliated Voters 
After understanding the characteristics of unaffiliated voters, it is necessary to 
understand how they are mobilized. Traditional mobilizing methods such as national 
organization and personal support organization (koenkai) have been the focus on vote 
mobilization by scholars. As Richardson (1997) suggests, around one third to a half of 
the voters are tied to individual politicians through social network and national 
organizations. On the other hand, koenkai , or politician's personal organization which 
link the candidate with his supporters, is widely examined by scholars. For example, 
Curtis (1971) suggests "hard votes" of the LDP is maintained by koenkai based on 
communal or personal loyalties. However, influence of national organization and 
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koenkai are decreasing, and more importantly, unaffiliated voters are seldom 
mobilized by these institutions. In fact, scholars also indicate the importance of media 
among unaffiliated voters. In this dissertation, media strategy of the DP J will be the 
focus of analysis. 
National organizations are important traditional mobilization machines. "Soshiki 
Senkyo" in Japanese means conducting organization-based election. National 
organizations such as trade union, religious groups, professional groups, sector 
associations and other interest groups are very interest in politics and elections. These 
national organizations would recommend candidates to members, providing 
candidates funding, campaign workers, organizing promotion activities and most 
importantly mobilizing votes through personal connections. These organizations have 
powerful vote mobilization effort, as members of these groups are more likely to be 
mobilized (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, p.32). Traditionally, the LDP is supported 
by many of these organizations, such as the Nokyo (a countrywide agricultural interest 
group), the Daijyu (Post Office related interest group), and other professional interest 
groups. On the other hand, the DP J relies on the support from the union, such as the 
Nikkyoso (union of teachers and school workers), the Jichiro (All-Japan Prefectural 
and Municipal Workers Union) and other Sohyo related union. Of course, electoral 
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performance of the DPJ somehow depends on the mobilization power from these 
groups, however the so-called "organization votes" are decreasing significantly in 
recent years. In the 2001 He election, the eight union-backed candidates offer only 7 
percent of votes, or 1. 5 5 million votes out of 9 million votes the DP J obtained in PR 
bloc, when compare with the mobilization power of 5.6 million votes by these 
organizations in the 1980s (K6llner, 2002; Kawakami, 2006). 
At the same time, koenkai, or politicians' personal organization, is another 
important institution for mobilizing support. According to Miyake (1998, p.173-174), 
more than half of the LDP and JSP voters exposed to koenkai and other group 
activities in the 1983 HR election, and nearly two-third of "stable voters" participated 
in koenkai and other group activities. However, the importance of koenkai is 
decreasing as redistricting of electoral district in the 1994 political reform. The 
electoral system reform divided the medium-sized districts in the MMD system into 
smaller districts in the SMD system, shake the base of koenkai. Although Otake (1997, 
p.348) confirms that koenkai is still influential in the 1996 election and tries to adapt 
to the new electoral system, the influence of the koenkai is becoming weaker. In fact, 
according to the Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai survey63, number of respondent that 
63 From Akarui Senkyo Shuishin Kyokai homepage, 
http ://www.akaruisenkyo.or.jp/066search/pdf/44syu.pdf. 
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joined a koenkai is decreasing. In 1979, there was 19.7% of voters answered that they 
joined a koenkai, the number decreased to 160/0 in 1996, and further decreased to 
merely 10.2% in 2005. Among the koenkai members, only 1.7% has paid the annual 
fee in 2005, which indicates percentage of active participation in koenkai is very low. 
These evidences indicate a significant decrease of importance of koenkai in 
mobilizing voters after the political reform in 1994. 
National organization and koenkai were critical in mobilizing votes in the past, 
however influence of these organizations are decreasing, as indicates by the fact that 
number of votes mobilized by national organization and number of koenkai members 
are both decreasing. More importantly, urban unaffiliated voters, who are the support 
base of the DPJ, are less likely to be affected by these traditional mobilization 
methods. Unaffiliated voters are more likely to be mobilized by media, as illustrate in 
the following section. 
5.3.4 Media and Unaffiliated Voters 
An original interview with Kabashima Ikuo, a famous political science scholar in 
Japan and now the Kumamoto Province governor, reveals the importance of media in 
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modem Japanese politics64 : 
... influence of mass media is much stronger nowadays ... in Japan, {{wide-show" 
or soft news has a huge influence in politics ... There are positive face and 
negative face of media politics to a regime, and Koizumi has worked out the 
positive side. Right now, the pension problem, the ((politics and money" problem 
is reported in wide-show, and is working out its negative face to the regime ... 
... In the past, it is the same no matter who become the leader of a party, 
nowadays leaders need to face the media and media reports have huge influence 
in both the flow of politics and voting rate ... 
Media is becoming increasingly important in Japanese politics, and is having 
significant effect on unaffiliated voters. Shinada's (2006) typology of Japanese voters 
enables us to understand the significance of media towards unaffiliated voters. In this 
typology, voters are divided into four groups according to the degree of political 
awareness and party detachment: 
64 Details refer to Appendix 11. 
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Table 5.6: Typology of unaffiliated voters, from Shinada (2006) 
High political awareness Low political awareness 
Low party detachment Loyal voters Delegated voters 
High party detachment Negative voters Independent voters 
Among the four types, negative voters are the group which has the highest 
proportion to vote for the DP J (40.7% in average), while independent voters tend to 
either abstain from voting or vote for the DPJ (43.7% vote for the DPJ). These voters 
have high level of party detachment and are unaffiliated voters. Demographically 
speaking, negative voters are those young office workers, mainly live in urban areas. 
Independent voters are those twenties or students in big cities. On the other hand, 
loyal voters and delegated voters tend to vote for the LDP (52.5% and 65.2% of votes 
from them respectively), ,where loyal voters are middle-aged, from local cities, and 
are self employed, in the agricultural sector or at management level, while delegated 
voters are of various age group and area, but are mainly women (Shinada, 2006). 
One of the most important implications is that, negative voters tend to cast their 
vote according to the evaluation on the difference between their policy stance and 
those of the political parties, while independent voters are interested in easy 
understanding issues. In contrast, loyal voters that vote according to that particular 
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affiliated party and delegated are easily mobilized by party and vote according to 
social environment (Shinada, 2006, p.43). Information sources for these voters are 
critical. Negative voters are more responsive than loyal voters in television news 
report, Manifesto and television advertisement, and in fact television and newspaper 
ranked first and fifth among 16 information channels. This shows they are more 
policy-oriented. Independent voters pay least attention to all information channels 
among four types of voters except showing interest in wide-show program. This 
shows that both negative voters and independent voters mainly get their political 
information through media. On the other hand, loyal voters have a wide range of 
information channel, showing high level of awareness to political information; while 
delegated voters show the lowest response to Manifesto and the least policy oriented 
when make voting decision (Shinada, 2006). 
Another research conducted by Sakaiya (2005) confirms a positive relationship 
between political awareness and dependence on media for political information. The 
research divides different information channels into three categories: mass media, 
direct campaign and personal channel. Mass media includes television, radio, 
newspaper reports, advertisement and programs; direct campaign includes talks, 
posters, speech and so on, while personal channel include various social networks and 
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recommendation from organizations. Among these channels, media and direct 
campaign have the contact rate of 70% while personal channel has only 40%, and at 
the same time mass media provide most information in total with a share of 54.5%, 
compare with 32.1 % for direct campaign and 11.4% for personal channel (Sakaiya, 
2005). Most importantly, the research confirms that voters with higher political 
awareness and higher education level tend to obtain information through media, while 
voters who have high party affiliation or joined the koenkai tend to obtain information 
through personal network (Sakaiya, 2005). In conclusion, urban unaffiliated voters (or 
negative voters in Shinada's typology) who have higher political awareness and low 
party affiliation tend to obtain information through mass media instead of depending 
on information channel such as organization recommendation (a personal channel) or 
koenkai (a direct campaign). 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, media is an important channel of information for negative voters, 
who are the core supporter of the DPJ. Traditional channels may have significant 
influence in the past, but their influence is decreasing significantly. On the other hand, 
media is becoming more and more important in modem Japanese politics. Scholars 
such as Ogawa (2003,2006), Ida (2005,2007), Kabashima, Takeshita and Serikawa 
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(2007) and Kusano (2006) recognizes the importance of media in Japanese politics 
with different focuses. For example Ogawa (2003, 2006) focuses on the effect of 
media on public judgment, and the weight of strategic framing versus issue framing in 
media reports. Ida (2005, 2007) also focuses on the strategic and issue framing, as 
well as the impact of Manifesto report in the 2003 HR election. On the other hand, 
Kabashima, Takeshita and Serikawa (2007) points out the relationship between media 
and leadership image, as well as the Koizumi's media strategy. Kusano (2006) 
compares the media strategy between the LDP and the DPJ. In the following, this 
dissertation would like to argue that the DP J leadership deliberately promotes the 
party through media strategy, and adjusts media strategy in response to changes in 
electoral environment. 
5.4 Media Strategies of the DP J 
In the following, the DP J media strategy will be analyzed. Through original 
investigation in party documents, media reports and politician's publications, this 
dissertation argues the DP J leadership constantly endeavors in media strategies and 
also deliberately adjusts its strategy in response to external environmental changes. 
Unfortunately, since the party documents can only be traced back to 1999, the 
analysis will started from 1999 instead of 1996 when the "old" DP J emerged. 
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From the very beginning, the DP J leadership clearly noticed the importance of 
media promotion, as a party document stated that "in response to public expectation, 
the DPJ has to make its stance clearer and easier to be understood,,65 and "in order to 
be an alternative to the LDP regime, it is important to appeal the activities (of the 
party) to the public actively,,66. The DPJ also notices the importance to appeal to the 
unaffiliated voters, for example the party invited professors to hold seminars for the 
politicians and local party organizations about unaffiliated voters in Japan 67. A report 
announced right before the "new DP J" formation in March 1998 also emphasizes the 
importance of appealing to unaffiliated voters68 . The DP J also emphasize on the 
importance of the investigation and analysis on unaffiliated voters, and the party 
should listen to their voices through various channels, such as internet opinion pOU69. 
In brief, development of the DPJ media strategy can be divided into three stages: 
image and popularity promotion stage from the emergence of the "new" DP J in 1998 
to 2001 , policy promotion stage from 2002 to 2005, and strategic promotion stage 
from 2006 onwards. The triggers for the adjustment of the media strategy are the 
65 Activity Report 1999, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8822. 
66 Activity Plan 2000, http ://www.dpj .orjp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8823 . 
67 From the DPJ homepage, http://www.dpj .orjp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=7970 . 
68 From the DPJ homepage, http://www.dpj.orjp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=11623 . 
69 From Activity Plan 2004, http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover_taika(y04_2.html 
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"Koizumi boom" in the 2001 He election, and the "Postal Reform Dismissal" in the 
2005 HR election. The DPJ adjusted its media strategy accordingly after the defeats in 
elections. 
5.4.1 Image and Popularity Promotion of the DPJ before 2001 
From 1999 to 2001, the party had a coherence aim on three distinct yet 
interdependent goals: promoting party's popularity, building up party's image and 
clarifying party's vision. Popularity promotion aims at making the party better known 
by the public. Party image building concerns about producing an emotional effect 
among the public and clarifying party vision attempts to improve public's cognitive 
understanding towards the party stance and policy. Through different media channels, 
including traditional media, new media and building up its own media channel, the 
DPJ worked on different projects to promote the party. 
5.4.1.1 Popularity Promotion Campaign 
In this period, one of the major tasks for the DP J is to promote its popularity. The 
DPJ attempted to increase its popularity through exposure in media. For example, the 
DP J conducted two open recruitments of candidate for the 2000 HR Election in 1999. 
From March 1999, the DPJ placed advertisements in local newspaper, national 
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newspaper and sports newspaper, as well as radio advertisement to promote the open 
recruitment of candidate for the 2000 HR election. Moreover, from June to August 
1999, the DPJ conducted another open recruitment specially for recruiting women 
candidates, using a catchphrase "Jyosei no Genki ga, Nihon wo Kaeru" (Japan can 
change with the vigor of women). The two campaigns were widely reported by media 
and had over 600 applications in totaCo. Eventually, 17 applicants were chosen as 
official DP J candidate and 3 of them were being elected. The DP J also attempted to 
attract media attention to improve the party's popularity, one good example is in 1999, 
when Hatoyama was elected as president after a widely noticed president election, the 
DP J released a whole-page advertisement in national newspapers and evening 
newspapers to announce the result7l . Another example is that, in 2001 the DPJ 
released a series of character goods of Hatoyama Yukio, the party leader. The series of 
character goods included T-shirt, mobile phone strip and sticker, using a cartoon 
image of "alien" as the theme 72. This campaign can been seen as building a friendly 
image for the party leader and develop a source of income for the party, but more 
importantly the campaign attracted attention from media and hence improved the 
popularity of the DP J before the 2001 He election, as the party reports stated "the 
70 Activity Report 1999, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8822. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Hatoyama Yukio has a nickname of "Uchujin" (Alien), and the cartoon character is designed by a 
design lecturer, details refer to http://www.dpj.orjp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=2355 and 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=2613 . 
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character goods enable to create a hot topic in media and increase the exposure of the 
DPJ in media,,73. 
5.4.1.2 Image Promotion Campaign 
In creating the party's image, the DPJ used a series of slogans focusing on the 
theme of "freshness and changes". In early 1999 when the LDP, Komeito and Liberal 
Party formed a coalition government, the DP J promoted a slogan "Kokumin to 
Renritsu shimasu" (Coalition with the public) 74. This slogan did not only response to 
the unimaginable coalition between the Ozawa's LP and the LDP, but also appealed to 
the public that the DP J is a party represented a person who earn his living, a tax payer 
and a consumer. In other words, this slogan aims at promoting the DP J's image as a 
representative of the citizens and a party strives for a better living, less wastage and 
better consumer protection, in contrast to the LDP image of collusion with 
bureaucracy and business. This created a fresh image of the party. 
At the same time, the DP J promoted another set of slogans to create an image of 
new politics in contrast with the "old" LDP style of politics, showed a clear theme of 
"changes" under the disorder political situation. In April 1999, the DP J encountered 
73 Activity Report 2001, http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover_taikai_yOl.html. 
74 Activity Report 1999, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8822 
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the Unified Local Election and promoted a slogan "Chiho no Chikara, Watashi wa 
Kaetai" (With the power from the local, I want to change (the political situation)), this 
slogan inherited from the slogan in the 1998 HC Election" Watashi wa Kaetai" (I 
want to change (the political situation)) 75. These two slogans, together with the slogan 
"21 Seiki wa Minshuto" (The 21 st Century is the DP J) and "Anata wa Ji-ji-ko desuka, 
Atarashi Minshuto desuka?" (Are you for the LDP-LP-Komeito coalition or the new 
DPJ?) in 199976, the 2000 HR Election slogan "Toru. Anata ga Ugokeba Nihon ga 
Kawaru77" (Capture it! Japan will change if you take the action), and the 2001 HC 
Election "Nihon wa, Seiken Kotai shika, Kawaranai" (Japan cannot change without 
alternation in regime) 78, formed a continuous campaign that created and stabilized the 
image of the DP J as a reformist party and is fresh in compare with the LDP politics. 
5.4.1.3 Clarify Party Vision Campaign 
The DP J also made an effort on promoting and clarifying the party vision and 
policy making ability. One important movement is the creation of the Next Cabinet 
(NC). The party regards the NC as "a symbol that can appeal the existence of the 
DP J,,79. In order to appeal the policy making strength of the party to the public, the 
75 Ibid . 
76 Ibid. 
77 http ://www.dpj .or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num= 1814. 
78 Activity Report 2001 , http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover _ taikai_yO l .html. 
79 Activity Plan 2000, http ://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8823 . 
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DPJ required the promotion campaign to focus on the NC in promotion campaign. For 
example, Next Cabinet Ministers were asked to actively response to media and gain 
exposure in media; promotion campaign also aimed at building image of the NC that 
can mutually benefit the DPJ8o. Moreover, structure of the NC is subject to adjustment 
in response to political environment changes and to enhance policy debate8l . For 
example, the NC Decentralization Minister and the NC Social Security Minister were 
set up in 1999 as the issue was the focus policy at the time. The NC Postal Reform 
Minister and NC Pension Minister are set up in 2005 and 2007 respectively in 
response to the postal reform and pension system problem 82. Besides the NC, the DP J 
applied media strategy in the Diet to clarify the party's stance. In the 2000 Activity 
Plan, the DP J identified the "question time" in the Kokka Kihon Seisaku Iinkai 
(Nation Basic Policy Committee) as an important arena for appealing the party's 
stance. Party leader discussion held in both the HR and HC every week offered 
chances for the DP J to appeal its stance directly to the public, as it was live 
broadcasted through television 83. 
5.4.1.4 Development of New Media Channels 
Besides usage of traditional media, the DP J also applied new media such as 
80 Ibid. 
81 Activity Report 2001, http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover _ taikai_yO 1.html. 
82 According to various personnel appointments released in the DPJ news homepage. 
83 Activity Plan 2000, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8823 . 
220 
intemet and attempted to develop its own channel of information dissemination. The 
DP J noticed the potential of intemet as early as in 1999. The DP J conducted several 
activities which illustrated the awareness of intemet campaign. For example, as early 
as in 1999, the DP J organized workshops on intemet usage for party local 
organization, candidates and legislators in order to encourage them to use intemet in 
elections campaigns84 . The DP J also started releasing video message from Party 
Leader, Secretary General and Next Cabinet Ministers on the DP J homepage in 1999 
and regularized in 2000. The DPJ started distributing intemet mail magazines to 
general public once every week since May 2001 85 , which included columns written by 
President Hatoyama and information on party activities in the Diet, and there are over 
20000 registered for the mail magazine by the end of 200 1. The distribution of mail 
magazine is even earlier than the PM Koizumi mail magazine which started 
distribution in June 2001 (Hoshi and Osaka, 2006, p.208). Another example is that in 
2001 , Hatoyama appeared in an intemet chatroom "Yahoo! Chat" and communicate 
directly with internet user. He is the first politician ever appeared in internet chatroom. 
Kan Naoto also appeared in "Yahoo! Chat" in October 2003 (Nakamiya, 2006, p.5). 
Other than disseminating information through internet, the DP J also attempted to 
collect public opinion through internet. For example the DPJ conducted policy 
84 Activity Report 1999, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8822. 
85 Activity Report 2001 , http://www.dpj .orjp/gover_taikai_y01.html. 
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recruitment through internet since 2001 and several bills are introduced to the Diet 
based on these policy recruitments86 . The above activities show that the DP J has the 
consciousness to use internet in information dissemination and collecting information 
from the public. 
On the other hand, the DP J also developed its own media channel to disseminate 
information. Besides the Gekkan Minshu (Democrats Monthly Magazine) that aims at 
general public, the DPJ also published a magazine "D' ear" (Democrats' ear) that 
targets at women readers87 . The DPJ politicians also published books in order to 
explain the formation of the party, criticized current political situation, and clarify the 
vision and ideology of the party, these publications includes Igarashi (1996), 
Hatoyama and Kan (1997), Warashina (1997), Nakagari (1998) and Ishii (1999). 
Although these publications did not produce a huge impact to the public as Ozawa's 
(1993) Nihon Kaizo Keikaku (Japan Reformation Plan) did, they served as a channel 
to explain the party's stance to the public who are aware of the politics. 
5.4.1.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the DPJ has already understood the importance of media 
86 Ibid. 
87 Activity Report 1999, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=8822. 
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campaign to appeal to the general public in the beginning. Through tradition media, 
internet and the party's own media, the DP J focused on promoting its popularity, 
building up a fresh image and promoting the party's ability in policy formation and 
clarify party's vision and stance. 
5.4.2 Policy Oriented Strategy and the Manifesto 
The DP J has noticed the importance of media campaign and made an effort to 
promote the party's popularity, image and clarify its vision in the first stage. However, 
the 2001 He Election defeat signified some imperfections in the media strategy. After 
Koizumi replaced Mori to become the Prime Minister, his idea of structural reform 
was able to obtain a wide support from the public (Shiota, 2006, p.158). Moreover, 
there were voices complaining the DP J policies and stance as difficult to understand 
and unclear, especially on the constitutional reform issue and policy in response to the 
terrorism (Shiota, 2006, p.161). In the 2002 Activity Plan, the DP J noticed that its 
promotion style before only had a limited effect to its supporter, and was unable to 
reach the general public to explain the party's policy stance88 . The party's media 
campaign has to be adjusted in order to promote to a wider population and easier to be 
understood. In response, the party applied various measures to make its policy clearer 
88 http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover_taikai_y02.html. 
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and easier to understand. These measures included adjustment in the party 
organization, more policy-oriented media campaign, party publications, use of 
Manifesto in elections and use of internet in information collection and dissemination. 
5.4.2.1 Adjustment in Party Organization 
Firstly, the DP J made some adjustment in party organization. In the 2002 
Activity Plan, the DP J announced to construct a more cooperative relationship 
between the creative team, research team and press team within the DP J. In details, 
the linkage between research activities with the media campaign has to be strengthen, 
for instance media campaign such as design of posters, advertisement in newspapers 
and magazines, internet campaign and response to mass media should be 
corresponding to the trend of public opinion 89. The trend of public opinion is 
investigated by a new Research Department (Chosa Kyoku) set up in 2004. The 
Research Department is responsible to conduct public opinion poll and news report 
research in order to gather information and analyze the needs of the public as well as 
the problem of the LDP and bureaucracy9o. Media strategy and Diet strategy are 
formulated accordingly. Although actual operation of the party organization is not 
revealed, this reform signified an awareness of a more cooperative, policy-based 
89 Ibid. 
90 Activity Plan 2004, http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover_taikai_y04_2.html. 
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media campaign is necessary, which was lacked in the first stage of the media strategy. 
Besides reform in party organization, various media strategy showed the adjustment 
in the path of campaign. 
5.4.2.2 Publications in Promoting Policy 
Publication of the DP J clearly showed the adjustment in media strategy. Instead 
of publishing books about party vision, the DP J began to publish books on explaining 
party policy. In 2002, a series of policy booklet were published, including booklets on 
women policy, environmental policy and industry reform policy. Local policy booklet 
such as the "DP J's Okinawa Vision" was also published91 . In addition, publications 
concerning general policy and policy activities of the party were also released. In 
September 2002, the DPJ published a book called "Next Cabinet - DPJ's main 
policies that change Japan", which explained the DPJ policies in each area. The DPJ 
also published a quarterly named "Discussion Journal Minshu" since May 2002, 
which focused in a policy area in each issue, for instance the economic and 
employment policy, foreign policy, tax reform and so on. A Diet Report which records 
the DP J's Diet activities was also published in 2002. Finally, the DP J published its 
own "Next Cabinet News" 2 times per week, which was used to distribute to media, 
91 Activity Report 2002, http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover _taikai_y03 _ 2.html. 
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local party organizations and interest groups to promote the policy activity of the 
5.4.2.3 Policy-Oriented Electoral Campaign and Manifesto 
The policy-oriented campaign was more fruitful in 2003, as the party did not 
only promote its policy to the public, but successfully applied a policy-oriented 
election campaign in the 2003 Unified Local Election and the 2003 HR election. 
Manifesto became the focus in the 2003 Unified Local Election and the 2003 HR 
Election, as the Manifesto has become a hot topic in the 2003 HR Election and the 
election is regarded as "Manifesto Election". 
In 2003, the DPJ published a "Minshuto Seisaku Indekkusu" (DPJ Policy Index) 
which includes all the DPJ policy (it is also published in 2004). Another important 
publication is the Manifesto in elections since 2003. The DP J released a policy 
collection named "Toichi Chiho Jichitai GUn Senkyo Seisakushu" (Unified Local 
Election Policy Collection) in the Unified Local Election 2003. The DPJ also 
published a Manifesto in the 2003 HR election and became the focus of election. 
According to Kanai (2003, p.170-172), the difference between Policy Index and 
92 Details ofDPJ publications can be found in Ibid. 
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Manifesto is that, Policy Index includes those policies that the DP J wish to implement 
but cannot make a promise. On the other hand, Manifesto includes those policies the 
party promised to implement. The DP J regarded the usage of Manifesto as a challenge 
to the Koizumi regime through policy debate and the media regard the election as a 
choice between the DP J and LDP through policy (Ida, 2005). 
Content of the Manifesto bases on policy discussions in early years, in addition 
to discussion among politicians and departments, policy recruitment through public 
hearing on Manifesto and suggestions from interest groups. The DP J also received 
suggestion from governors, professors and a group formed from financial sector and 
labor union (the 21 Seiki Rincho )93. The 2003 HR election Manifesto contains 5 
promises and 2 policy suggestions94 . The five promises evolved around political 
reform, such as canceling conditional aid to local government from the bureaucracy, 
halt public works that are regarded as wastage, abolish the Highway Public 
Corporation, reduce the number of legislator and civil servant and release the 
information on political party's financial situation; while the 2 promises are creating a 
new pension system and educational reform. In short, the 2003 Manifesto did not 
clearly show the financing and planning of the policies and is still an amateur work. In 
93 http://www.dpj.or.jp/gover _ taikai_y04 _3 .html. 
94 Details of the 2003 Manifesto refers to 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/images/Manifesto _ 2003 .pdf. 
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the 2004 HC and 2005 HR election, the DP J continued to publish manifesto. In the 
2004 HC election, the DP J proposed eight policies, including reforming the pension 
system, decentralization, agricultural reform, improving market equality, employment 
support, educational reform, foreign policy and increasing the transparency of 
politics95 . The 2004 Manifesto has become more sophisticated than the 2003 
Manifesto, but still unable to specify the financial plan and timetable. In 2005, the 
Manifesto named the "Okada Seiken 500 nichi Puran" (A 500 Days Plan for the 
Okada Regime) included a plan for taking over the LDP regime, which 
sophisticatedly planned the action and policy of the new government after the DP J 
replaced the LDP government. The 2005 Manifesto also had eight promises but the 
policies are more detailed with the cost clearly mentioned96 . The Manifesto and other 
publications shows the DP J has focused more on policy promotion in this stage, in 
compare with a more general appeal in vision, image building and enhancing 
populari ty in the first stage. 
5.4.2.4 New Media in Policy-Oriented Campaign 
Besides the publications, media strategy through intemet also shows the same 
trend. Since 2001, the party has started to recruit policy through intemet. This practice 
95 Details of the 2004 Manifesto refers to 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/images/Manifesto _2004. pdf. 
96 Details of the 2005 Manifesto refers to 
http://www.dpj.orjp/policy/manifesto/images/Manifesto _2005. pdf. 
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continues in the second stage, 7 proposals were accepted in 2002, 5 proposals were 
accepted in 2003 and 7 proposals were accepted in 200597 . Other than recruitment of 
policy through internet, the DP J also conducted public opinion poll through internet. 
In December 2002, the DPJ started a project named "Yoto@net", which is a public 
opinion poll project on the internet. Through this project, the DPJ collected public 
opinion on image of leadership, policies proposed by the DP J, expectation towards the 
party and important party decision like the merger with the LP. Based on the public 
opinion, the DP J adjusted the focus of promotion activities and strategy in Diet 
debate98 . The internet public opinion poll project was under the Research Department 
and was conducted until the 2005 reform. 
The DP J internet website has also transformed into an information dissemination 
center on the DP J policy activities. The "DP J Archive" which includes past DP J news 
and policy documents was created on the internet in 2002, followed by disseminating 
the DPJ own news and information on the party's website since 2003, public can 
search for information on the party's policy and policy activities through the internet99 . 
The DP J homepage also started to provide intemet video on the President and 
Secretary General 's press conference, as well as live broadcast the special party 
97 Refer to Activity Reports in respective years. 
98 Refer to Activity Report 2002 and 2003. 
99 Ibid . 
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general meeting and the "Joint Plenary Meeting of Party Members of Both Houses of 
the Diet" from 2002. In 2003, a mobile version of the DPJ homepage started and 
allowed access of the party's information through mobile phone lOO • 
5.4.2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, after being defeated in the 2001 HC election, the DP J adjusted 
from a general promotion strategy to a more policy-oriented strategy. The DP J 
reformed its party organization in order to formulate a more cooperative media 
campaign based on public opinion. Publications of the party revealed this change and 
the "Manifesto election" since 2003 created a new political environment that 
emphasize on policy promotion. The DP J also worked hard to improve the 
dissemination power of the party on both party activities and the party policies 
through intemet and mobile site. 
5.4.3 The 2005 HR Election Defeat and Strategic Campaign 
The DP J experienced another heavy defeat in the 2005 HR Election as the 
number of seats decreased from 1 77 seats to 113 seats after the election. Analysis of 
the election results showed the DP J was still able to obtain a rather significant portion 
100 Ibid. 
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of support from unaffiliated voters, while the LDP victory was contributed by an 
increase in support from unaffiliated voters who have abstained from the previous 
election. The 2005 HR election signified the importance of media strategy in the 
election. PM Koizumi was skillful in media strategy, as some scholars regarded his 
media performance as "the Koizumi Theatre" (Koizumi Gekijyo). 
5.4.3.1 Koizumi's Success in Media Campaign 
Scholars conclude three Koizumi's media strategies that contribute to the LDP 
victory in 2005: Koizumi's frequent appearance on television program, LDP's control 
on the agenda setting process and promotion of "assassin" candidates. Firstly, a 
research conducted by Kabashima Semina and Asahi Shimbun in 2006 101 finds that 
there is a positive relationship between the supportive rate of the Koizumi Cabinet 
and the frequency of Koizumi 's appearance on television program. For instance from 
2004 July to 2005 July when Koizumi reduced his frequency of appearance on the 
television, the supportive rate of the LDP cabinet decreased at the same time; while 
the cabinet supportive rate reach the height when Koizumi appear more frequently in 
October 2002, September and October 2003, April and May 2004 and August and 
September 2005. Yamada (2004, as cited in Kabashima, Takeshita and Serikawa, 2007, 
101 Asahi Shimbun, 7th April, 2006. As cited in Kabashima, Takeshita and Serikawa (2007, p.251 ). 
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p.250) also concludes support towards the LDP in election is a result of the reformist 
image of Koizumi rather than details of the reform. 
Secondly, the LDP successfully set the agenda to the postal reform issue. Since 
the He rejected the postal reform bill which was approved by the HR, Koizumi 
instantly dissolved the HR and began the election campaign solely focusing on the 
postal reform issue. Koizumi's move successfully set the agenda to postal reform, as 
the issue was not concerned by the public before became the focus after the 
dissolution. According to a public opinion poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun l02 , 
when asking which issue should the government work on (allowing multiple answers), 
postal reform only ranked eighth (25.7%) among 10 issues and pension system 
(76.10/0) ranked first. After the dissolution, the LDP place the focus of media 
campaign on the postal reform. For example in a press conference held on 8th August, 
Koizumi said the dissolution and election is to ask "whether the Diet is correct (in 
rejecting the postal reform bill) or the public is correct (in supporting postal reform). 
According to a survey conducted by Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai in 2006, among 
the issues that affected voting decision, the postal reform issue ranked third with 
46.3%, just behind the pension issue which ranked first with 58.6%. Postal reform 
102 Yomiuri Shimbun, 27th April, 2005. From Kusano (2006, p.33 ). 
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received a significant increase in attention after the dissolution, which implied a 
successful agenda setting by the LDP. 
Thirdly, the arrangement of "assassin" candidate made media reports focusing on 
election district with assassin candidate. According to Kabashima and Sugawara 
(2005), media focused their reports on 33 districts where there were competition 
between the "rebel group" who are the anti-postal reform ex-LDP politicians and the 
"assassin" candidate who are recruited by Koizumi in order to challenge the "rebel 
group". The election was set to a competitive structure of "rebel group" versus 
"assassin" candidate, where the DP J candidates were ignored in the media. In other 
words, instead of a "LDP versus DP J" competition structure, media reports have 
created a LDP "assassin candidate versus ex-LDP politician" competition structure. 
5.4.3.2 The DPJ Failure in Media Campaign 
The DPJ concluded several problems in its media strategy in a report l03 . These 
problems include failure in agenda setting, counter-effect in media campaign and 
reliance on previous election success. As mentioned before, the LDP successfully 
controlled in agenda of the election, while the DP J failed to promote its own agenda. 
103 From the DPJ homepage, http: //www.dpj.or.jp/governance/taikailimages/BOX_ UN0240.pdf 
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According to the report, the DP J tried to promote that there is "some more important 
issues than the postal reform", which were the pension reform and support towards 
child-raising 104 . However, the LDP responded in a passive way, by insisting the 
problems should be discussed between the governing parties and the opposition 
parties. At the same time, the DP J failed to promote a counterproposal on the postal 
reform and explained why the DP J opposed the postal reform due to internal conflict. 
Combination of these two factors produced an effect that the DP J failed to response to 
the postal reform agenda and could not build up its own agenda effectively. 
Secondly, media strategy including advertisement, catchphrase and internet 
campaign proved to be unsuccessful and even produced counter-effect. For example, 
there were responses saying that the message of the DP J television advertisement 
could not be understood and the noise in the advertisement produced a poor image. 
Advertisement in newspapers intended to campaign in a humor way but produced a 
negative effect 1 05 . Media campaign in the 2005 election created a passive, difficult to 
understand image to the audience, when comparing with a direct and unify campaign 
from the LDP, which has a positive and clear theme of "Kaikaku wo Tomeruna" 




intemet campaign, despite the DP J has acknowledged the importance of intemet 
campaign as discussed in the previous section, the DP J did not expect the LDP to 
change from a passive attitude to an active intemet campaign strategy, such as 
actively using blog of politicians to attract unaffiliated voters. The DP J failed to apply 
a strategic intemet campaign as the LDP did, and the DP J report commented this as a 
"strategic defeat on internet campaign" 106 . 
Thirdly, the DP J admitted that the party was overconfidence on the effectiveness 
of previous election campaigns, for instance reliance on Manifesto and support from 
unaffiliated voters. Despite the DP J is good at policy formation and the Manifesto was 
the strategy that lead to the 2003 HR and 2004 He victory, the DP J did not have a 
focus policy that aimed at agenda setting, for example there are eight policies in both 
the 2004 and 2005 Manifestol07. In compare with the LDP Manifesto that placed the 
focus on postal reform, the DP J Manifesto was similar to a general policy collection. 
The DP J was also over-reliance on the support from unaffiliated voters, and the 
failure to promote a unify image and promptly response to public opinion in election 
campaign resulted in a decrease in support from unaffiliated voters. In contrast, the 
LDP applied a strategic election campaign as revealed by Seko (2006), where the LDP 
106 Ibid . 
107 Refers to http://www.dpj.orjp/policy/manifesto/index. html. 
235 
has unified the promotion related organization within the party, adjusted the media 
and election strategy in response to a series of public opinion poll, applied strategic 
application of intemet media, and promoted in an easily understand way. 
5.4.3.3 Party Organization Adjustment in Strategic Promotion Campaign 
In response to the above evaluation, the DP J reformed its party organization to 
conduct a more strategic media campaign. First of all, the DP J formed a "Koho 
Senryaku Honbu" (PR Strategy Headquarter) in order to unify the information 
dissemination system of the party108. Beforehand, the DPJ had a separate information 
dissemination channel as the Koho-Senden Iinkai (Public Relation and Advertisement 
Committee) was responsible for daily information dissemination of the partyl09 and 
Sogo Senkyo Taisaku Honbu (General Election Strategy Headquarter) was set up and 
responsible for media strategy in times of election 1 10, while the Chosa Kyoku 
(Research Department) was responsible for public opinion research and analyze news 
report for building media strategy. The newly set up "Koho Senryaku Honbu" which 
includes members from the Chosa Kyoku (Research Department), Kikaku Kyoku 
(Project Department), Seisaku Kyoku (Production Department) and Jimu Kyoku 
(Secretary Department) enabled a more unify system to carry out research and 
108 Activity Plan 2006, http://www.dpj .or.jp/gover_taikai_y06_2.html. 
109 Refers to "the Future Plan of DPJ" , 
http ://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num= 113 81 . 
110 Refers to the DPJ news, http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews .cgi?indication=dp&num=4387. 
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analysis on public opinion, planning of media strategy and production of campaign 
materials III . 
At the same time, the DP J continued to strengthen its policy formation ability 
and promoted through different channels. The DP J formed a new think tank called the 
"PLATON - Kokyo Seisaku Purattohomu" (Public Policy Platform) in December 2005 
to conduct policy research (although the DP J has already set up a think tank called 
"Think Net Center 21" in 1999, the think tank seldom disclosed its activities) 1 12. The 
new think tank invites professors, civil society groups, politicians, and bureaucrats to 
form project teams in each policy area and formulate policies for the DP J reference. 
The think tank also holds BBL (Brown Bag Lunch) 2 to 3 times per month, inviting 
speakers to hold discussion sections with mass media, politicians and public, and 
symposiums to discuss on specific policy areas. The DP J continued to conduct policy 
recruitment through internet and proposed 7 bills based on the applications in 2006. 
5.4.3.4 Focuses in Strategic Promotion Campaign 
The DP J changed from a general policy promotion to a strategic promotion on 
the focus policy area. As a part of the unified promotion campaign, the DP J chose the 
11 1 Refer to http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=4266 and 
http ://www.dpj.or.jp/news/dpjnews.cgi?indication=dp&num=6856. 
11 2 Details ofPLATON refer to http://www.platon-web.net/. 
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pension reform, child-raising grant and reborn of agricultural sector as the focus 
policy in the 2007 election 113. The DP J set the theme of election to be "the livelihood 
of the people", and emphasized itself as an alternative to the LDP. In response to the 
pension problem that the LDP government failed to identify the pension record, the 
DP J promoted a set of slogans "Kokumin no Seikatsu ga Daiichi" (The livelihood of 
the people is our first priority) and "Matomona Seiji suru Tameni" (The DPJ strives 
for an honest politics) to att~ck the poor LDP governance 1 14. The 2007 Manifesto also 
placed the focus on the three central policies. The message was clearer in contrast 
with the eight promises in the 2005 Manifesto. The 2007 Manifesto continued to be 
sophisticated as the DP J clearly identified the financial arrangement and timetable of 
the policies, showing a high level of policy formation ability. On the other hand, the 
DPJ also released a simplified version of Manifesto naming the "Manifesto: the 
livelihood", by using a question and answer style of writing to explain the DP J 
policies from a citizen's point ofview1l5 . This shows the DPJ's awareness to promote 
its policy in a more easily understood way, as Manifesto is difficult to understand for 
general public in nature. 
11 3 Refers to Manifesto 2007, http ://www.dpj.orjp/policy/manifesto/images/Manifesto_2007.pdf. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Refers to Manifesto 2007: the livelihood, 
http ://www.dpj.orjp/policy/manifesto/images/Manifesto _2007_ seikatsu.pdf. 
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5.4.3.5 New Media in Strategic Promotion Campaign 
Concerning other promotion channels, the DP J also emphasized on information 
dissemination through internet. As the grey area in electoral campaign law did not 
prohibit releasing news on political activities, the DP J frequently updated the news on 
politicians' election campaign activities and Ozawa's information through the party 
homepage. At the same time, publication also shows a coherence theme in promotion, 
for example a DP J related group published a book on young DP J politicians and their 
vision on reforming Japan (Seikei Kurabu, 2007), which was timely to promote the 
DP J as an alternative to the LDP government as it is published in early July. 
5.4.3.6 Strategic Promotion Campaign and the 2007 HC Election 
Media campaign of the DP J was successful throughout the election. First of all, 
the DP J successfully set pension system reform as the agenda of the election. In a 
president discussion held by the Japan Journalist Press Club, the pension system has 
become the focus of the discussion, and the Asahi Shimbun commented this made the 
pension system reform as the focus of the 2007 election 1 16. According to a public 
opinion poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun l17 , 72% of voters think that pension 
system reform is the focus of the election, where among 82% of DP J supporter and 
116 Asahi Shimbun, 11th July, 2007. 
http://www2.asahi.com/senkyo2007/news/TKY20070711 051 O.html 
11 7 Asahi Shimbun, 10th July, 2007. 
http ://www2.asahi.com/senkyo2007 /speciallTKY20070709Q413 .html 
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69% of unaffiliated voters agreed. Secondly, the DP J successfully unified the party to 
focus on a single issue in the election, which suggested the party organization reform 
to be effective. A research conducted by Asahi Shimbun and Tokyo University 1 18 
shows that there are more than 600/0 of DP J politicians considered the pension system 
reform as the most important policy in the election, while only 31 % of LDP 
politicians answered the same answer. Media strategy of the DP J on representing "the 
livelihood of the people" is also proved to be effective, as a countrywide public 
opinion poll 1 19 finds that, in those areas that public think the income difference is 
huge, voters tends to vote for the DPJ (45% for the DPJ and 28% for the LDP in 
electoral district; 50% to the DP J and 26% to the LDP in PR section) while voters 
tend to vote for the LDP in those area the income difference is not significant. 
5.4.3.7 Conclusion 
In short, the 2005 HR election defeat offered a chance for the DP J to readjust its 
media strategy. The DP J reformed the promotion related party organization and 
unified the promotion campaign under a promotion headquarter. A think tank was set 
up in order to conduct policy research in a more specialized manner. The 2007 HC 
election showed the DP J's adjustment of promotion campaign to a more strategic one, 
118 Asahi Shimbun, 12th July, 2007. 
http: //www2.asahi.com/senkyo2007/news/TKY200707120241.html 
119 Asahi Shimbun, 27th July, 2007. 
http: //www2.asahi.com/senkyo2007/speciaVTKY200707260481.html 
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as the DP J promoted only three focus policies under a single theme of "livelihood of 
the people". The DP J also attempted to make its policies easier to be understood 
through a simplified version of Manifesto. Media mix was applied and various public 
opinion polls and surveys showed the DP J successfully controlled the agenda setting 
process, built up its image and unified within the party. 
5.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, this dissertation argues media strategy of the DP J illustrates the 
actomess of the party and plays a key role in obtaining support from unaffiliated 
voters. The DP J leaders deliberately promote the party through different media 
strategy because they noticed the importance of unaffiliated voters and their high 
awareness to media. In the beginning of this chapter, electoral performance of the DP J 
and existing literatures on the electoral performance of the DP J is presented. After that, 
support base of the DP J is analyzed and unaffiliated voters are confirmed as the key to 
the DP J electoral success. Then, traditional campaign such as national organization 
and koenkai are proved to be ineffective in mobilizing unaffiliated voters. As they 
have a high contact rate with media and have high awareness towards media channels, 
this dissertation focus on the DP J media campaign and argues the media campaign is 
the key to understand the DP J electoral performance. 
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Through original investigation on party reports, news reports and politicians' 
publications, this dissertation argues the DP J adopts different media strategies in 
different stages. In the first stage from 1998 to 2001, the DP J leaders intended to 
promote the DP J popularity and clarify the party image through applying various 
measures, for example different media mix, slogans and image campaign. The DP J 
has also developed its own media channel. After the 2001 Koizumi boom and He 
election, the DP J leaders shifted the campaign focus to policy oriented strategy. The 
DP J party organization was adjusted and various publications and media mix also 
showed the shift of direction. Publication of manifesto further enhanced the effect of 
policy-oriented campaign. Finally, after the 2005 HR election defeat, the DP J leaders 
recognized the weakness of the DP J policy-oriented campaign. They concluded a 
more strategic campaign is necessary and accordingly adjust the party organization 
and media promotion, as showed in the 2007 He election campaign. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion Chapter 
This dissertation has addressed two most important issues facing by the currently 
largest opposition party in Japan: the DP J The first issue is the internal 
coherence problem and the second issue is the role of media strategy in the 
DPJ's electoral performance. Although superficial evidence shows that the 
leaders are short-lived with low autonomy, the DP J leadership is actually 
playing an important role in both maintaining internal coherence of the DP J and 
formulating media strategy of the DP J Through investigating party documents, 
news reports, politicians' publications, conducting first-hand interviews, 
researching second-hand interviews, and generating original data, this 
dissertation demonstrates the DP J leaders are playing an active role in 
manipulating the party organization, creating collective incentive and 
distributing selective incentives in order to maintain internal coherence. The 
DP J leaders also formulate and adjust media strategy direction and party 
organization in order to attract supports, especially from unaffiliated voters. The 
DP J successfully maintain its internal coherence and advance in elections in 
response to external environmental changes. 
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6.1 Summary 
In chapter 4 we identified a three-dimensional internal fragmentation within the 
DP J: former party affiliation conflict, ideological conflict and generational conflict. 
Existence of heterogeneous groups indicates a low degree of systemness and low level 
of coherence. Moreover, frequent changes in leadership superficially indicate a low 
level of leadership autonomy. Nonetheless, the DP J is able to remain unify as a whole 
and did not split even experiencing difficult periods. This dissertation disagrees the 
DP J is an "umbrella party" without a coherence ideology as claimed by many scholars, 
and argues the DP J leadership actually have certain level of autonomy. This 
dissertation argues that the DP J leaders noticed the importance of maintaining the 
internal coherence of the party, as they are inspired by the NFP experience, and there 
are three factors that maintain the party's internal coherence. Firstly, through 
first-hand interview and investigation on party documents, this dissertation suggests 
the party leader manipulate in formulating the bottom-up policy making procedure, 
the open leadership system and in the merger with the Liberal Party. Secondly, the 
DP J actually has collective incentives inherit from its leaders and these incentives 
maintain the coherence of the party. By investigating the DP J politicians ' personal 
belief, personal manifesto and other evidences, this dissertation discovered that the 
DP J politicians actually have a high level of conformity on the decentralization and 
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civil-society based participatory style of politics, which is coherent with the "DP J's 
style of politics" that the party leaders intend to differentiate the party from the LDP. 
Thirdly, through original data and analysis on the distribution of party posts (a sample 
of seven appointments), Next Cabinet posts (all twelve appointments) and Diet posts 
(the current HR and HC Committee Chairman and Director Posts), this dissertation 
discovers a widespread balancing personnel policy. This balancing personnel policy is 
not only among factions, but also among union-related and non-union politicians and 
politicians from different generations. The DP J successfully maintained internal 
coherence through the three categories of measures despite the party has a 
three-dimensional internal fragmentation. 
In chapter 5, this dissertation focuses on the DPJ media strategy and electoral 
performance. Existing literature's explanation such as electoral system and voting 
behavior are dissatisfying as they virtually ignore the "actorness" of the DP J to seek 
for electoral advancement. Those explanations also could not explain the 
comparatively constant support from unaffiliated voters despite the fluctuation in the 
DP J electoral performance. This dissertation argues the key to explain the DP J's 
actorness in manifesting their electoral performance is on media strategy of the DPJ, 
as the DP J leaders noticed the importance to promote to unaffiliated voters, who 
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frequently vote for the DP J tends to gather political information from media (but not 
personal channel or direct campaign). Through original investigation on party 
documents, politician interviews and media reports, this dissertation suggests there are 
three stages of media strategy throughout the history of the DP J, namely the image 
and population promotion stage, policy-oriented promotion stage and strategic 
promotion stage. In each stage, the DP J places different focuses on media strategy, 
and the party sensibly shifts the focus of media strategy in response to change in 
electoral environment. In the image and population promotion stage, the focus was 
placed on promoting the party's popularity, building up the party's image and 
clarifying the party's vision. The DPJ instantly shifted their focus towards policy 
oriented strategy after the defeat in the 2001 He election, where the Koizumi's 
reformist image and his determination to "break down the old LDP" overlapped with 
the DP J's image as a party of reform. The DP J leadership noticed the party has to 
distinguish with the LDP through policies, and has to make the media campaign 
penetrate to a wider population. Therefore in the second stage, the DPJ adjusted the 
party organization, applied various measures and channels to reach this goal. The 
policy-oriented strategy successfully distinguished the DP J from the LDP and the 
difference is further enhanced by the application of Manifesto in the 2003 HR election. 
The DP J won the 2003 HR election by 1 77 seats and the strategy continued 
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contributing to the 2004 HC victory. However, the DPJ heavy defeat in the 2005 HR 
election revealed the weakness of policy-oriented policy. The DP J again concluded 
the defeat and readjusted its party organization and media strategy and shifted to a 
strategic media campaign, which is confirmed to be successful in the 2007 HC 
election. In the history of the DP J media strategy, we can observe an active 
manipulation of media strategy by the party leadership, which is closely related to the 
DP J electoral performance. 
6.2 Theoretical Reflection 
This dissertation raised two research questions concerning about the Democratic 
Party of Japan's (DPJ) internal coherence and electoral performance. In order to 
assemble a concrete case study on the Democratic Party of Japan, theories on party 
organization and media effect are applied .. 
When inquiring the puzzle of maintaining internal coherence, this dissertation 
discussed the suitability of various party organization theories and proposed that the 
institutional perspective proposed by Panebianco (1988) is most suitable in 
investigating party organization of the DP J. Party organization is not a unitary actor 
with single interest, for instance the DP J has conflict based on factionalism with three 
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dimensions of conflict (traditional ideology, former party affiliation and generation) as 
discussed in chapter 4. Institutional perspective, which focuses on historical and 
leadership factors, enables us to investigate the dynamic internal ecology of the DP J 
thoroughly. 
On the other hand, party organization theory from electoral competition and 
sociological perspectives falIed to provide the inspiration from internal. It is because 
these perspectives concern about electoral needs and resources that provide chances 
or limitation for political parties to develop their organization, while internal power 
conflicts, historical factor as well as actorness of politicians are ignored. 
However, this dissertation does not directly evaluate the institutionalization level 
of the DP J as Panebianco's framework aims at. This dissertation illustrates the 
possibility for a historical-determined fragmented party to maintain internal coherence 
through maneuvers by party leadership. Historical factor is important in determining 
characteristic of a party, for instance the DP J history determines its characteristic of 
fragmentation, yet leadership can still plays an active role, as illustrated in chapter 4 
of this dissertation. This dissertation suggests besides historical factor, "actomess" of 
political actor is also critical in development of a party organization. 
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At the same time, this dissertation also has an implication on the debate of party 
system. Party system should not be recognized as merely a reflection of cleavage 
system in society. By applying the idea of Sartori (1976), a societal cleavage become 
salient in politics only if party makes it to become salient, action of political parties 
implies the existence of "party actomess". Actomess of a political party is closely 
related to the limitation by party origin as well as opportunities created by the action 
of leadership. Therefore, it is necessary to understand actomess of individual party 
before we can fully understand a party system. It is especially true for Japan as the 
new multi-party system is still infantile, new party appears and old party distinguishes, 
whether a party can remains survival and develops very much depends on the 
actomess of a political party. 
This dissertation also inquires electoral performance of the DP J from media 
perspective. Scholars explained electoral performance from structural perspectives 
which are plausible but again ignore "actomess" of political party. This dissertation 
first inquires the foundation of the DPJ party support. Unaffiliated voters, who have 
high support rate towards the DPJ, receive political information mainly through media. 
In the investigation, this dissertation follows Pharr's (1996) conclusion that media has 
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a dynamic relationship with other actors in political arena. Political party, as one of 
the most important political actor in political arena, actively formulates media strategy 
in order to present particular information and image. 
This dissertation argues media strategy is critical in understanding the DP J 
electoral performance. By applying different media effect theory, this dissertation 
identifies three stages of the DP J media strategies. These media strategies actually 
relate to various media effects such as agenda-setting effect, framing effect and 
promoting image campaign. 
Agenda setting is critical in setting up theme of election and guiding voters to 
vote according to the agenda proposed by the party. The DP J successfully set the 
agenda in the 2007 HC election and won a majority in the election. On the other hand, 
the way media frame an election affects voters' perception on that particular election, 
for instance the 2005 HR election was framed as a "LDP assassin versus rebel 
politicians from the LDP", and virtually excluded the DP J from the election frame. 
Promoting image campaign is crucial in the early stage of the DPJ media strategy, as 
the DP J needed to build up a clear and unique image in order to promote itself. Finally, 
media has an effect on political involvement towards voters, especially "negative" 
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unaffiliated voters who have high awareness towards politics and "independent" 
unaffiliated voters who interests in simple issues, as they mainly receive political 
information through media and media can encourage them to vote in an election 
(Shinada, 2006). 
In conclusion, Panebianco's framework (1988) offered a foundation for this 
dissertation, as historical and leadership factors are critical in understanding the DP J 
internal coherence. On the other hand, media effect theories are applied throughout 
the analysis of the DP J media strategy. By applying institutional perspective in 
understanding internal coherence of the DPJ and media effect perspective in 
understanding media strategy of the DP J, this dissertation intends to provide 
alternative explanations towards the two research questions. 
6.3 Current Issues of the DP J 
Of course, internal fragmentation within the DP J does not come to an end despite 
the party is able to prevent from disintegration. The measures taken by the DP J 
leadership is not aiming at resolve internal fragmentation within the party, but to 
prevent the party from disintegration. Even if there is a collective incentive to 
maintain the identity and a selective incentive to reward particular politicians, there 
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are still fragmentation among factions, on former party affiliation and generational. 
Media reports occasionally show there are disputes among top leadership of the DPJ. 
A news report in February 2008 revealed a clash between Hatoyama and Ozawa on 
the issues concerning party direction and party coherence 120. Hatoyama dissatisfies 
Ozawa proposal of a grand-coalition with the LDP, which results in a distrust towards 
Ozawa within the DPJ. Moreover, Hatoyama requests Ozawa to apologize to the 
public after his decision to absent from the Diet meeting in order to conduct election 
campaign for the Osaka gubernatorial election. There is also anti-Ozawa movement 
within the DPJ, and there may be a pro-Ozawa and anti-Ozawa competition in the 
presidential election hold in September 2008. At the same time, there is a continuous 
conflict within the party between the conservative and progressive group. There is 
some "anti-Maehara" movement within the party when the conservative politician 
Maehara Seiji became president l21 . Around 30 young and middle-ranking politicians 
from the "Riberaru no Kai" who are dissatisfied with Maehara's conservative 
ideology and style of party operation came together to form a counter-proposal in 
response to Maehara conservative stance. At the same time, some conservative young 
and middle-ranking politicians also formed a study group to promote a resolute China 
policy within the party in response to the Asia policy proposed by President Okada. 
120 From Asahi Shimbun on 9th February, 2008 ; 
http: //www.asahi .com/politics/update/0209/TKY200802080525 .html 
121 From Chugoku Shimbun, 25th January, 2006 ; 
http://www.chugoku-np.co.jpiNewsPack/CN20060 1250 1 003221_ Politics.html 
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Recently, there is also dispute related to the former leader Maehara Seiji 122. Maehara 
recently expressed his comment on the DP J agricultural policy publicly in a monthly 
magazine, resulting in a vigorous opposition from the DP J Next Cabinet member. 
Tsutsui Nobutaka, the Next Cabinet Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
does not only criticize Maehara's comment on the party's policy, but also criticizing 
his lack of leadership and poor performance during his presidency. 
It is not surprising that the DP J is not unified and continue to have the above 
conflicts, as the gene of the DP J is a party formed from various factions, consisted of 
members with different ideologies and with different generations. However, the DP J 
is certainly not an "umbrella organization" without a goal of pursuing an ideal society. 
One recent news report on the latest proposal of decentralization proposed by the 
LDP 123 , Asahi Shimbun used the topic "This and That are Postponed, the Government 
Proposal on Decentralization". The LDP proposal is regarded as "a step backward" 
reformation which "based on the interest of central Ministry". The proposal frequently 
uses vague wordings such as "consideration" rather than a concrete principle in 
transferring power to local government, making the proposal of decentralization 
merely a topic of investigation without conclusion. In contrast, the DP J has already 
122 From Asahi Shimbun on 13 th June, 2008 ; 
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0613/TKY200806120320 .html 
123 From Asahi Shimbun, 11 th June, 2008; 
http ://www.asahi.com/politics/update/06111TKY20080611 0 1 05 .html 
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formulated a bill to abolish centralized aid to local government as early as in February 
2008 124 . This proposal is more concrete than LDP's proposal and is regarded as the 
pillar to the DPJ's decentralization vision. The DPJ also places its focus on 
decentralization in the Diet on the Gasoline Tax issue and actively discuss with local 
governors to exchange ideas 125. The DP J also set the theme of that specific section of 
Diet as the "Gasoline Diet", showing the DP J is pursuing a decentralization politics 
and hope to differentiate itself from the LDP through the decentralization issue l26 . 
Besides the issue of internal coherence, the DP J has to prepare for the upcoming 
HR election that is expected to be held by the end of 2008 127 or early next year. 
Recent public opinion poll shows that support rate of the DP J is higher than that of the 
LDP by 40/0 and the DP J would receive 13% of proportional representative votes more 
than the LDP if election was held at that time 128. The support rate of the LDP since 
Abe inherited Koizumi to become the Prime Minister remains at a low level, and the 
situation did not improve after Fukuda replaced Abe following the LDP's defeat in the 
2007 He election. The DP J would have a higher chance than any previous election to 
124 From Asahi Shimbun, 14th February, 2008; 
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0213/TKY200802130350.html 
125 From Asahi Shimbun, 8th February, 2008; 
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0208/TKY200802080474.html 
126 From Asahi Shimbun, 21 st January, 2008; 
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0121/TKY20080121 0115.html 
127 From Asahi Shimbun, 20th May, 2008; 
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0520/TKY2008052003 16.html 
128 From Asahi Shimbun, 1 st May, 2008; 
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0501/TKY200805010244 .html 
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replace the LDP government in the coming election. Media campaign is certainly 
important in the upcoming election, as this information channel is still determining 
among voters, especially for unaffiliated voters. A strategic media campaign may 
enhance the chance of the DP J to win support from unaffiliated voters. In fact, Ozawa 
has already appeared in various wide-shows and news program to appeal the DP J 
policy on the gasoline tax and decentralization issue 129 . However, when the moment 
of a HR dissolution and election is approaching, electoral environment will become 
more fluctuate and complicated. For instance, the focus in current Japanese politics 
has shifted from the gasoline tax issue to the elderly medical system issue, where 
public is dissatisfied with the LDP proposal to reform the elderly medical system. 
Other new issues may come up to the agenda and the DP J has to be responsive 
enough to the changing electoral environment. 
6.4 Further Works 
This dissertation does not cover every aspect of the DP J party organization and 
electoral strategy, as this research is constrained by time and resource limitation. 
There may be imperfection in methodology, as this dissertation mainly depends on 
interpretation of party documents, news reports and second-hand interviews. Although 
129 From Asahi Shimbun, 31 st March, 2008; 
http ://www.asahi.com/culture/tv_radio/TKY20080331 0329 .html 
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first-hand interviews and quantitative analysis is applied in the current dissertation, a 
more comprehensive research is preferred if further resources are available. For 
example, non-participatory observation can discover the actual party operation in 
policy formation process and the effectiveness on grievance expression. More 
first-hand interviews with major politicians can also reveal their reasons of remaining 
in the party. Full analysis on distribution of posts can provide a more conclusive 
analysis towards distributio'n of selective incentives. Further analysis on media 
campaign of the DP J, such as observation on actual operation and first-hand interview 
with party officials is also preferred. Due to the above limitations, this dissertation 
does not make a strong argument in rejecting existed literatures, but aim at making an 
alternative explanation towards the role of leadership in maintaining internal 
coherence of the DP J and formulation of media strategy. 
Nonetheless, this dissertation has addressed two very important issues 
concerning the currently largest opposition party in Japan: the internal coherence and 
media strategy. Japanese politics is coming to another important and interesting 
moment, perhaps as important as the 1993 non-LDP coalition government, as the DPJ 
may become a leading governing party after the upcoming HR election. The 
sophisticated electoral campaign strategy and polished party policy of the DP J may 
256 
contribute to a huge victory. Moreover, with the experience of maintaining internal 
coherence and the warning of previous opposition cooperation failure, the DP J 
leadership surely notices the coherence and cooperation issue. Japanese politics 
hopefully can transform into a "real" democracy with a stabilize two-party or 
multi-party system. As the importance ofDPJ in contemporary Japanese politics is 
expected to increase in the near future, there is urgency for scholars to pay more 
attention and effort to understand the DPJ. This dissertation hopes to act as a 
foundation for further researches. 
Appendix I: Interview Record with a DP J Officer 
Time: 13th July, 2007, 4:00pm, 
Place: Headquarter ofDPJ, Tokyo 
I: Interviewer 
D: DPJ Officer, Miss Uchida, from the International Department 
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I: Thank you for your time. My research is concentrating on the Democratic Party 
of Japan and hope to get some information from you. 
D: Today I may present some general information to you, and I may refer you to 
other departments for the detail information. As the election 130 is approaching, I 
guess you might feel interest about the election. 
I: As the HC election is approaching, DPJ Chairman Ozawa and Deputy Chairman 
Kan have promised to quit politics if the opposition party failed to win the 
majority in the HC election, do the party feel confident in victory? 
D: Yes, we hope to get a majority of in the HC election. The victory line for the DPJ 
is 55 seats, and opposition parties have to get 61 seats overall. As the head of 
International Department of the DPJ, Iwakuni Tetsundo mentioned to foreign 
ambassadors and press in a briefing section few days ago, this is a good chance 
for the DP J to win a majority, as the "response" is very good at local level, we 
have confidence that we could win. Of course there may be difficulties in certain 
areas, but we are confidence. 
I: How about the strategy of winning the election? 
D: As I am not responsible for that, I am sorry that I do not have in depth 
information. According to our Chairman, we are focusing in local area. Actually 
since May 2006, when Ozawa became our Chairman, he made some trips and 
visited all the prefectures in the country, and this is the way how our Chairman 
shows his concern towards local area in a steady manner. 
Another part of our strategy is shown in the manifesto. We have 3 promises and 
7 suggestions in the manifesto. In the three promises, the most important one is 
about the agricultural policy. In the past, the DP J has been regarded as an 
130 Refer to the 2007 House of Councilor Election, which held in 29th July, 2007. 
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"urban" party, and is very weak in rural area. In this election, we apply a strategy 
revolve around the Chairman and focus on the local area. Of course we have 
tried hard to develop in local area. 
Moreover, we have set the agenda of the election on "pension". This is the part 
which Abe does not want to face, and is the most dissatisfying issue of the public. 
That is why we have the slogan "Seiji wa Seigatsu" (Politics concerns about your 
living), and try to convenience the public that the pension system (reform) is 
important. We target at the irresponsible Social Insurance Agency which fails to 
keep an accurate pension record, and this becomes a real concern by the public. 
We do not only check the performance of the government, but also try to appeal 
the image of a "trustworthy" political party to the public. 
I: As you have mentioned the DP J is strong in urban area and weak in rural area, 
what is the reason behind? 
D: Nowadays our influence is starting to penetrate into rural area. In the beginning, 
the DP J has an image of "strong in policy making", and this is the selling point 
of the DPJ. In contrast, the DPJ is a young political party without a strong basis 
of constituency (jib an) and is weak in local organization. In order to build local 
organization from the very beginning, our chairmen often visit local areas and 
have meetings with people, trying to penetrate into local areas. 
Another reason the DP J is strong in urban area is that, there are many 
unaffiliated voters in urban areas. Unaffiliated voters in urban areas are 
especially sensitive to "reform" and "righteous". The DPJ, as a new political 
party, seemingly to be the party that would do something new for them, therefore 
we could obtain support from them. Of course we still get support from urban 
area voters. However, after Koizumi declare that he would "breakdown" the LDP, 
and he "uses the same cue" as the DP J did. As a result, unaffiliated voters turned 
to the LDP, especially in the 2005 Postal Reform Election. 
I: So, what would the DP J do in order to regain support in the urban area? 
D: Those LDP reforms ended in halfway eventually, and placed a "backward" image 
to the voters. Urban unaffiliated voters feel that the LDP remain unchanged in 
the end, and start to detach from the LDP. Especially in these nine months 131 
131 Abe became the Prime Minister in 26th September, 2006, and various scandals break out since 
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when Abe became the Prime Minister. Various scandals involving "politics and 
money" break out, and remind the voters there are still many problems in the 
LDP. Urban voters are especially disgust towards these scandals. Of course rural 
voters would not agree with scandals, but voters in urban area are more 
dissatisfied. This may due to the concentration of population in urban area, and 
they are dissatisfied with the public enterprise, in contrast rural area may be 
constrained by some local interest. 
I: The LDP is regarded as strong in rural area, how about the DP J's local 
organization power? 
D: The DP J is a young political party. The LDP is overwhelmingly strong in terms 
of local organization power, since it has built up for many years. Of course the 
DP J tackles this problem from the formation stage of the party, and the local 
organization power is growing stronger when comparing with 10 years ago. 
I: How does the DPJ build up the local organization power? 
D: Sorry, I think I cannot go in depth into this topic. 
I: How about DPJ's relationship with other parties? 
D: Sorry, the Committee Members still have not make any remarks on this issue. Of 
course, as you may see there is coordination among opposition parties. 
I: OK. So, how do you appeal the difference between the DPJ and the LDP to the 
voters? 
D: think it is important to explain to the voters in an earthly and easy to understand 
manner. As our chairman often mention, we are pursuing decentralization and 
focusing on local area, as well as pension system, and bringing up the problem of 
corrupted bureaucracy-politician relationship. We are also pursuing a politics 
leading by politicians instead of leading by Kasumigaseki (bureaucracy). The 
LDP is a party that cannot perform anything without Kasumigaseki. If the DPJ 
took the incumbency, we would cooperate with the Kasumigaseki and create a 
November 2006, for example Sata Genichiro, Matsuoka Toshikatsu and Akagi Norihiko involved in 
political funding scandals and Matsuoka commit suicide in the middle of the scandal. Defense Minister 
Kyuma Fumio resigned from the position after he made a remark "it could not be helped that an atomic 
bomb was dropped on Nagasaki in order to end the war." 
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politician-lead government, this does not mean that we are antagonize against 
bureaucracy. The LDP just cannot terminate the reliance on Kasumigaseki as 
clear as we could. We insist that councilors are elected by public and should be 
the politicians who lead the government. I think this is the part we would like to 
appeal to the public. 
I: How about the relationship between the DP J and the union? 
D: We have a good relationship with labor unions, and we would have discussion 
and consultation on policy with them. Of course not all unions are friendly to us, 
but we would like to develop a cooperative relationship with them. We would 
listen to their request in policy and bring it up to the Diet, and hope to strengthen 
the trust between us and the union. 
This is also related to the issue of local organization. Rengo has a strong base of 
local organization, and it is the same for many other organizations. We are 
widening our cooperation with these organizations, continuously building a good 
relationship and maintaining good communication (Kazetosi) with Rengo. 
I: I would like to have some question about the party structure of the DP J. 
D: The decision making organ concerning issues within party lies on Jyonin 
Kanjikai. The organ which determines policy is Tsugi no Naikaku (the Next 
Cabinet). Seisaku. Chosa Kaicho (Chairman of Policy Research Council) leads 
the Seisaku Chosa Kai as well as leading the discussion within the Next Cabinet. 
Kokkaitaisaku Iinkai is the organ which determines the strategy within the Diet. 
Kanjicho is the person who responsible for the party internal issues and of course, 
depends on the delegation from the Chairman. 
I: DPJ members originally came from different political parties and with different 
ideologies. How would the party balance different factions? 
D: The DPJ very much depends on democratic rules within the party. In the very 
beginning of decision making, there are various departmental committee (Bumon 
Kaigi) focus on different policy areas and work at parallel level, for example 
social welfare department, cultural department, and so on. Within the 
departmental council, they discuss the problems, policies and proposing bills 
related to the specific area. The departmental committee is lead by respective 
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Next Cabinet Minister and vice-minister, and is open to all legislator of the DP 1. 
Those legislators attending the council meeting are free to voice out their opinion, 
and this is the first stage of decision making process. The conclusion determined 
within the departmental committee will be send to the Seicho Yakuinkai (Policy 
Research Committee) and seek approval from the Seicho Yakuinkai. And then the 
proposal is sent to the Next Cabinet meeting and again being discussed. After the 
Next Cabinet come up with a conclusion, either accept, refuse or amendment, it 
is sent to the Chairman for approval and become the policy of the DPJ. 
If there is a strong voice of opposition within the departmental committee, even 
if the Next Cabinet Minister wishes to come up with an approval, there will be 
huge resistance within the party. That is why we always have the mind of 
majority consensus within the party. On the other hand, majority voice within the 
departmental committee should follow the formal route and discussed by the 
Next Cabinet. Therefore, the DP J requests the members to following the party 
decision and it is against the rule if they vote differently from the party line. It is 
because if a legislator opposes the decision, he should voice out in the very 
beginning and try to gain support from fellow legislators. We believe in this 
democratic rule and expect our legislator to accept a decision which went 
through such a democratic process. 
Of course sometimes individual legislator may vote differently from the party 
line, but most of the time this is not the case, therefore it will become a focus in 
the media when happened. There may be different opinion within the discussion 
process, but in fact this is good for the party. 
I: How about the faction within the DP J? 
D: I believe that there are no LDP type factions within the DPJ. 
I: A final question, what is the future plan of the DPJ? 
D: We are aiming at a victory in the coming He election, and planning for replacing 
the LDP regime in the next HR election. Of course it is important for us to unify 
the party to fight the election. 
I: Thank you very much for your time. 
(End of script) 
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Appendix 11: Interview Record with Professor Kabashima Ikuo 
Time: 24th July, 2007, 3:30pm 
Venue: Tokyo University, Tokyo 
I: Interviewer 
K: Professor Kabashima Ikuo 
I: I would like to ask about the television politics in Japan. 
K: It is different in the Koizumi era and Abe era. Koizumi is strong in catching ones 
heart, using simple language, the so called "one phrase politics", to appeal the 
voters. In contrast, Abe failed to perform as Koizumi did. This is related to Abe's 
ability and charm. Me.dia is having increasingly importance in politics, and 
having both positive effect and negative effect. Politicians like Koizumi who can 
use the media well can get advantage from television politics, but in Abe era, the 
media is having minus effect on the politics. 
I: So the television politics is important in this election. 
K: According to the public opinion, those who are interest in television politics have 
higher supportive rate towards the DP 1. Therefore higher the voting rate is the 
more advantage the DP has. 
I: How about the movement of unaffiliated voters in this election? 
K: Unaffiliated voters are very important in election nowadays, since there are a lot 
of unaffiliated voters in Japan. In the Koizumi era, unaffiliated voters support the 
Koizumi LDP, but nowadays they turned to support the DPJ. Unaffiliated voters 
are a group of voters who support a certain party at one time and support no 
party at the other time. They seldom kept clear from supporting no party for a 
long period of time. 
I: Unaffiliated voters are especially significant for those new parties with 
progressive ideology, is that the reason why the DP J has a high percentage of 
unaffiliated voters as its supporter? 
K: As the DP J is new party, even if supportive rate before an election is high, voters 
may turn to support the LDP after the election. That is why the supporter base of 
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the DPJ is very weak when comparing with the LDP and the Komeito. The DPJ 
has to mobilize the unaffiliated voters every time or it will lose in the election. 
I: Isn't it difficult to build up a two-party system? 
K: The supportive base of the DP J will be stabilized if it can win a majority. It is 
because the DPJ is still a new political party, and its support is originated from 
other parties. Actually besides the LDP and the DPJ, there are also other small 
parties in the competition and therefore it may be a 2-plus-2 party system. 
I: What is your opinion towards the perspective of a two-party system in Japan? 
K: There might be a two-:party system in the future. Voters in Japan have very weak 
support towards political parties, therefore it is difficult to develop into a 
political-party led politics. Voters does not support a specific party, instead they 
see the LDP and the DP J as consumer goods, and choose the one they feel good. 
I: Concerning the DPJ, it has changed significantly from the beginning, what is the 
reason? 
K: It is responding to the change of the LDP, due to the reform by Koizumi, the DP J 
as an opposition party has to change accordingly. 
I: So the DP J no longer stick to it stance of a liberal party? 
K: Yes. The DPJ's position has changed. 
I: Is it related to the merger with the LP in 2003? 
K: It is because the LP cannot stand alone and merge with the DPJ in 2003. Mr. 
Ozawa gave up the leadership of the LP and merge with the DP J, and he has 
become more liberal when comparing with his time in the LP, which is more 
conservative. He has waited for a chance to become a leader in the DP J in order 
to practice his philosophy. 
I: So the DP J has extended its supporter base to the rural area because of this 
merger? 
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K: Yes, the DPJ has penetrated into the rural area. The DPJ supportive rate in rural 
area has growth. The DPJ has a high supportive rate in urban area, and its 
weakness is in the rural area. Many people regard the DP J as a "scattered" party, 
since everyone is thinking differently within the party, but it might not be a 
negative thing to the DPJ, since it may represent different sects in the society. It 
may get the support from urban area, as well as rural area. 
I: "Scattered" in the sense that there are factions in the party? 
K: There are factions everywhere. Since the electoral system has changed into a 
single-member district one, the influence of factions has been weakened. 
Factions within the DPJ are much weaker than those in the LDP. The solid~rity 
and bond within factions in the DP J is weaker than the LDP factions. It is 
because the DP J is still out of power, and factions within the DP J are less related 
to those interests. The influence of mass media is much stronger than the 
influence of factions. 
In Japan, "wide-show" or soft news has a huge influence in politics. There are 
positive face and negative face of media politics to a regime, and Koizumi has 
worked out the positive side. Right now, the pension problem and the "politics 
and money" problem are reported in wide-show. Media is working out its minus 
face to the regime. Although the amount of reports is lesser than the time of 
"Koizumi Theater", those reports in wide-show have worked out the minus face. 
In the past, it is the same no matter who become the leader of a party, nowadays 
party leader need to face the media and media reports has huge influence in both 
the flow of politics and voting rate. 
I: What triggers this change in role of media? 
K: I believe it is the introduction of single-member-district in 1994, as well as the 
increasing awareness of soft news and the increasing of political news in 
wide-show. 
I: I see. Thank you very much for your time. 
(End of script) 
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